Parliamentarians and corruption in Africa: the challenge of leadership and the practice of politics

This report, compiled on behalf of the African Parliamentary Network Against Corruption (APNAC), surveys the attitudes of African parliamentarians toward corruption. It is the first study of its kind to investigate the manner in which corruption impacts directly upon the political behaviour, practices and attitudes of those elected members sitting in parliaments across the continent. If the problems of corruption are to be tackled in the African continent, then the role of elected members of legislative assemblies will surely be a crucial factor.

Does corruption matter for international entrepreneurship?

This study asks how key regulations influence nascent international entrepreneurship in countries with varying levels of corruption. Using regulatory capture theory and institutional theory, we hypothesize and test the effects of tax, export regulations, and corruption, on international entrepreneurship. We consider direct effects of these regulations as well as a possible moderating effect of corruption on nascent international entrepreneurship. Our findings indicate that the effect of regulations on international nascent entrepreneurship vary depending on types of regulation. Interestingly, we find that corruption plays a dual role, serving as both grease and sand for nascent international entrepreneurship. Corruption worsens the burden of regulations which have financial costs element. Another interesting finding is that corporate tax is not a significant deterrent factor for IE when corruption is low.

Taxes, corruption, and entry

Tax policies and corruption are important institutional considerations which can shape entrepreneurship. We investigate how tax rates, and the interaction between corruption and tax rates, influence variations in entry across a panel of 72 countries in the period 2005–2011. We use a series of panel estimations as well as several robustness checks to test these effects, using relevant controls for economic development, the size of the state, and other regulatory and tax policy measures. We find that higher tax rates consistently discourage entry. Further, we find that although the direct influence of corruption on entry is also consistently negative, the interaction influence of corruption and tax rate is positive. This indicates that corruption can offset the negative influence of high taxes on entry. We discuss the implications of our findings for policymakers and future research.

Wickedness, Governance and Collective Sanctions: : Can Corruption be Tamed?

Tackling a problem requires mostly, an ability to read it, conceptualize it, represent it, define it, and then applying the necessary mechanisms to solve it. This may sound self-evident except when the problem to be tackled happens to be “complex, “ “ill-structured,” and/or “wicked.” Corruption is one of those kinds of problems. Both in its global and national manifestations it is ill-structured. Where it is structural in nature, endemic and pervasive, it is perhaps even wicked. Qualities of the kind impose modest expectations regarding possibilities of any definitive solution to this insidious phenomenon. If so, it may not suffice to address the problem of corruption using existing categories of law and/or good governance, which overlook the “long-term memory” of the collective and cultural specific dimensions of the subject. Such socio-historical conditions require focusing on the interactive and self-reproducing networks of corruption and attempting to ‘subvert’ that phenomenon’s entire matrix. Concepts such as collective responsibility, collective punishment and sanctions are introduced as relevant categories in the structural, as well as behavioral, subversion of some of the most prevalent aspects of corruption. These concepts may help in the evolving of a new perspective on corruption fighting strategies.

Corruption, governance and collective sanctions: : can a wicked problem be tamed?

Tackling a problem requires mostly, an ability to read it, conceptualize it, represent it, define it, and then applying the necessary mechanisms to solve it. This may sound self-evident except when the problem to be tackled happens to be “complex, “ “ill-structured,” and/or “wicked.” Corruption is one of those kinds of problems. Both in its global and national manifestations it is ill-structured. Where it is structural in nature, endemic and pervasive, it is perhaps even wicked. Qualities of the kind impose modest expectations regarding possibilities of any definitive solution to this insidious phenomenon. If so, it may not suffice to address the problem of corruption using existing categories of law and/or good governance, which overlook the “long-term memory” of the collective and cultural specific dimensions of the subject. Such socio-historical conditions require focusing on the interactive and self-reproducing networks of corruption and attempting to ‘subvert’ that phenomenon’s entire matrix. Concepts such as collective responsibility, collective punishment and sanctions are introduced as relevant categories in the structural, as well as behavioral, subversion of some of the most prevalent aspects of corruption. These concepts may help in the evolving of a new perspective on corruption fighting strategies.

