688 resultados para Insurance, Disability
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There is a controversial debate about the effects of permanent disability benefits on labormarket behavior. In this paper we estimate equations for deserving and receiving disabilitybenefits to evaluate the award error as the difference in the probability of receiving anddeserving using survey data from Spain. Our results indicate that individuals aged between55 and 59, self-employers or working in an agricultural sector have a probability of receiving a benefit without deserving it significantly higher than the rest of individuals. We also find evidence of gender discrimination since male have a significantly higher probability of receiving a benefit without deserving it. This seems to confirm that disability benefits are being used as an instrument for exiting the labor market for some individuals approaching the early retirement or those who do not have right to retire early. Taking into account that awarding process depends on Social Security Provincial Department, this means that some departments are applying loosely the disability requirements for granting disability benefits.
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Medicare Deductible, co-insurance and premiuns form, and rescription drugs plans.
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An important policy issue in recent years concerns the number of people claimingdisability benefits for reasons of incapacity for work. We distinguish between workdisability , which may have its roots in economic and social circumstances, and healthdisability which arises from clear diagnosed medical conditions. Although there is a linkbetween work and health disability, economic conditions, and in particular the businesscycle and variations in the risk of unemployment over time and across localities, mayplay an important part in explaining both the stock of disability benefit claimants andinflows to and outflow from that stock. We employ a variety of cross?country andcountry?specific household panel data sets, as well as administrative data, to testwhether disability benefit claims rise when unemployment is higher, and also toinvestigate the impact of unemployment rates on flows on and off the benefit rolls. Wefind strong evidence that local variations in unemployment have an importantexplanatory role for disability benefit receipt, with higher total enrolments, loweroutflows from rolls and, often, higher inflows into disability rolls in regions and periodsof above?average unemployment. Although general subjective measures of selfreporteddisability and longstanding illness are also positively associated withunemployment rates, inclusion of self?reported health measures does not eliminate thestatistical relationship between unemployment rates and disability benefit receipt;indeed including general measures of health often strengthens that underlyingrelationship. Intriguingly, we also find some evidence from the United Kingdom and theUnited States that the prevalence of self?reported objective specific indicators ofdisability are often pro?cyclical that is, the incidence of specific forms of disability arepro?cyclical whereas claims for disability benefits given specific health conditions arecounter?cyclical. Overall, the analysis suggests that, for a range of countries and datasets, levels of claims for disability benefits are not simply related to changes in theincidence of health disability in the population and are strongly influenced by prevailingeconomic conditions. We discuss the policy implications of these various findings.
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Audit report on the Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust for the year ended June 30, 2007
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This paper extends previous resuls on optimal insurance trading in the presence of a stock market that allows continuous asset trading and substantial personal heterogeneity, and applies those results in a context of asymmetric informationwith references to the role of genetic testing in insurance markets.We find a novel and surprising result under symmetric information:agents may optimally prefer to purchase full insurance despitethe presence of unfairly priced insurance contracts, and other assets which are correlated with insurance.Asymmetric information has a Hirschleifer-type effect whichcan be solved by suspending insurance trading. Nevertheless,agents can attain their first best allocations, which suggeststhat the practice of restricting insurance not to be contingenton genetic tests can be efficient.
