NAPIS Report YTD 1st Quarter-4th Quarter 2007

INAPIS Title III Client Service Unit Report - INAPIS (National Aging Program Information System) Service Unit Report collects and reports service/performance data and related program management information to the federal and state government. This report shows the number of older Iowans who receive services and the number of units by service category from Title III funding of the Older Americans Act, the Administration on Aging (AoA) and limited state general fund dollars. Additionally, it shows the number of persons served by individual services and total "unduplicated" client count across all services. In other words, if you add the total number of clients from all services it is higher than the actual number of persons served across all services, because some people need and receive more than one service. (Please note: this is preliminary data, and may be subject to change.)

Title III-E Report YTD 1st Quarter-4th Quarter 2007

Family Caregiver Support Program (Title III-E) - The Administration on Aging (AoA) has determined that for Title III-E, the actual family caregiver is the client, not the older person receiving the services. Iowa NAPIS (National Aging Program Information System) collects and reports Title III-E service/performance data and related program management information to the federal and state government in a format like the other Title III services. The major shift in reporting relates to who is the client. As a result, this Title III-E Client/Service Unit Report shows the number of caregivers who receive services and the number of units by service category from the Title III-E funding of the Older Americans Act, the AoA, and limited state general fund dollars. Additionally, it shows the number of persons served by individual services and total "unduplicated" client count across all services. In other words, if you add the total number of clients (caregivers) from all services, it is higher than the actual number of persons served across all services because some people need and receive more than one service. (Please note: this is preliminary data, and may be subject to change.) Title III-E Report YTD 1st Quarter 2007 Title III-E Report YTD 2nd Quarter 2007 Title III-E Report YTD 3rd Quarter 2007 Title III-E Report YTD 4th Quarter 2007

Annual Infrastructure Report, 2006

In accordance with the Code of Iowa, Section 8.57, this annual report summarizes the status of all ongoing building related projects for which an appropriation from the Rebuild Iowa Infrastructure Fund, the Vertical Infrastructure Fund or the Tobacco Settlement Trust Fund has been made to the Department of Administrative Services. The report includes projects for which funding reverted in 2006 as well as ongoing projects.

Does direct democracy reduce the size of government? New evidence from historical data, 1890-2000

Using historical data for all Swiss cantons from 1890 to 2000, we estimate the causal effect of direct democracy on government spending. The main innovation in this paper is that we use fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity and instrumental variables to address the potential endogeneity of institutions. We find that the budget referendum and lower costs to launch a voter initiative are effective tools in reducing canton level spending. However, we find no evidence that the budget referendum results in more decentralized government or a larger local government. Our instrumental variable estimates suggest that a mandatory budget referendum reduces the size of canton spending between 13 and 19 percent. A 1 percent lower signature requirement for the initiative reduces canton spending by up to 2 percent.

Catalan government popularity. An example of economic effects on sub-national government support

The aim of this essay is to deal with economic voting in contexts ofmultilevel governance and to be a contribution to the debate on attribution of responsibilities in popularity functions literature. We use aggregate and individual data from Catalonia in order to analyse the relation between the state of the economy and the support for a sub-state government. The empirical analysis shows that the responsibility hypothesis works in regional governments without explicit macroeconomic competencies. We have also considered the evaluations of government performance on certain specific policies in order to clarify and determine the factors that drive Catalan government support. The article considers the implications of the findings for future attempts to model party support in a context of the European Union.

Policy making in divided government. A pivotal actors model with party discipline

This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.

State Government E85 Use Plan filed December 31, 2007

The State Government E85 Use Plan was mandated by Culver Executive Order 3 and was required to be submitted to the Governor’s Office December 31, 2007. The plan makes policy recommendations governing the use of E85 fuel by state government, the reporting of E85 fuel sales statewide, and establishes a task force to discuss biodiesel use for state government, local government, and private industry and make recommendations.

Fiscal decentralization policies and sub-national government debt in evolving federations

As part of a process of democratization, many countries spanning Europe, Latin Amertica, Africa, and Asia are reorganizing their governments bydevolving fiscal responsibility and authority to newly empowered regionaland local governments. Although decentralization in each country proceedsdifferently, a common element tends to be an initially heavy relianceon central government grants to fund regional spending. We develop atheoretical model of regional borrowing decisions in which the incentivesfor regional borrowing depend crucially on how the regions expect thefederal system of finance to evolve. We examine the implications of themodel using data on Spanish regions for the period 1984-1995 and findevidence that regions may be borrowing inefficiently in response toincentives imbedded in the Spanish system of fiscal decentralization.

Population based resource allocation: The use of hybrid risk adjustment

The emphasis on integrated care implies new incentives that promote coordinationbetween levels of care. Considering a population as a whole, the resource allocation systemhas to adapt to this environment. This research is aimed to design a model that allows formorbidity related prospective and concurrent capitation payment. The model can be applied inpublicly funded health systems and managed competition settings.Methods: We analyze the application of hybrid risk adjustment versus either prospective orconcurrent risk adjustment formulae in the context of funding total health expenditures for thepopulation of an integrated healthcare delivery organization in Catalonia during years 2004 and2005.Results: The hybrid model reimburses integrated care organizations avoiding excessive risktransfer and maximizing incentives for efficiency in the provision. At the same time, it eliminatesincentives for risk selection for a specific set of high risk individuals through the use ofconcurrent reimbursement in order to assure a proper classification of patients.Conclusion: Prospective Risk Adjustment is used to transfer the financial risk to the healthprovider and therefore provide incentives for efficiency. Within the context of a National HealthSystem, such transfer of financial risk is illusory, and the government has to cover the deficits.Hybrid risk adjustment is useful to provide the right combination of incentive for efficiency andappropriate level of risk transfer for integrated care organizations.

Forest fires: Evaluation of government intervention measures

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between government measures, volunteer participation, climate variables and forest fires. A number of studies have related forest fires to causes of ignition, to fire history in one area, to the type of vegetation and weathercharacteristics or to community institutions, but there is little research on the relation between fire production and government prevention and extinction measures from a policy evaluation perspective.An observational approach is first applied to select forest fires in the north east of Spain. Taking a selection of fires with a certain size, a multiple regression analysis is conducted to find significant relations between policy instruments under the control of the government and the number of hectares burn in each case, controlling at the same time the effect of weather conditions and other context variables. The paper brings evidence on the effects of simultaneity and the relevance of recurring to army soldiers in specific days with extraordinary high simultaneity. The analysis also brings light on the effectiveness of twopreventive policies and of helicopters for extinction tasks.

Openness, government size and the terms of trade

This paper investigates the relationship between trade openness and the size of government, both theoretically and empirically. We show that openness can increase the size of governments through two channels: (1) a terms of trade externality, whereby trade lowers the domestic cost of taxation and (2) the demand for insurance, whereby trade raises risk and public transfers. We provide a unified framework for studying and testing these two mechanisms. First, we show how their relative strength depends on a key parameter, the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Second, while the terms of trade externality leads to inefficiently large governments, the increase in public spending due to the demand for insurance is optimal. We show that large volumes of trade may result in welfare losses if the terms of trade externality is strong enough while small volumes of trade are always beneficial. Third, we provide new evidence on the positive association between openness and the size of government and test whether it is consistent with the terms of trade externality or the demand for insurance. Our findings suggest that the positive relationship is remarkably robust and that the terms of trade externality may be the driving force behind it, thus raising warnings that globalization may have led to inefficiently large governments.