991 resultados para Eurozone sovereign debt crisis
Resumo:
Includes bibliography
Resumo:
Incluye Bibliografía
Resumo:
Includes bibliography
Resumo:
Includes bibliography
Resumo:
Includes bibliography
Resumo:
Includes bibliography
Resumo:
Includes bibliography
Resumo:
Includes bibliography
Resumo:
Includes bibliography
Resumo:
Includes bibliography
Resumo:
With external conditions sluggish and highly uncertain as the global economy still struggles to shake off the effects of the economic crisis of 2008-2009, the Latin American and Caribbean region is not isolated from these effects and is projected to record a small drop in gross domestic product (GDP) in 2015, followed by a weak recovery in 2016. Against this backdrop, 2015 will be the third consecutive year of increasing declines in regional export values; a state of affairs not seen since the Great Depression of the 1930s. This poor performance reflects the end of the commodity price boom, the slowdown of the Chinese economy, the weak recovery of the eurozone and the lacklustre economic activity in the region, particularly in South America.
Resumo:
At the light of what happened in 2010 and 2011, a lot of European countries founded themselves in a difficult position where all the credit rating agencies were downgrading debt states. Problem of solvency and guarantees on the states' bond were perceived as too risky for a Monetary Union as Europe is. Fear of a contagion from Greece as well was threatening the other countries as Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland; while Germany and France asked for a division between risky and riskless bond in order to feel more safe. Our paper gets inspiration by Roch and Uhlig (2011), it refers to the Argentinian case examined by Arellano (2008) and examine possible interventions as monetization or bailout as proposed by Cole and Kehoe (2000). We propose a model in which a state defaults and cannot repay a fraction of the old bond; but contrary to Roch and Uhlig that where considering a one-time cost of default we consider default as an accumulation of losses, perceived as unpaid fractions of the old debts. Our contributions to literature is that default immediately imply that economy faces a bad period and, accumulating losses, government will be worse-off. We studied a function for this accumulation of debt period by period, in order to get an idea of the magnitude of this waste of resources that economy will face when experiences a default. Our thesis is that bailouts just postpone the day of reckoning (Roch, Uhlig); so it's better to default before accumulate a lot of debts. What Europe need now is the introduction of new reforms in a controlled default where the Eurozone will be saved in its whole integrity and a state could fail with the future promise of a resurrection. As experience show us, governments are not interested into reducing debts since there are ECB interventions. That clearly create a distortion between countries in the same monetary union, giving to the states just an illusion about their future debtor position.
Resumo:
This paper focuses on the impact of Indonesia's economic crisis on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). It shows how the performance of SMEs during the crisis varied widely even in the same industrial subsector, and found that the factors most affecting performance have been market orientation and the linkages that the SMEs have formed with the buyers of their products. Well-performing SMEs were found to have utilized putting-out linkages with wholesalers which enabled them to switch to products having better markets. On the other hand, the SMEs which had subcontracting linkages with assemblers or contracting linkages with user-factories (with the exception of SMEs having export-oriented linkages) suffered badly in the crisis because of specificity of products with little room for switching. The paper also found that exposure to debt due to borrowing for investment has been another factor affecting performance, but that enterprise size has had no linear correlation with performance.