Access Update, August 2009

Monthly newsletter for the Iowa Department of Public Health

Access Update, October 2009

Monthly newsletter for the Iowa Department of Public Health

Access Update, December 2009

Monthly newsletter for the Iowa Department of Public Health

Access Update, February 2010

Monthly newsletter for the Iowa Department of Public Health

Access Update, April 2010

Monthly newsletter for the Iowa Department of Public Health

Access Update, June 2010

Monthly newsletter for the Iowa Department of Public Health

Access Update, August 2010

Monthly newsletter for the Iowa Department of Public Health

Access Update, October 2010

Monthly newsletter for the Iowa Department of Public Health

Access Update, December 2010

Monthly newsletter for the Iowa Department of Public Health

Access Update, February 2011

Monthly newsletter for the Iowa Department of Public Health

Access Update, April 2011

Monthly newsletter for the Iowa Department of Public Health

Time consistent Pareto solutions in common access resource gameswith asymmetric players

In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.

Access by Capacity and Peak-Load Pricing

Several European telecommunications regulatory agencies have recently introduced a fixed capacity charge (flat rate) to regulate access to the incumbent's network. The purpose of this paper is to show that the optimal capacity charge and the optimal access-minute charge analysed by Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers (1996) have a similar structure and imply the same payment for the entrant. I extend the analysis tothe case where there is a competitor with market power. In this case, the optimalcapacity charge should be modified to avoid that the entrant cream-skims the market,fixing a longer or a shorter peak period than the optimal. Finally, I consider a multiproduct setting, where the effect of the product differentiation is exacerbated.

Access Update, June 2011

Monthly newsletter for the Iowa Department of Public Health