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Aims: To provide 12-month prevalence and disability burden estimates of a broad range of mental and neurological disorders in the European Union (EU) and to compare these findings to previous estimates. Referring to our previous 2005 review, improved up-to-date data for the enlarged EU on a broader range of disorders than previously covered are needed for basic, clinical and public health research and policy decisions and to inform about the estimated number of persons affected in the EU. Method: Stepwise multi-method approach, consisting of systematic literature reviews, reanalyses of existing data sets, national surveys and expert consultations. Studies and data from all member states of the European Union (EU-27) plus Switzerland, Iceland and Norway were included. Supplementary information about neurological disorders is provided, although methodological constraints prohibited the derivation of overall prevalence estimates for mental and neurological disorders. Disease burden was measured by disability adjusted life years (DALY). Results: Prevalence: It is estimated that each year 38.2% of the EU population suffers from a mental disorder. Adjusted for age and comorbidity, this corresponds to 164.8 million persons affected. Compared to 2005 (27.4%) this higher estimate is entirely due to the inclusion of 14 new disorders also covering childhood/adolescence as well as the elderly. The estimated higher number of persons affected (2011: 165 m vs. 2005: 82 m) is due to coverage of childhood and old age populations, new disorders and of new EU membership states. The most frequent disorders are anxiety disorders (14.0%), insomnia (7.0%), major depression (6.9%), somatoform (6.3%), alcohol and drug dependence (>4%), ADHD (5%) in the young, and dementia (1-30%, depending on age). Except for substance use disorders and mental retardation, there were no substantial cultural or country variations. Although many sources, including national health insurance programs, reveal increases in sick leave, early retirement and treatment rates due to mental disorders, rates in the community have not increased with a few exceptions (i.e. dementia). There were also no consistent indications of improvements with regard to low treatment rates, delayed treatment provision and grossly inadequate treatment. Disability: Disorders of the brain and mental disorders in particular, contribute 26.6% of the total all cause burden, thus a greater proportion as compared to other regions of the world. The rank order of the most disabling diseases differs markedly by gender and age group; overall, the four most disabling single conditions were: depression, dementias, alcohol use disorders and stroke. Conclusion: In every year over a third of the total EU population suffers from mental disorders. The true size of "disorders of the brain" including neurological disorders is even considerably larger. Disorders of the brain are the largest contributor to the all cause morbidity burden as measured by DALY in the EU. No indications for increasing overall rates of mental disorders were found nor of improved care and treatment since 2005; less than one third of all cases receive any treatment, suggesting a considerable level of unmet needs. We conclude that the true size and burden of disorders of the brain in the EU was significantly underestimated in the past.Concerted priority action is needed at all levels, including substantially increased funding for basic, clinical and public health research in order to identify better strategies for improved prevention and treatment for isorders of the brain as the core health challenge of the 21st century. (C) 2011 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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We construct and calibrate a general equilibrium business cycle model with unemployment and precautionary saving. We compute the cost of business cycles and locate the optimum in a set of simple cyclical fiscal policies. Our economy exhibits productivity shocks, giving firms an incentive to hire more when productivity is high. However, business cycles make workers' income riskier, both by increasing the unconditional probability of unusuallylong unemployment spells, and by making wages more variable, and therefore they decrease social welfare by around one-fourth or one-third of 1% of consumption. Optimal fiscal policy offsets the cycle, holding unemployment benefits constant but varying the tax rate procyclically to smooth hiring. By running a deficit of 4% to 5% of output in recessions, the government eliminates half the variation in the unemployment rate, most of the variation in workers'aggregate consumption, and most of the welfare cost of business cycles.
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There are two fundamental puzzles about trade credit: why does it appearto be so expensive,and why do input suppliers engage in the business oflending money? This paper addresses and answers both questions analysingthe interaction between the financial and the industrial aspects of thesupplier-customer relationship. It examines how, in a context of limitedenforceability of contracts, suppliers may have a comparative advantageover banks in lending to their customers because they hold the extrathreat of stopping the supply of intermediate goods. Suppliers may alsoact as lenders of last resort, providing insurance against liquidityshocks that may endanger the survival of their customers. The relativelyhigh implicit interest rates of trade credit result from the existenceof default and insurance premia. The implications of the model areexamined empirically using parametric and nonparametric techniques on apanel of UK firms.
