Transforming scientific information with everyday thinking: A social representations perspective

Cette thèse examine la circulation et l'intégration des informations scientifiques dans la pensée quotidienne d'après la théorie des représentations sociales (TRS). En tant qu'alternative aux approches traditionnelles de la communication de la science, les transformations survenant entre le discours scientifique et le discours de sens commun sont considérées comme adaptatives. Deux études sur la circulation des informations dans les media (études 1 et 2) montrent des variations dans les thèmes de discours exposés aux profanes, et parmi les discours de ceux-ci, en fonction de différentes sources. Ensuite, le processus d'ancrage dans le positionnement préalable envers la science est étudié, pour l'explication qu'il fournit de la réception et de la transmission d'informations scientifiques dans le sens commun. Les effets d'ancrage dans les attitudes et croyances préexistants sont reportés dans différents contextes de circulation des informations scientifiques (études 3 à 7), incluant des études de type corrélationnel, experimental et de terrain. Globalement, cette thèse procure des arguments en faveur de la pertinence de la TRS pour la recherche sur la communication de la science, et suggère des développements théoriques et méthodologiques pour ces deux domaines de recherche. Drawing on the social representations theory (SRT), this thesis examines the circulation and integration of scientific information into everyday thinking. As an alternative to the traditional approaches of science communication, it considers transformations between scientific and common-sense discourses as adaptive. Two studies, focused on the spreading of information into the media (Studies 1 and 2), show variations in the themes of discourses introduced to laypersons and in the themes among laypersons' discourses, according to different sources. Anchoring in prior positioning toward science is then studied for the explanation it provides on the reception and transmission of scientific information into common sense. Anchoring effects in prior attitudes and beliefs are reported in different contexts of circulation of scientific information (Studies 3 to 7) by using results from correlational, field, and experimental studies. Overall, this thesis provides arguments for the relevance of SRT in science communication research and suggests theoretical and methodological developments for both domains of research.

Optimism and commitment: An elementary theory of bargaining and war

We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders. Two parties play a Markov game that combines stages of bargaining with stages where one side has the ability to impose surrender on the other. Under uncertainty and incomplete information, in the unique equilibrium of the game, long confrontations occur: war arises when reality disappoints initial (rational) optimism, and it persist longer when both agents are optimists but reality proves both wrong. Bargaining proposals that are rejected initially might eventually be accepted after several periods of confrontation. We provide an explicit computation of the equilibrium, evaluating the probability of war, and its expected losses as a function of i) the costs of confrontation, ii) the asymmetry of the split imposed under surrender, and iii) the strengths of contenders at attack and defense. Changes in these parameters display non-monotonic effects.

Suppliers of Priors: A Theory of Retailing Inspired by the Market for Chinese Antiquities

Adverse selection may thwart trade between an informed seller, who knows the probability p that an item of antiquity is genuine, and an uninformed buyer, who does not know p. The buyer might not be wholly uninformed, however. Suppose he can perform a simple inspection, a test of his own: the probability that an item passes the test is g if the item is genuine, but only f < g if it is fake. Given that the buyer is no expert, his test may have little power: f may be close to g. Unfortunately, without much power, the buyer's test will not resolve the difficulty of adverse selection; gains from trade may remain unexploited. But now consider a "store", where the seller groups a number of items, perhaps all with the same quality, the same probability p of being genuine. (We show that in equilibrium the seller will choose to group items in this manner.) Now the buyer can conduct his test across a large sample, perhaps all, of a group of items in the seller's store. He can thereby assess the overall quality of these items; he can invert the aggregate of his test results to uncover the underlying p; he can form a "prior". There is thus no longer asymmetric information between seller and buyer: gains from trade can be exploited. This is our theory of retailing: by grouping items together - setting up a store - a seller is able to supply buyers with priors, as well as the items themselves. We show that the weaker the power of the buyer�s test (the closer f is to g), the greater the seller�s profit. So the seller has no incentive to assist the buyer � e.g., by performing her own tests on the items, or by cleaning them to reveal more about their true age. The paper ends with an analysis of which sellers should specialise in which qualities. We show that quality will be low in busy locations and high in expensive locations.

Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

Public sector rationing and private sector selection [paper accepted and forthcoming in Journal of Public Economic Theory]

We study the interaction between nonprice public rationing and prices in the private market. Under a limited budget, the public supplier uses a rationing policy. A private firm may supply the good to those consumers who are rationed by the public system. Consumers have different amounts of wealth, and costs of providing the good to them vary. We consider two regimes. First, the public supplier observes consumers' wealth information; second, the public supplier observes both wealth and cost information. The public supplier chooses a rationing policy, and, simultaneously, the private firm, observing only cost but not wealth information, chooses a pricing policy. In the first regime, there is a continuum of equilibria. The Pareto dominant equilibrium is a means-test equilibrium: poor consumers are supplied while rich consumers are rationed. Prices in the private market increase with the budget. In the second regime, there is a unique equilibrium. This exhibits a cost-effectiveness rationing rule; consumers are supplied if and only if their costbenefit ratios are low. Prices in the private market do not change with the budget. Equilibrium consumer utility is higher in the cost-effectiveness equilibrium than the means-test equilibrium [Authors]

From MuSIASEM theory to practice: report and reflections from field research in Kampot province, Cambodia

This document contains a report and summary of the field research activities in a rural community of rice farmers in Kampot province, Cambodia in 2011, which I conducted within the context of my PhD research at ICTA-UAB (Institute of Environmental Science and Technology, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain). The purpose of the field research was to gather data for a MuSIASEM analysis (Multi-Scale Integrated Analysis of Societal and Ecosystem Metabolism) at the village and household level, in order to analyze the multidimensional challenges that small farmers may face nowadays within the context of global rural change and declining access to land. While the literature on MuSIASEM offers a great variety of theoretical explanations and practical applications, there is little information available for students regarding the practical steps required for doing a MuSIASEM analysis at the local level. Within this context, this report offers not only a documentation of the field research design and data collection methods, but further provides a general overview on some organizational and preparative aspects, including some personal reflections, that one may face when preparing and conducting field research for MuSIASEM analysis. In summary, this document thus serves three objectives: (i) to assure methodological transparency for the future work, based on the collected data during field research, (ii) to share my personal experience on the preparative and practical steps required for field research and data collection for a MuSIASEM analysis at the local level, and (iii) to make available for the further interested reader some more detailed background information on the case study village.

Predictions from information-theoretical models of nonequilibrium radiation

The radiation distribution function used by Domínguez and Jou [Phys. Rev. E 51, 158 (1995)] has been recently modified by Domínguez-Cascante and Faraudo [Phys. Rev. E 54, 6933 (1996)]. However, in these studies neither distribution was written in terms of directly measurable quantities. Here a solution to this problem is presented, and we also propose an experiment that may make it possible to determine the distribution function of nonequilibrium radiation experimentally. The results derived do not depend on a specific distribution function for the matter content of the system

Man Made Black Holes and Big Bangs: Diffusion and Integration of Scientific Information into Everyday Thinking

Drawing on Social Representations Theory, this study investigates focalisation and anchoring during the diffusion of information concerning the Large Hadron Collider (LHC), the particle accelerator at the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN). We hypothesised that people focus on striking elements of the message, abandoning others, that the nature of the initial information affects diffusion of information, and that information is anchored in prior attitudes toward CERN and science. A serial reproduction experiment with two generations and four chains of reproduction diffusing controversial versus descriptive information about the LHC shows a reduction of information through generations, the persistence of terminology regarding the controversy and a decrease of other elements for participants exposed to polemical information. Concerning anchoring, positive attitudes toward CERN and science increase the use of expert terminology unrelated to the controversy. This research highlights the relevance of a social representational approach in the public understanding of science.

Interbank market integration under asymmetric information

We argue that the main barrier to an integrated international interbankmarket is the existence of asymmetric information between differentcountries, which may prevail in spite of monetary integration or successfulcurrency pegging. In order to address this issue, we study the scope forinternational interbank market integration with unsecured lending whencross-country information is noisy. We find not only that an equilibriumwith integrated markets need not always exist, but also that when it does,the integrated equilibrium may coexist with one of interbank marketsegmentation. Therefore, market deregulation, per se, does not guaranteethe emergence of an integrated interbank market. The effect of a repo marketwhich, a priori, was supposed to improve efficiency happens to be morecomplex: it reduces interest rate spreads and improves upon the segmentationequilibrium, but\ it may destroy the unsecured integrated equilibrium, sincethe repo market will attract the best borrowers. The introduction of othertransnational institutional arrangements, such as multinational banking,correspondent banking and the existence of "too-big-to-fail" banks mayreduce cross country interest spreads and provide more insurance againstcountry wide liquidity shocks. Still, multinational banking, as theintroduction of repos, may threaten the integrated interbank marketequilibrium.

