A Supply Function Competition Model for the Spanish Wholesale Electricity Market

We model the Spanish wholesale market as a multiplant linear supply function competition model. According to the theory, the larger generators should have supply curves for each plant which are to the left of the supply curves of plants owned by smaller generators. We test this prediction for fuel plants using data from the Spanish Market Operator (OMEL) from May 2001 to December 2003. Our results indicate that the prediction of the model holds.

La gestión del conocimiento científico-técnico en la universidad: un caso y un proyecto

[ES] Actualmente, las universidades se enfrentan a aumentos en sus necesidades de financiación, cuando el criterio predominante es que los poderes públicos tengan una menor presencia en la misma. Por otra parte, algunos investigadores indican que la Universidad parece estar perdiendo posiciones como centro de generación de conocimiento, el cual, como recurso en s. mismo, este siendo objeto de creciente atención por parte de las empresas y los gobiernos, considerándose le el recurso clave en la consecución de ventajas competitivas. En estas circunstancias, estimamos que la Universidad debe hacer mayores esfuerzos en orientar su investigación a la aplicación del conocimiento científico-técnico, en colaboración con las empresas y las administraciones públicas, como indica el modelo de la triple hélice de Etzkowitz y Leydesdorff. En este trabajo se presenta también como se afronta en la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea la gestión del conocimiento científico técnico, as. como un proyecto de investigación cuya finalidad consiste en la búsqueda de un modelo de gestión de este conocimiento en el contexto descrito.

Resale in Auctions with Financial Constraints

This paper analyzes auctions where bidders face nancial constraints that may force them to resell part of the property of the good (or subcontract part of a project) at a resale market. First we show that the ine¢ cient speculative equilibria of second- price auctions (Garratt and Tröger, 2006) generalizes to situations with partial resale where only the high value bidder is nancially constrained. However, when all players face nancial constraints the ine¢ cient speculative equilibria disappear. Therefore, for auctioning big facilities or contracts where all bidders are nancially constrained and there is a resale market, the second price auction remains a simple and appropriate mechanism to achieve an e¢ cient allocation.

Consumer Expertise or Credit Risk? An empirical analysis of mortgage pricing

Loan mortgage interest rates are usually the result of a bank-customer negotiation process. Credit risk, consumer cross-buying potential, bundling, financial market competition and other features affecting the bargaining power of the parties could affect price. We argue that, since mortgage loan is a complex product, consumer expertise could be a relevant factor for mortgage pricing. Using data on mortgage loan prices for a sample of 1055 households for the year 2005 (Bank of Spain Survey of Household Finances, EFF-2005), and including credit risk, costs, potential capacity of the consumer to generate future business and bank competition variables, the regression results indicate that consumer expertise-related metrics are highly significant as predictors of mortgage loan prices. Other factors such as credit risk and consumer cross-buying potential do not have such a significant impact on mortgage prices. Our empirical results are affected by the credit conditions prior to the financial crisis and could shed some light on this issue.

Financial x-ray

An over view of the financial x-ray service. JL

Report on Knowledge Exchange workshop Price of keeping knowledge: financial streams for digital preservation

In contrast to cost modeling activities, the pricing of services must be simple and transparent. Calculating and thus knowing price structures, would not only help identify the level of detail required for cost modeling of individual instititutions, but also help develop a ”public” market for services as well as clarify the division of task and the modeling of funding and revenue streams for data preservation of public institutions. This workshop has built on the results from the workshop ”The Costs and Benefits of Keeping Knowledge” which took place 11 June 2012 in Copenhagen. This expert workshop aimed at: •Identifying ways for data repositories to abstract from their complicated cost structures and arrive at one transparent pricing structure which can be aligned with available and plausible funding schemes. Those repositories will probably need a stable institutional funding stream for data management and preservation. Are there any estimates for this, absolute or as percentage of overall cost? Part of the revenue will probably have to come through data management fees upon ingest. How could that be priced? Per dataset, per GB or as a percentage of research cost? Will it be necessary to charge access prices, as they contradict the open science paradigm? •What are the price components for pricing individual services, which prices are currently being paid e.g. to commercial providers? What are the description and conditions of the service(s) delivered and guaranteed? •What types of risks are inherent in these pricing schemes? •How can services and prices be defined in an all-inclusive and simple manner, so as to enable researchers to apply for specific amount when asking for funding of data-intensive projects?Please

Imperfect Competition

Para quien es de utilidad: •Alumnos de Tª Microeconómica IV, curso 3º LE. •Alumnos de las asignaturas de Tª de Juegos y Organización Industrial del Máster en Economía: Instrumentos del Análisis Económico. Estas notas sobre competencia imperfecta están dedicadas al estudio de estructuras de mercado caracterizadas por la existencia de poder de mercado. Se estudia en primer lugar el monopolio, dedicando una atención especial a los diferentes tipos de discriminación de precios. A continuación se presenta la Tª de juegos no cooperativos y se muestra su utilidad para analizar diferentes fenómenos económicos caracterizados por la interdependencia estratégica. Finalmente, se estudian diferentes modelos de competencia oligopolística y la estabilidad de los acuerdos colusivos.

