Geburtenentwicklung und gesellschaftliche Struktur

Declining birthrates are causing problems on different levels of societal structure. The much discussed necessity to restructure pension-systems is only one part of a much bigger problem our society faces. There are numerous scientific theories and studies on the causes and resulting problems of declining birthrates. The results of these are not easily comparable and relatively unconnected. The aim of this dissertation is to discuss them within a new frame. Starting with Hartmut Esser´s Theory of Rational Choice and using other modifications of rational decision making theory (i.e. microeconomic modelling, game theory etc.) a new theoretical position as well as an integrated model of fertility behaviour is developed. In this frame the probable causes of declining birth rates are discussed with respect to situational factors (logic of situation) as well as decision-immanent factors (logic of selection). The model is completed by an extensive discussion of the resulting societal changes (logic of aggregation).

Essays in industrial organization

The thesis consists in three papers that investigate two debated topics in industrial organization (in particular in competition policy) through formal models based on game-theory. The first paper deals with potential effects of conglomerate mergers among leading brands in facilitating foreclosure of new suppliers through the retailing channel. The two remaining papers analyze antitrust policy with respect to monopolization of markets of spare parts and aftermarkets by monopolistic equipment manufacturers.

Teoria dei giochi e Multi-criteria decision-making per reti mobili Ad-hoc: un protocollo di routing

Nell'elaborato si analizzano aspetti della teoria dei giochi e della multi-criteria decision-making. La riflessione serve a proporre le basi per un nuovo modello di protocollo di routing in ambito Mobile Ad-hoc Networks. Questo prototipo mira a generare una rete che riesca a gestirsi in maniera ottimale grazie ad un'acuta tecnica di clusterizzazione. Allo stesso tempo si propone come obiettivo il risparmio energetico e la partecipazione collaborativa di tutti i componenti.

The Structure of Financial Supervision: Consolidation or Fragmentation for Financial Regulators?

This research was designed to answer the question of which direction the restructuring of financial regulators should take – consolidation or fragmentation. This research began by examining the need for financial regulation and its related costs. It then continued to describe what types of regulatory structures exist in the world; surveying the regulatory structures in 15 jurisdictions, comparing them and discussing their strengths and weaknesses. This research analyzed the possible regulatory structures using three methodological tools: Game-Theory, Institutional-Design, and Network-Effects. The incentives for regulatory action were examined in Chapter Four using game theory concepts. This chapter predicted how two regulators with overlapping supervisory mandates will behave in two different states of the world (where they can stand to benefit from regulating and where they stand to lose). The insights derived from the games described in this chapter were then used to analyze the different supervisory models that exist in the world. The problem of information-flow was discussed in Chapter Five using tools from institutional design. The idea is based on the need for the right kind of information to reach the hands of the decision maker in the shortest time possible in order to predict, mitigate or stop a financial crisis from occurring. Network effects and congestion in the context of financial regulation were discussed in Chapter Six which applied the literature referring to network effects in general in an attempt to conclude whether consolidating financial regulatory standards on a global level might also yield other positive network effects. Returning to the main research question, this research concluded that in general the fragmented model should be preferable to the consolidated model in most cases as it allows for greater diversity and information-flow. However, in cases in which close cooperation between two authorities is essential, the consolidated model should be used.

Die Debatte über die Ziele des Vierten Kreuzzugs : ein Beitrag zur Lösung geschichtswissenschaftlich umstrittener Fragen mit Hilfe sozialwissenschaftlicher Instrumente

Der Rational-Choice-Ansatz (RCA) hat in den letzten Jahrzehnten eine weite Ver-rnbreitung in vielen sozialwissenschaftlichen Disziplinen erfahren. Insbesondere in den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten gab es wiederholte Bemühungen, den RCA auchrnauf geschichtswissenschaftliche Fragestellungen und Themen anzuwenden. Ein interssanter Ansatz dafür ist eine integrative Methodik, die unter der Bezeichnung „Analytic Narrative“ bekannt wurde. Damit wird versucht, die klassische narrative Form der Erklärung historischer Phänomene mit spieltheoretischen Modellierungen zu verbinden. Inspiriert durch diesen Ansatz geht die vorliegende Untersuchung der Frage nach, in welcher Form und unter welchen Umständen der RCA als analytische Grundlage für historische Themenfelder und Fragestellungen geeignet sein mag. Dies wird nicht nur theoretisch, sondern an einem historischen Beispiel untersucht. Konkreter Betrachtungsgegenstand der Arbeit ist der Vierte Kreuzzug. Vor über 800 Jahren endete dieser mit der Eroberung und Plünderung Konstantinopels sowie der Zerschlagung des Byzantinischen Reichs. Seit mehr als 150 Jahren streiten Historiker über die Ursachen für diese Ereignisse. Die theoretischenrnGrundpositionen, die innerhalb dieser Debatte durch einzelne Historiker einge-rnnommen wurden, dienen als Ausgangspunkt für die hier verfolgte Untersuchung.rnEs wird gezeigt, dass die Daten, die uns über den Vierten Kreuzzug vorliegen,rndie Möglichkeit eröffnen, verschiedene auf dem RCA basierende Analyseverfah-rnren zur Anwendung zu bringen. Das zentrale Ziel der Analyse besteht darin, ausrnden vorhandenen Quellen neue Einsichten in die strategischen Handlungsoptionen der für den Verlauf des Kreuzzugs relevanten Akteure zu generieren undrnüberdies ein Höchstmaß an Überprüfbarkeit zu gewährleisten.

