Why Do Firms Pay Dividends?: Evidence from an Early and Unregulated Capital Market

Why do firms pay dividends? To answer this question, we use a hand-collected data set of companies traded on the London stock market between 1825 and 1870. As tax rates were effectively zero, the capital market was unregulated, and there were no institutional stockholders, we can rule out these potential determinants ex ante. We find that, even though they were legal, share repurchases were not used by firms to return cash to shareholders. Instead, our evidence provides support for the information–communication explanation for dividends, while providing little support for agency, illiquidity, catering, or behavioral explanations. © The Authors 2013. Published by Oxford University Press [on behalf of the European Finance Association]. All rights reserved.

Workplace determinants of social capital:cross-sectional and longitudinal evidence from a finnish cohort study

To examine which contextual features of the workplace are associated with social capital.

Outward foreign direct investment and human capital development:A small country perspective

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine the pattern of outward foreign direct investment (FDI) by Irish MNCs, and more specifically, to investigate their approach to human capital development and how these correspond to foreign MNCs in Ireland. In particular, it seeks to investigate training and development expenditure, adoption of succession planning, use of formal development programmes for senior management "potential", and also the presence of a specific "key group" development programme. Design/methodology/approach - Data were obtained through the largest, most representative study ever conducted on multinational companies (MNCs) in Ireland. The most senior human resources practitioner in these firms completed a questionnaire, through the personal interview medium, on various facets of their human resource management (HRM) practices. In total 260 usable interviews were completed equating to an overall response rate of 63 per cent. This represents a 78 per cent response rate for Irish MNCs, the primary focus of this paper, and 60 per cent for foreign MNCs. Findings - Overall, Irish MNCs tend to compare favourably with their foreign counterparts in terms of the human capital development mechanisms examined. Only one statistically significant association was found regarding differences between Irish and foreign owned MNCs, Irish MNCs were found to be significantly less likely to have formal management development programmes. Originality/value - The study is the first large scale, representative survey to be conducted on MNCs in Ireland helping to address the research lacuna on Irish owned MNCs. © Emerald Group Publishing Limited.

Accuracy of shoulder joint and subacromial injections in cadavers.

OBJECTIVE:

"Blind" shoulder injections are often inaccurate and infiltrate untargeted structures. We tested a hypothesis that optimizing certain anatomical and positional factors would improve accuracy and reduce dispersal.

METHODS:

We evaluated one subacromial and one glenohumeral injection technique on cadavers.

RESULTS:

Mean accuracy was 91% for subacromial-targeted and 74 and 91% (worst- and best-case scenarios) for joint-targeted injections. Mean dispersal was 19% for subacromial-targeted and 16% for joint-targeted injections. All results bettered those reported previously.

CONCLUSION:

These "optimized" techniques might improve accuracy and limit dispersal of blind shoulder injections in clinical situations, benefiting efficacy and safety. However, evaluation is required in a clinical setting.

Structural Capital of University Spin-Out Firms: The Moderating Role of University Incubators

University incubators (UI) are generally believed to be important in the successful commercialisation of university spin-outs (USO) with over half of all UK Universities having established an on-campus UI. In this chapter we examine the value of UIs in the spin-out process, focusing on the structural networks of USOs located in a UI as compared to USOs in a University with no access to a UI. Our primary research question is therefore: to what extent does the structural network of USOs with access to an on-campus UI differ from USOs without? The research therefore con-tributes to a growing critique of the effectiveness of UIs in commercialis-ing academic research and the recognition of positive direct and indirect externalities from participation in networks. Through network mapping of all USOs from two research intensive universities, we profile and ana-lyse the formal and informal network ties of USOs to various partners in-ternal and external to the host university. Through interviews we also consider how these networks enhance the resources and capabilities of USOs. Our findings highlight significant differences, with USOs located in a UI having more informal but fewer formal ties, both to other USOs as well as within the host University. In contrast, location in an incuba-tor was not found to affect the extent and nature of ties with external or-ganisations. Reasons for these differences are examined through inter-views with the USOs and point to various factors including the proactive brokering role of incubator and university staff, university bureaucracy, the hidden networks of executive board members across USOs, university equity investment policy and complementary technologies.

Income ineqaulity from 1960-2012: a brief time-series history of capital and labour

This commentary examines two principal forms of inequality and their evolution since the 1960s: the division of national income between capital and labour, and the share of total income held by the top 1 per cent of earners. Trends are linked to current discussions of inequality drivers such as financialisation, and a brief time-series analysis of the effects of trade and financial sector growth on top incomes is presented.

Spiritual capital and democratization in Zimbabwe:A case study of a progressive charismatic congregation

Throughout Africa, charismatic Christianity has been caricatured as an inhibitor of democratization. Its adherents are said either to withdraw from the rough and tumble of politics ('pietism') or to preach a prosperity gospel that encourages believers to pour their resources into their churches in the hope that God will 'bless' them. Both courses of action are said to encourage such people to be politically quietist, with no interest in democratization or other forms of political activity. This is said to thwart democratization. This article utilizes an ethnographic case study of a 'progressive' charismatic congregation in Harare, Zimbabwe, in 2007, to provide evidence that 'pietism' and 'prosperity' are not the only options for charismatic Christianity. Drawing on the concept of 'spiritual capital', it argues that some varieties of charismatic Christianity have the resources to contribute to democratization. For example, this congregation's self-styled 'de-institutionalization' process is opening up new avenues for people to learn democratic skills and develop a worldview that is relationship-centred, participatory, and anti-authoritarian. The article concludes that spiritual capital can be a useful tool for analysing the role of religions in democratizations. It notes, however, that analysts should take care to identify and understand what variety of spiritual capital is generated in particular situations, focusing on the worldviews it produces and the consequences of those worldviews for democratization. © 2009 Taylor & Francis.

Holding Shareholders to Account: British Banking Stability and Contingent Capital

This chapter seeks to explain the relative stability of the British banking system in terms of its capital structure. From 1826 joint-stock banking was allowed, but shareholder liability was jointly and severally unlimited. Limited liability banks were allowed from 1857–8, but these banks issued partly paid shares with an obligation on shareholders to subscribe for uncalled capital. Contingent capital meant that shareholders and managers would suffer losses in the event of failure and this discouraged risk shifting at the expense of note-holders and depositors. Although individual banks collapsed, the failure rate of banks (in terms of number or capital) did not reach a critical level—10 per cent—beyond which the payments system might have been threatened. This chapter argues that agency problems and systemic risk rose after the abolition of contingent share capital in 1958 and the deregulation of the banking sector in the 1970s.