Comparison of information structures

We introduce two ways of comparing information structures, say ${\cal I}$ and${\cal J}$. First we say that ${\cal I}$ is richer than ${\cal J}$ when forevery compact game $G$, all correlated equilibrium distributions of $G$ inducedby ${\cal J}$ are also induced by ${\cal I}$. Second, we say that ${\cal J}$is faithfully reproducable from ${\cal I}$ when all the players can computefrom their information in ${\cal I}$ ``new information'' that they could havereceived from ${\cal J}$. We prove that ${\cal I}$ is richer than ${\cal J}$if and only if ${\cal J}$ is faithfully reproducable from ${\cal I}$.

Optimal second-degree price discrimination and arbitrage: On the role of asymetric information among buyers

The traditional theory of monopolistic screening tackles individualself-selection but does not address the possibility that buyers couldform a coalition to coordinate their purchases and to reallocate thegoods. In this paper, we design the optimal sale mechanism which takesinto account both individual and coalition incentive compatibilityfocusing on the role of asymmetric information among buyers. We showthat when a coalition of buyers is formed under asymmetric information,the monopolist can do as well as when there is no coalition. Although inthe optimal sale mechanism marginal rates of substitution are notequalized across buyers (hence there exists room for arbitrage), theyfail to realize the gains from arbitrage because of the transaction costsin coalition formation generated by asymmetric information.

A Walrasian theory of commodity money: Paradoxical results

The objective of this note is to analyze some implications of the model of commodity money described in Banerjee and Maskin (1996) which may seem paradoxical. In order to do this, we incorporate a general production cost structure into the model. We focus on two different results. First, the existence of technologies that make counterfeiting a commodity more difficult may exclude it from being used as medium of exchange. Second, allocative distortions due to problems of asymmetric information may become larger in the presence of such technologies.

Institutional support of the firm: A theory of business registries

Registering originative business contracts allows entrepreneurs and creditors to choose, andcourts to enforce market-friendly contract rules that protect innocent third parties whenadjudicating disputes on subsequent contracts. This reduces information asymmetry for thirdparties, which enhances impersonal trade. It does so without seriously weakening property rights,because it is rightholders who choose or activate the legal rules and can, therefore, minimize thecost of any possible weakening. Registries are essential not only to make the chosen rules publicbut to ensure rightholders commitment and avoid rule-gaming, because independent registriesmake rightholders choices verifiable by courts. The theory is supported by comparative andhistorical analyses.

The growth and diffusion of knowlegde and the theory of the firm

We analyze the implications of a market imperfection related to the inability to establish intellectual property rights, that we label {\it unverifiable communication}. Employees are able to collude with external parties selling ``knowledge capital'' of the firm. The firm organizer engages in strategic interaction simultaneously with employees and competitors, as she introduces endogenous transaction costs in the market for information between those agents. Incentive schemes and communication costs are the key strategic variables used by the firm to induce frictions in collusive markets. Unverifiable communication introduces severe allocative distortions, both at internal product development and at intended sale of information (technology transfer). We derive implications of the model for observable decisions like characteristics of the employment relationship (full employment, incompatibility with other jobs), firms' preferences over cluster characteristics for location decisions, optimal size at entry, in--house development vs sale strategies for innovations and industry evolution.

Ignoring information in binary choice with continuous variables: When is less 'more'?

When can a single variable be more accurate in binary choice than multiple sources of information? We derive analytically the probability that a single variable (SV) will correctly predict one of two choices when both criterion and predictor are continuous variables. We further provide analogous derivations for multiple regression (MR) and equal weighting (EW) and specify the conditions under which the models differ in expected predictive ability. Key factors include variability in cue validities, intercorrelation between predictors, and the ratio of predictors to observations in MR. Theory and simulations are used to illustrate the differential effects of these factors. Results directly address why and when one-reason decision making can be more effective than analyses that use more information. We thus provide analytical backing to intriguing empirical results that, to date, have lacked theoretical justification. There are predictable conditions for which one should expect less to be more.