City of Wapello, Independent Auditor's Reports, Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings and Questioned Costs, June 30, 2006

City Audit Report

Procedures’ costs related to outpatient chemotherapy treatment of women suffering from breast cancer

To identify the direct cost of procedures related to an outpatient chemotherapy treatment for women with breast cancer. Method: This is a quantitative research, using the case study methodology, performed in an outpatient chemotherapy of a private hospital. The total cost was calculated by multiplying the time spent by professionals involved in therapeutic procedures, the unit cost of direct labor, adding to the cost of materials, drugs and solutions. For performing the calculations, we used the Brazilian currency (R$). Results: The average total cost per chemotherapy session corresponded to R$ 1,783.01 (100%), being R$ 1,671.66 (93,75%) spent with drugs, R$ 74,98 (4.21%) with materials, R$ 28.49 (1.60%) with labor and R$ 7.88 (0.44%) with solutions. Conclusion: The results may support discussions and decision making for the management of costs related to chemotherapy aimed at reducing expenses and eliminating waste without harm to the care provided. 


Intra-Industry Trade, Multilateral Trade Integration, and Invasive Species Risk, December 2006

We analyze the linkage between protectionism and invasive species (IS) hazard in the context of two-way trade and multilateral trade integration, two major features of real-world agricultural trade. Multilateral integration includes the joint reduction of tariffs and trade costs among trading partners. Multilateral trade integration is more likely to increase damages from IS than predicted by unilateral trade opening under the classic Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) framework because domestic production (the base susceptible to damages) is likely to increase with expanding export markets. A country integrating its trade with a partner characterized by relatively higher tariff and trade costs is also more likely to experience increased IS damages via expanded domestic production for the same reason. We illustrate our analytical results with a stylized model of the world wheat market.

Costs of reusable and disposable aprons in a public teaching hospital

Objective To analyze the direct cost of reusable and disposable aprons in a public teaching hospital. Method Cross-sectional study of quantitative approach, focusing on the direct cost of reusable and disposable aprons at a teaching hospital in northern Paraná. The study population consisted of secondary data collected in reports of the cost of services, laundry, materials and supplies division of the institution for the year 2012 Results We identified a lower average cost of using disposable apron when compared to the reusable apron. The direct cost of reusable apron was R$ 3.06, and the steps of preparation and washing were mainly responsible for the high cost, and disposable apron cost was R$ 0.94. Conclusion The results presented are important for hospital managers properly allocate resources and manage costs in hospitals
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City of Johnston, Independent Auditor's Reports, Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings and Questioned Costs, June 30, 2006

City Audit Report

Perry Community School District, Independent Auditor's Reports, Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings and Questioned Costs, June 30, 2006

Community School District Audit Report

Report on Impacts and Costs of the Iowa Low-Income Weatherization Program, 2005

This report summarizes state and utility low-income weatherization program activity for households weatherized to completion during calendar year 2001. The report includes state, utility, and agency summaries of calendar year 2001 spending and impacts by measure, end-use, and fuel.

Report on Impacts and Costs of the Iowa Low-Income Weatherization Program, 2001

This report summarizes state and utility low-income weatherization program activity for households weatherized to completion during calendar year 2001. The report includes state, utility, and agency summaries of calendar year 2001 spending and impacts by measure, end-use, and fuel.

Report on Impacts and Costs of the Iowa Low-Income Weatherization Program, 2002

This report summarizes state and utility low-income weatherization program activity for households weatherized to completion during calendar year 2001. The report includes state, utility, and agency summaries of calendar year 2001 spending and impacts by measure, end-use, and fuel.

Report on Impacts and Costs of the Iowa Low-Income Weatherization Program, 2003

This report summarizes state and utility low-income weatherization program activity for households weatherized to completion during calendar year 2001. The report includes state, utility, and agency summaries of calendar year 2001 spending and impacts by measure, end-use, and fuel.

Report on Impacts and Costs of the Iowa Low-Income Weatherization Program, 2004

This report summarizes state and utility low-income weatherization program activity for households weatherized to completion during calendar year 2001. The report includes state, utility, and agency summaries of calendar year 2001 spending and impacts by measure, end-use, and fuel.