How does corruption hurt growth? Evidences about the effects of corruption on factors productivity and per capita income

Corruption is a phenomenon that plagues many countries and, mostly, walks hand in hand with inefficient institutional structures, which reduce the effectiveness of public and private investment. In countries with widespread corruption, for each monetary unit invested, a sizable share is wasted, implying less investment. Corruption can also be a burden on a nation’s wealth and economic growth, by driving away new investment and creating uncertainties regarding private and social rights. Thus, corruption can affect not only factors productivity, but also their accumulation, with detrimental consequences on a society’s social development. This article aims to analyze and measure the influence of corruption on a country’s wealth. It is implicitly admitted that the degree of institutional development has an adverse effect on the productivity of production factors, which implies in reduced per capita income. It is assumed that the level of wealth and economic growth depends on domestic savings, foster technological progress and a proper educational system. Corruption, within this framework, is not unlike an additional cost, which stifles the “effectiveness” of the investment. This article first discusses the key theories evaluating corruption’s economic consequences. Later, it analyzes the relation between institutional development, factor productivity and per capita income, based on the neoclassical approach to economic growth. Finally, it brings some empirical evidence regarding the effects of corruption on factor productivity, in a sample of 81 countries studied in 1998. The chief conclusion is that corruption negatively affects the wealth of a nation by reducing capital productivity, or its effectiveness.

Financial regulation and international criminal policy: the anti-money laundering system in Brazil and Argentina

The objective of this paper is to present and compare the process and the results of the implementation of the anti-money laundering system in Brazil and Argentina. Considering that the internal transformations cannot be discussed without a clear understanding of the international apparatus, attention will be given to the description of the “international policy” designed and conducted by FATF. Therefore, its incorporation into two different national realities, the Brazilian and the Argentinean ones, will shed light not only on the transnational transformations both States underwent but also on the anti-money laundering regime itself. The paper is divided into five parts. The first one presents a brief introduction on the emergence and development of the relationship between financial regulation and criminal policy. The two following sections are designed to present an overview of the anti money laundering system in Brazil and Argentina and of the role of FATF in their implementation process. The fourth section presents two Brazilian examples of situations in which full advantage of the FATF regime was taken: the National Strategy to Combat Corruption and Money Laundering and the BacenJud, a communication channel between the financial system and the judicial power. To conclude, final comments will be presented in connection with the central questions of the project this paper is part of .

A Defesa Judicial do Estado Brasileiro nas Varas Federais

There is no information whatsoever of a society in which there are no demands among private people and companies, among individuals and institutions, varying only the tenor and the intensity of the issues. It would be ideal if conflicts could be solved in common aggreement. The selfcomposition, yet, does not often occurr; leaving the remaining issues for a third part, i.e., the State. Up to the English and French Revolutions, political power was exercised by limitless governors and the State did not submit to the law. After those revolutions, rules are agregated to curb Absolutism and organize the State, which starts to acccomplish its duties under the law, i.e., a Law State. As a result, today, the individual can sue the State to make the State perform or not any undesirable action. In this dissertation, one traces back from the very beginning the role of the institutions in charge of defending the State in courts of law. The judicial defense of the Brazilian State in a court of law, since 1608 to the 1988 Constitution, was a role of the Public Ministry, along with other institutional functions, including prosecution. As a consequence of this ambivalence, the results of the State defense came even to be contradictory. The promulgation of the 1988 Federal Constitution adjusted this historical dualism. The 1988 Constituent embodied significant change to the concept and operationalization of a State Advocacy, confering to a new institution , which was called 'Advocacia Geral da União' or 'General Advocacy of the Union' (article 131), the judicial and extrajudicial representation of the Union. The final object of the reflections of this study is centred on the analysis of the activities of the 'General Advocacy of the Union', in its first years of functioning, in other words, from 1993 to 1999

Terceirização: exercício de atividades de representação judicial e de consultoria jurídica nos municípios paulistas

Constitui objetivo específico desta investigação verificar como, na prática, se desenvolvem as atividades de representação judicial e de consultoria jurídica dos municípios dentro do estado de São Paulo.