Looking for safe harbor in a crowded sea: Coastal space use conflict and marine renewable energy development

Technological advances in the marine renewable energy industry and increased clarity about the leasing and licensing process are fostering development proposals in both state and federal waters. The ocean is becoming more industrialized and competition among all marine space users is developing (Buck et al. 2004). More spatial competition can lead to conflict between ocean users themselves, and to tensions that spill over to include other stakeholders and the general public (McGrath 2004). Such conflict can wind up in litigation, which is costly and takes agency time and financial resources away from other priorities. As proposals for marine renewable energy developments are evaluated, too often decision-makers lack the tools and information to properly account for the cumulative effects and the tradeoffs associated with alternative human uses of the ocean. This paper highlights the nature of marine space conflicts associated with marine renewable energy literature highlights key issues for the growth of the marine renewable energy sector in the United States. (PDF contains 4 pages)

Financial analysis of small-scale fish farming enterprises to alleviate poverty in homestead

This paper focuses on the financial analysis involved in setting up of fish farming on a small-scale in a homestead. About 0.5 acres of land was used for the construction of pond which as a stock of Clarias spp/ Heterobranchus spp and Tilapia spp at the ratio of one to three for a period of 12 months. The land/land development cost is N26,500.00, pond construction cost, N35,700.00, equipment cost, N2,650.00 and stock/Input requirement cost N155,727.00 while the revenue from sales is N376,000.00. A cash flow analysis is also calculated for the fish farm, which is N155,423.00 for first year cash flow, and appropriate profit/mosses were calculated for five-year production cycle of N1,036,515.00 million. At the end appreciable profit is realized from the enterprises. This type of enterprises is viable for small-scale farmers to practices and adopted for financial support for their family

Financial equilibrium, voting procedures, and coalition structures in allocational mechanisms

This thesis is comprised of three chapters, each of which is concerned with properties of allocational mechanisms which include voting procedures as part of their operation. The theme of interaction between economic and political forces recurs in the three chapters, as described below.

Chapter One demonstrates existence of a non-controlling interest shareholders' equilibrium for a stylized one-period stock market economy with fewer securities than states of the world. The economy has two decision mechanisms: Owners vote to change firms' production plans across states, fixing shareholdings; and individuals trade shares and the current production / consumption good, fixing production plans. A shareholders' equilibrium is a production plan profile, and a shares / current good allocation stable for both mechanisms. In equilibrium, no (Kramer direction-restricted) plan revision is supported by a share-weighted majority, and there exists no Pareto superior reallocation.

Chapter Two addresses efficient management of stationary-site, fixed-budget, partisan voter registration drives. Sufficient conditions obtain for unique optimal registrar deployment within contested districts. Each census tract is assigned an expected net plurality return to registration investment index, computed from estimates of registration, partisanship, and turnout. Optimum registration intensity is a logarithmic transformation of a tract's index. These conditions are tested using a merged data set including both census variables and Los Angeles County Registrar data from several 1984 Assembly registration drives. Marginal registration spending benefits, registrar compensation, and the general campaign problem are also discussed.

The last chapter considers social decision procedures at a higher level of abstraction. Chapter Three analyzes the structure of decisive coalition families, given a quasitransitive-valued social decision procedure satisfying the universal domain and ITA axioms. By identifying those alternatives X* ⊆ X on which the Pareto principle fails, imposition in the social ranking is characterized. Every coaliton is weakly decisive for X* over X~X*, and weakly antidecisive for X~X* over X*; therefore, alternatives in X~X* are never socially ranked above X*. Repeated filtering of alternatives causing Pareto failure shows states in X^n*~X^((n+1))* are never socially ranked above X^((n+1))*. Limiting results of iterated application of the *-operator are also discussed.

Linking Reduced Deforestation and a Global Carbon Market: Impacts on Costs, Financial Flows, and Technological Innovation

25 p.

Regulation of the fitness of Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) by intra-specific competition amongst the juveniles

Factors affecting the fitness of juvenile salmon are discussed. Although fitness from the genetic point of view is defined as the relative capacity of carriers of a given genotype to transmit their genes to the gene pool of the following generations, growth and survival of individuals are also components of fitness, and are influenced by responses to competition, which is the major topic of this article including implications for management. In order to better understand the relationships of density-dependent survival in Newfoundland, egg depositions were manipulated experimentally in the Freshwater River. Figures demonstrate the relationship between stock (number of eggs per 100 m2 of river) and recruitment (number of smolts per l00 m2 of Atlantic salmon, and also the percentage survival from egg to smolt stage related to potential egg depositions.