The credit ratings game

The spectacular failure of top-rated structured finance products has broughtrenewed attention to the conflicts of interest of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs). We modelboth the CRA conflict of understating credit risk to attract more business, and the issuerconflict of purchasing only the most favorable ratings (issuer shopping), and examine theeffectiveness of a number of proposed regulatory solutions of CRAs. We find that CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings when there is a larger fraction of naive investors in the marketwho take ratings at face value, or when CRA expected reputation costs are lower. To theextent that in booms the fraction of naive investors is higher, and the reputation risk forCRAs of getting caught understating credit risk is lower, our model predicts that CRAs aremore likely to understate credit risk in booms than in recessions. We also show that, due toissuer shopping, competition among CRAs in a duopoly is less efficient (conditional on thesame equilibrium CRA rating policy) than having a monopoly CRA, in terms of both totalex-ante surplus and investor surplus. Allowing tranching decreases total surplus further.We argue that regulatory intervention requiring upfront payments for rating services (beforeCRAs propose a rating to the issuer) combined with mandatory disclosure of any ratingproduced by CRAs can substantially mitigate the con.icts of interest of both CRAs andissuers.

Beyond Smith's rule: An optimal dynamic index, rule for single machine stochastic scheduling with convex holding costs

Most research on single machine scheduling has assumedthe linearity of job holding costs, which is arguablynot appropriate in some applications. This motivates ourstudy of a model for scheduling $n$ classes of stochasticjobs on a single machine, with the objective of minimizingthe total expected holding cost (discounted or undiscounted). We allow general holding cost rates that are separable,nondecreasing and convex on the number of jobs in eachclass. We formulate the problem as a linear program overa certain greedoid polytope, and establish that it issolved optimally by a dynamic (priority) index rule,whichextends the classical Smith's rule (1956) for the linearcase. Unlike Smith's indices, defined for each class, ournew indices are defined for each extended class, consistingof a class and a number of jobs in that class, and yieldan optimal dynamic index rule: work at each time on a jobwhose current extended class has larger index. We furthershow that the indices possess a decomposition property,as they are computed separately for each class, andinterpret them in economic terms as marginal expected cost rate reductions per unit of expected processing time.We establish the results by deploying a methodology recentlyintroduced by us [J. Niño-Mora (1999). "Restless bandits,partial conservation laws, and indexability. "Forthcomingin Advances in Applied Probability Vol. 33 No. 1, 2001],based on the satisfaction by performance measures of partialconservation laws (PCL) (which extend the generalizedconservation laws of Bertsimas and Niño-Mora (1996)):PCL provide a polyhedral framework for establishing theoptimality of index policies with special structure inscheduling problems under admissible objectives, which weapply to the model of concern.

Money doctors

We present a new model of money management, in which investors delegate portfolio management to professionals based not only on performance, but also on trust. Trust in the manager reduces an investor's perception of the riskiness of a given investment, and allows managers to charge higher fees to investors who trust them more. Money managers compete for investor funds by setting their fees, but because of trust the fees do not fall to costs. In the model, 1) managers consistently underperform the market net of fees but investors still prefer to delegate money management to taking risk on their own, 2) fees involve sharing of expected returns between managers and investors, with higher fees in riskier products, 3) managers pander to investors when investors exhibit biases in their beliefs, and do not correct misperceptions, and 4) despite long run benefits from better performance, the profits from pandering to trusting investors discourage managers from pursuing contrarian strategies relative to the case with no trust. We show how trust-mediated money management renders arbitrage less effective, and may help destabilize financial markets.

Determinants of organizational form: Transaction costs and institutions in the European trucking industry

We explain why European trucking carriers are much smaller and rely more heavily on owner-operators(as opposed to employee drivers) than their US counterparts. Our analysis begins by ruling outdifferences in technology as the source of those disparities and confirms that standard hypothesesin organizational economics, which have been shown to explain the choice of organizational form inUS industry, also apply in Europe. We then argue that the preference for subcontracting oververtical integration in Europe is the result of European institutions particularly, labor regulationand tax laws that increase the costs of vertical integration.