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This paper theoretically and empirically documents a puzzle that arises when an RBC economy with a job matching function is used to model unemployment. The standard model can generate sufficiently large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment, or a sufficiently small response of unemployment to labor market policies, but it cannot do both. Variable search and separation, finite UI benefit duration, efficiency wages, and capital all fail to resolve this puzzle. However, either sticky wages or match-specific productivity shocks can improve the model's performance by making the firm's flow of surplus more procyclical, which makes hiring more procyclical too.
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This paper analyses whether or not tax subsidies to private medicalinsurance are self-financing by means of a structural approach. Weconstruct a simulation routine based on a microeconometric discretechoice model that allows us to evaluate the impact of premium changeson the utilisation of outpatient and inpatient health care services. Wesimulate the 1999 Spanish tax reform that abolished the tax deductionfor expenditures on private health insurance using a representativesample of the Catalan population. Prior to this reform, foregone taxrevenue arising from deductions after the purchase of private insuranceamounted to 69.2 M. per year. In contrast, the elimination of thesubsidies to private policies is estimated to generate an extra costfor the public sector of about 8.9 M. per year.
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We study the interaction between insurance and capital markets within singlebut general framework.We show that capital markets greatly enhance the risksharing capacity of insurance markets and the scope of risks that areinsurable because efficiency does not depend on the number of agents atrisk, nor on risks being independent, nor on the preferences and endowmentsof agents at risk being the same. We show that agents share risks by buyingfull coverage for their individual risks and provide insurance capitalthrough stock markets.We show that aggregate risk enters private insuranceas positive loading on insurance prices and despite that agents will buyfull coverage. The loading is determined by the risk premium of investorsin the stock market and hence does not depend on the agent s willingnessto pay. Agents provide insurance capital by trading an equally weightedportfolio of insurance company shares and riskless asset. We are able toconstruct agents optimal trading strategies explicitly and for verygeneral preferences.
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In this paper, we incorporate a positive theory of unemployment insuranceinto a dynamic overlapping generations model with search-matching frictionsand on-the-job learning-by-doing. The model shows that societies populatedby identical rational agents, but differing in the initial distributionof human capital across agents, may choose very different unemploymentinsurance levels in a politico-economic equilibrium. The interactionbetween the political decision about the level of the unemployment insuranceand the optimal search behavior of the unemployed gives rise to aself-reinforcing mechanism whichmay generate multiple steady-stateequilibria. In particular, a European-type steady-state with highunemployment, low employment turnover and high insurance can co-exist withan American-type steady-state with low unemployment, high employment turnoverand low unemployment insurance. A calibrated version of the model featurestwo distinct steady-state equilibria with unemployment levels and durationrates resembling those of the U.S. and Europe, respectively.
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This paper studies the effects of uncertain lifetime on capitalaccumulation and growth and also the sensitivity of thoseeffects to the existence of a perfect annuities market. Themodel is an overlapping generations model with uncertainlifetimes. The technology is convex and such that the marginalproduct of capital is bounded away from zero. A contribution ofthis paper is to show that the existence of accidental bequestsmay lead the economy to an equilibrium that exhibits asymptoticgrowth, which is impossible in an economy with a perfect annuitiesmarket or with certain lifetimes. This paper also shows that ifindividuals face a positive probability of surviving in everyperiod, they may be willing to save at any age. This effect ofuncertain lifetime on savings may also lead the economy to anequilibrium exhibiting asymptotic growth even if there exists aperfect annuities market.
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We analyze a mutual fire insurance mechanism usedin Andorra, which is called La Crema in the locallanguage. This mechanism relies on households'announced property values to determine how much ahousehold is reimbursed in the case of a fire andhow payments are apportioned among other households.The only Pareto eficient allocation reachablethrough the mechanism requires that all householdshonestly report the true value of their property.However, such honest reporting is not an equilibriumexcept in the extreme case where the property valuesare identical for all households. Nevertheless, as the size of the society becomes large, thebenefits from deviating from truthful reportingvanish, and all of the non-degenerate equilibriaof the mechanism are nearly truthful andapproximately Pareto efficient.