First impressions matter: Signalling as a source of policy dynamics

We first establish that policymakers on the Bank of England's Monetary PolicyCommittee choose lower interest rates with experience. We then reject increasingconfidence in private information or learning about the structure of the macroeconomy as explanations for this shift. Instead, a model in which voters signal theirhawkishness to observers better fits the data. The motivation for signalling is consistent with wanting to control inflation expectations, but not career concerns orpleasing colleagues. There is also no evidence of capture by industry. The papersuggests that policy-motivated reputation building may be important for explainingdynamics in experts' policy choices.

What do outside experts bring to a committee? Evidence from the Bank of England

We test whether outside experts have information not available to insiders by usingthe voting record of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee. Memberswith more private information should vote more often against conventional wisdom,which we measure as the average belief of market economists about future interest rates. We find evidence that external members indeed have information notavailable to internals, but also use a quasi-natural experiment to show they mayexaggerate their expertise to obtain reappointment. This implies that an optimalcommittee, even outside monetary policy, should potentially include outsiders, butneeds to manage career concerns.

Estimating overidentified, nonrecursive, time-varying coefficients structural VARs

This paper provides a method to estimate time varying coefficients structuralVARs which are non-recursive and potentially overidentified. The procedureallows for linear and non-linear restrictions on the parameters, maintainsthe multi-move structure of standard algorithms and can be used toestimate structural models with different identification restrictions. We studythe transmission of monetary policy shocks and compare the results with thoseobtained with traditional methods.

The optimum quantity of money: Theory and evidence

In this paper we propose a simple and general model for computing the Ramsey optimal inflation tax, which includes several models from the previous literature as special cases. We show that it cannot be claimed that the Friedman rule is always optimal (or always non--optimal) on theoretical grounds. The Friedman rule is optimal or not, depending on conditions related to the shape of various relevant functions. One contribution of this paper is to relate these conditions to {\it measurable} variables such as the interest rate or the consumption elasticity of money demand. We find that it tends to be optimal to tax money when there are economies of scale in the demand for money (the scale elasticity is smaller than one) and/or when money is required for the payment of consumption or wage taxes. We find that it tends to be optimal to tax money more heavily when the interest elasticity of money demand is small. We present empirical evidence on the parameters that determine the optimal inflation tax. Calibrating the model to a variety of empirical studies yields a optimal nominal interest rate of less than 1\%/year, although that finding is sensitive to the calibration.

Real wage rigidities and the new Keynesian model

Most central banks perceive a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the gap between output and desired output. However, the standard new Keynesian framework implies no such trade-off. In that framework, stabilizing inflation is equivalent to stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap. In this paper, we argue that this property of the new Keynesian framework, which we call the divine coincidence, is due to a special feature of the model: the absence of non trivial real imperfections.We focus on one such real imperfection, namely, real wage rigidities. When the baseline new Keynesian model is extended to allow for real wage rigidities, the divine coincidence disappears, and central banks indeed face a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap. We show that not only does the extended model have more realistic normative implications, but it also has appealing positive properties. In particular, it provides a natural interpretation for the dynamic inflation-unemployment relation found in the data.

Strategic delegation in monetary unions

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.

Corporate finance and the monetary transmission mechanism

This paper analyzes the transmission mechanisms of monetarypolicy in a general equilibrium model of securities marketsand banking with asymmetric information. Banks' optimal asset/liability policy is such that in equilibrium capital adequacy constraints are always binding. Asymmetric information about banks' net worth adds a cost to outside equity capital, which limits the extent to which banks can relax their capital constraint. In this context monetarypolicy does not affect bank lending through changes in bank liquidity. Rather, it has the effect of changing theaggregate composition of financing by firms. The model also produces multiple equilibria, one of which displays all the features of a "credit crunch". Thus, monetary policy can also have large effects when it induces a shift from one equilibrium to the other.

Immune responses to airborne fungi and non-invasive airway diseases.

Inhalation of fungal particles is a ubiquitous way of exposure to microorganisms during human life; however, this exposure may promote or exacerbate respiratory diseases only in particular exposure conditions and human genetic background. Depending on the fungal species and form, fungal particles can induce symptoms in the lung by acting as irritants, aeroallergens or pathogens causing infection. Some thermophilic species can even act in all these three ways (e.g. Aspergillus, Penicillium), mesophilic species being only involved in allergic and/or non-allergic airway diseases (e.g. Cladosporium, Alternaria, Fusarium). The goal of the present review is to present the current knowledge on the interaction between airborne fungal particles and the host immune system, to illustrate the differences of immune sensing of different fungal species and to emphasise the importance of conducting research on non-conventional mesophilic fungal species. Indeed, the diversity of fungal species we inhale and the complexity of their composition have a direct impact on fungal particle recognition and immune system decision to tolerate or respond to those particles, eventually leading to collateral damages promoting airway pathologies.

De la mano de Keynes: "A tract on monetary reform"

En Tract on Monetary Reform, John Maynard Keynes propuso utilizar la base monetaria y el coeficiente de reserva bancaria como variables instrumentales d¿una política monetaria que había sido considerada hasta entonces innecesaria. En este trabajo se intenta desvelar las primeras contribuciones de Keynes al progreso del análisis económico

De la mano de Keynes: "A tract on monetary reform"

En Tract on Monetary Reform, John Maynard Keynes propuso utilizar la base monetaria y el coeficiente de reserva bancaria como variables instrumentales d¿una política monetaria que había sido considerada hasta entonces innecesaria. En este trabajo se intenta desvelar las primeras contribuciones de Keynes al progreso del análisis económico

Independent Central Banks: Low inflation at no cost?: A model with fiscal policy

In this article we extend the rational partisan model of Alesina and Gatti (1995) to include a second policy, fiscal policy, besides monetary policy. It is shown that, with this extension, the politically induced variance of output is not always eliminated nor reduced by delegating monetary policy to an independent and conservative central bank. Further, in flation and output stabilisation will be affected by the degree of conservativeness of the central bank and by the probability of the less in flation averse party gaining power. Keywords: rational partisan theory; fiscal policy; independent central bank JEL Classi fication: E58, E63.

Structural macro factors and the affine term structure of interest rates

This work consists of three essays investigating the ability of structural macroeconomic models to price zero coupon U.S. government bonds. 1. A small scale 3 factor DSGE model implying constant term premium is able to provide reasonable a fit for the term structure only at the expense of the persistence parameters of the structural shocks. The test of the structural model against one that has constant but unrestricted prices of risk parameters shows that the exogenous prices of risk-model is only weakly preferred. We provide an MLE based variance-covariance matrix of the Metropolis Proposal Density that improves convergence speeds in MCMC chains. 2. Affine in observable macro-variables, prices of risk specification is excessively flexible and provides term-structure fit without significantly altering the structural parameters. The exogenous component of the SDF is separating the macro part of the model from the term structure and the good term structure fit has as a driving force an extremely volatile SDF and an implied average short rate that is inexplicable. We conclude that the no arbitrage restrictions do not suffice to temper the SDF, thus there is need for more restrictions. We introduce a penalty-function methodology that proves useful in showing that affine prices of risk specifications are able to reconcile stable macro-dynamics with good term structure fit and a plausible SDF. 3. The level factor is reproduced most importantly by the preference shock to which it is strongly and positively related but technology and monetary shocks, with negative loadings, are also contributing to its replication. The slope factor is only related to the monetary policy shocks and it is poorly explained. We find that there are gains in in- and out-of-sample forecast of consumption and inflation if term structure information is used in a time varying hybrid prices of risk setting. In-sample yield forecast are better in models with non-stationary shocks for the period 1982-1988. After this period, time varying market price of risk models provide better in-sample forecasts. For the period 2005-2008, out of sample forecast of consumption and inflation are better if term structure information is incorporated in the DSGE model but yields are better forecasted by a pure macro DSGE model.

Fiscal sustainability and fiscal shocks in a dollarized and oil-exporting country: Ecuador

This paper investigates the fiscal sustainability of an emerging, dollarized, oil-exporting country: Ecuador. A cointegrated VAR approach is adopted in testing, first, if the intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied in Ecuador and, second, in identifying the permanent and transitory shocks that affect a fiscal policy characterized by inertia and a heavy dependence on oil revenues. Following confirmation that the debt-GDP ratio does not place the Ecuadorian budget under any pressure, we reformulate the model and identify two forces that push the fiscal system out of equilibrium, namely, economic activity and oil revenues implemented in the government budget. We argue that Ecuador needs to recover control of its monetary policy and to promote the diversification of its economy in order that non-oil tax revenues can replace oil revenues as a pushing force. Finally, we calculate quarterly elasticities of tax revenues with respect to Ecuador’s GDP and that of eight Eurozone countries. We illustrate graphically how the Eurozone countries with low positive or high negative elasticities’ levels suffer debt problems after the crisis. This finding emphasizes the pressing need for Ecuador to strengthen the connection between its tax revenues and output, and also suggests that the convergence of these elasticities in the Eurozone might contribute to the success of an eventually future fiscal union.

Testing the FTPL across government tiers

Control on regional government budgets is important in a monetary union as lower tiers of government have fewer incentives to consolidate debt. According to the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level; unsustainable non-Ricardian fiscal policies eventually force monetary policy to adjust. Hence, uncoordinated and non-regulated regional fiscal policies would therefore threaten price stability for the monetary union as a whole. However, the union central bank is not without defense. A federal government that internalises the spillover effect of non-Ricardian fiscal policies on the price level can offset non-Ricardian regional fiscal policies. A federal government, which taxes and transfers resources between regions, may compensate for unsustainable regional fiscal policies so as to keep fiscal policy Ricardian on aggregate. Following Canzoneri et al. (2001), we test the validity of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level for both federal and regional governments in Germany. We find evidence of a spillover effect of unsustainable policies on the price level for other Länder. However, the German federal government offsets this effect on the price level by running Ricardian policies. These results have implications for the regulation of fiscal policies in the EMU.

Estimating the effects of fiscal policy under the budget constraint

I reconsider the short-term effects of fiscal policy when both government spending and taxes are allowed to respond to the level of public debt. I embed the long-term government budget constraint in a VAR, and apply this common trends model to US quarterly data. The results overturn some widely held beliefs on fiscal policy effects. The main finding is that expansionary fiscal policy has contractionary effects on output and inflation. Ricardian effects may dominate when fiscal expansions are expected to be adjusted by future tax rises or spending cuts. The evidence supports RBC models with distortionary taxation. We can discard some alternative interpretations that are based on monetary policy reactions or supply-side effects.