Can the neuroeconomics revolution revolutionize psychiatry?

Neuroeconomics is a rapidly growing new research discipline aimed at describing the neural substrate of decision-making using incentivized decisions introduced in experimental economics. The novel combination of economic decision theory and neuroscience has the potential to better examine the interactions of social, psychological and neural factors with regard to motivational forces that may underlie psychiatric problems. Game theory will provide psychiatry with computationally principled measures of cognitive dysfunction. Given the relatively high heritability of these measures, they may contribute to improving phenotypic definitions of psychiatric conditions. The game-theoretical concepts of optimal behavior will allow description of psychopathology as deviation from optimal functioning. Neuroeconomists have successfully used normative or near-normative models to interpret the function of neurotransmitters; these models have the potential to significantly improve neurotransmitter theories of psychiatric disorders. This paper will review recent evidence from neuroeconomics and psychiatry in support of applying economic concepts such as risk/uncertainty preference, time preference and social preference to psychiatric research to improve diagnostic classification, prevention and therapy.

Cost Sharing under Uncertainty: An Algorithmic Approach to Cooperative Interval-Valued Games

Recently, Branzei, Dimitrov, and Tijs (2003) introduced cooperative interval-valued games. Among other insights, the notion of an interval core has been coined and proposed as a solution concept for interval-valued games. In this paper we will present a general mathematical programming algorithm which can be applied to find an element in the interval core. As an example, we discuss lot sizing with uncertain demand to provide an application for interval-valued games and to demonstrate how interval core elements can be computed. Also, we reveal that pitfalls exist if interval core elements are computed in a straightforward manner by considering the interval borders separately.

Persistent Deadlock in Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Case of Doha

The history of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiations is full of anecdotes on missed deadlines, failed ministerial conferences, and brinkmanship situations. Tactics such as walking away from the table or sleep-depriving night sessions are legendary in the context of attempting to overcome impasse in negotiations. This article traces and explains the recurrent deadlock in the Doha Round negotiations. It identifies four structural/contextual factors – ideas, institutions, interests, and information – as necessary for understanding and anticipating potential deadlocks. The article also offers a definition of deadlock, and discusses a set of factors highlighted in the international relations literature that explain the existence and persistence of deadlock. With the help of game theory, it then illustrates the challenges faced by actors during trade negotiations. The article concludes by outlining two general scenarios for the Doha Development Agenda and discusses their implications for the World Trade Organization.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Analytical Framework for Monetary Models

This paper shows that optimal policy and consistent policy outcomes require the use of control-theory and game-theory solution techniques. While optimal policy and consistent policy often produce different outcomes even in a one-period model, we analyze consistent policy and its outcome in a simple model, finding that the cause of the inconsistency with optimal policy traces to inconsistent targets in the social loss function. As a result, the central bank should adopt a loss function that differs from the social loss function. Carefully designing the central bank s loss function with consistent targets can harmonize optimal and consistent policy. This desirable result emerges from two observations. First, the social loss function reflects a normative process that does not necessarily prove consistent with the structure of the microeconomy. Thus, the social loss function cannot serve as a direct loss function for the central bank. Second, an optimal loss function for the central bank must depend on the structure of that microeconomy. In addition, this paper shows that control theory provides a benchmark for institution design in a game-theoretical framework.

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

El juego en la vejez, relatos de viejos marplatenses

En este texto se intenta problematizar la temática del juego en la vejez. Para ello la autora recurre a la descripción de una experiencia realizada en la ciudad de Mar del Plata en el contexto de la Formación Docente y que tiene como actores a personas adultas mayores y a estudiantes del cuarto año de estudios del Profesorado en Educación Física provincial. Se tiene en cuenta como marco teórico el material bibliográfico aportado por el Seminario Teoría de los Juegos cursado por la autora en su trayecto para lograr el postítulo de Magíster en Educación Corporal y se entrecruzan con otros estudios pertinentes a la temática gerontológica. Asimismo, los datos obtenidos por medio de la realización de entrevistas en un trabajo de campo allí descripto son los insumos necesarios para analizar, por un lado, tanto las conceptualizaciones que se tiene sobre la vejez y el envejecimiento como las ideas y preconceptos acerca del juego en los adultos mayores. Por otro lado, los juegos de hoy y ayer y la multiplicidad de sentidos que estos adquieren en la vejez, a partir de las voces de los propios protagonistas de la experiencia

El juego en la vejez, relatos de viejos marplatenses

En este texto se intenta problematizar la temática del juego en la vejez. Para ello la autora recurre a la descripción de una experiencia realizada en la ciudad de Mar del Plata en el contexto de la Formación Docente y que tiene como actores a personas adultas mayores y a estudiantes del cuarto año de estudios del Profesorado en Educación Física provincial. Se tiene en cuenta como marco teórico el material bibliográfico aportado por el Seminario Teoría de los Juegos cursado por la autora en su trayecto para lograr el postítulo de Magíster en Educación Corporal y se entrecruzan con otros estudios pertinentes a la temática gerontológica. Asimismo, los datos obtenidos por medio de la realización de entrevistas en un trabajo de campo allí descripto son los insumos necesarios para analizar, por un lado, tanto las conceptualizaciones que se tiene sobre la vejez y el envejecimiento como las ideas y preconceptos acerca del juego en los adultos mayores. Por otro lado, los juegos de hoy y ayer y la multiplicidad de sentidos que estos adquieren en la vejez, a partir de las voces de los propios protagonistas de la experiencia

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists