It's confusing when the Swiss go to the polls. Here are 6 surprising things about their elections

On Sunday, Switzerland votes on its federal parliament. The members of both chambers - 200 National Councillors and 46 Councillors of States - are directly elected, with the 26 Swiss cantons (or provinces) forming the districts. Seats in the National Council are distributed to the cantons based on their population size, while in the Council of States each full canton gets two seats and the six half-cantons get one each. Here are six things to look out for.

The 2015 Swiss elections: A landslide win for the right, despite limited changes in vote share

Switzerland held federal elections on 18 October, with the conservative Swiss People’s Party winning the largest share of the votes. Daniel Bochsler, Marlène Gerber and David Zumbach write that while the increase in vote share for the Swiss People’s Party was relatively limited, the party managed to significantly increase the number of seats it holds in Switzerland’s lower house of parliament, the National Council. Nevertheless, the party is unlikely to make substantial gains in the country’s upper house, the Senate, as it traditionally struggles under the two-round electoral system used in Senate elections.

Political conditions for fair elections

Democracy is not necessarily consolidated simply by the introduction of formal democratic institutions. It is often observed in new democracies that democratic institutions are neglected and eroded in actual practice. Particularly, electoral fraud committed by a ruler is one of the main problems in this regard. This paper deals with two questions, (1) under what conditions does a ruler have an incentive to hold fair elections (or to rig elections), and (2) what makes a ruler prefer to establish an independent election governing institution? Assuming that a ruler prefers to maintain her power, basically she has an incentive to rig elections in order to be victorious in the political competition. A ruler, however, faces the risk of losing power if the opposition stages successful protests on a sufficiently large scale. If opponents are able to pose a credible threat to a ruler, she will have an incentive to hold fair elections. The problem is that information on electoral fraud is not shared by every player in the game. For the opposition, imperfect information deepens their coordination problems. Imperfect information, on the other hand, in some cases causes a problem for a ruler. If the opposition is sufficiently cohesive and have little tolerance of cheating, even unverified suspicions of fraud may trigger menacing protests. In such a case, a ruler has an incentive to establish an independent election commission to avoid unnecessary collisions by revealing the nature of the elections.

Ethnicity and Elections under Authoritarianism: The Case of Kazakhstan

Despite the ethnicisation of power since independence in 1991, Kazakhstan has managed to maintain political stability without experiencing large-scale mobilisation to oppose Kazakh domination. This paper examines government strategy to avoid ethnic voting in an attempt to explain why ethnic divisions were rarely reflected in the struggle for power in the republic. While the arbitrary use of legal provisions considerably limited participation in elections by ethnic leaders, powerful pro-president parties that exhibited a cross-ethnic character were created to curtail ethnically based movements. The control strategy in elections aimed not simply at ethnicising the parliament in favour of Kazakhs, but at having loyal Russians and other minorities represented in the legislature through nomination by the president and catch-all pro-regime parties, or through the presidential consultative body—Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan. This well-controlled representation of minorities served not only to placate non-Kazakhs but also to provide legitimacy for the Kazakh-dominated leadership by projecting the image of cross-ethnic support for the president and some degree of power-sharing.

The gap between recognition and the 'compensation business' : the claim against Britain for compensation by Kenya's former Mau Mau fighters

During the first Kibaki administration (2002-2007), a movement by the former Mau Mau fighters demanded recognition for the role that they had played in the achievement of independence. They began to demand, also, monetary compensation for past injustices. Why had it taken over 40 years (from independence in 1963) for the former Mau Mau fighters to initiate this movement? What can be observed as the outcome of their movement? To answer these questions, three different historical currents need to be taken into account. These were, respectively, changing trends in the government of Kenya, progress in historical research into the actual circumstances of colonial control, and a realization, based on mounting experience, that launching a legal action against Britain could turn out to be a lucrative initiative. This paper concludes that, regardless of the actual purpose of the legal case, neither of their objectives was certain to be achieved. Two inescapable realities remain: the doubts cast on the reputation of the government by its decision to lift the Mau Mau‟s outlaw status – a decision that was widely seen as a latter-day example of the „Kikuyu favouritism‟ policy followed by the first Kibaki administration – and the popular interpretation of the involvement of Leigh Day, well known in Kenya ever since the unexploded bombs case for its success in obtaining substantial compensation payments, as a vehicle for squeezing large amounts of money from the British government for the benefit of the Kikuyu people.

Kenya after the 2007 "post-election violence" : constitutional reform and the National Accord and Reconciliation Act

Immediately after the announcement of the re-election of President Kibaki on the evening of 30 December 2007, Kenya was thrust into the worst civil unrest experienced by the country since independence – a development that became known as the "Post-Election Violence" (PEV). However, after a subsequent process of reconciliation, the PEV came to an end within a relatively short period. The present-day politics of Kenya are being conducted within the framework of a provisional Constitution that took shape through peaceful mediation. How did Kenya manage to put a lid on a period of turmoil that placed the country in unprecedented danger? This paper traces the sequence of events that led to mediation, explains the emergency measures that were needed to maintain law and order, and indicates the remaining problems that still need to be solved.

Changing local elite selection in Thailand : emergence of new local government presidents after direct elections and their capabilities

Before rural local government units were established in Thailand, reform debates within the country faced a crucial issue: Candidates at the rural sub-district levels might adopt electioneering methods such as vote buying and the patronage system of the local political and economic elite, the methods that had been used in the national elections. In fact, the results of the 2006 survey in this paper, which followed the introduction of direct elections in rural local government units in 2003, contrast with the result anticipated during the debates on political reform. The preliminary data of the survey shows that the decentralization process and the introduction of the direct election system in the rural areas had some effect in changing the selection process of the local elite in Thailand.