The European Social Survey. Methodological aspects

From a scientific point of view, surveys are undoubtedly a valuable tool for the knowledge of the social and political reality. They are widely used in the social sciences research. However, the researcher's task is often disturbed by a series of deficiencies related to some technical aspects that make difficult both the inference and the comparison. The main aim of the present paper is to report and justify the European Social Survey's technical specifications addressed to avoid and/or minimize such deficiencies. The article also gives a characterization of the non-respondents in Spain obtained from the analysis of the 2002 fieldwork data file.

Improving social measurements: The experience of the ESS first rounds in Spain

With the two aims of monitoring social change and improving social measurement, the European Social Survey is now closing its third round. This paper shows how the accumulated experience of the two first rounds has been used to validate the questionnaire, better adapt the sampling design to the country characteristics and efficiently commit fieldwork in Spain. For example, the dynamic character of the population nowadays makes necessary to estimated design effects at each round from the data of the previous round. The paper also demonstrates how, starting with a response rate of 52% at first round, a 66% response rate is achieved at the third round thanks to an extensive quality control conducted by the polling agency and the ESS national team and based on a detailed analysis of the non-response cases and the incidences reported by the interviewed in the contact form.

A Responsabilidade Social e o Desenvolvimento Sustentável nas Empresas Privadas: Estudo de Caso CAVIBEL, SARL

O papel das empresas face aos problemas sociais e ambientais está a despertar cada vez mais interesse por parte da sociedade e de todos os stakeholders envolventes, fazendo com que as empresas adoptem novas estratégias para garantir a sua sustentabilidade a longo prazo. Este trabalho tem como objetivo principal conhecer as acções sociais praticadas pela empresa do ponto de vista dos colaboradores internos e analisar as contribuições destas para a sustentabilidade da mesma. A metodologia consistiu num estudo de caso, na qual foi aplicada um inquérito aos colaboradores internos e uma entrevista ao Director dos Recursos Humanos da Empresa. Os resultados obtidos levam-nos a concluir que a empresa é socialmente responsável e sustentável. Contudo, os colaboradores internos são poucos informados dessas práticas.

Social security, retirement, and the single-mindedness of the electorate

We propose a positive theory that is consistent with two important featuresof social security programs around the world: (1) they redistributeincome from young to old and (2) they induce retirement. We construct avoting model that includes a political campaign or debate prior to theelection. The model incorporates single-mindedness of the groups that donot work: while the workers divide their political capital between their age concerns and occupational concerns , the retired concentrate alltheir political capital to support their age group. In our model, theelderly end up getting transfers from the government (paid by the young)and distortionary labor income taxes induce the retirement of the elderly.In addition, our model predicts that occupational groups that work morewill tend to have more political power. The opposite is true fornon-occupational groups (such as the elderly). We provide some evidencethat supports these additional predictions.

Social capabilities in Alzheimer’s patients

Patients with stage-I (very mild and mild) Alzheimer s disease were asked to participatein a Dictator Game, a type of game in which a subject has to decide how to allocate acertain amount of money between himself and another person. The game enables theexperimenter to examine the influence of social norms and social preferences on thedecision-making process. When the results of treatments involving Alzheimer s diseasepatients were compared with those of identical treatments involving patients with mildcognitive impairment or healthy control subjects, with similar ages and socialbackgrounds, no statistically significant difference was found. This finding suggests thatstage-I Alzheimer s disease patients may be as capable of making decisions involvingsocial norms and preferences as other individuals of their age. Whatever brain structuresare affected by the disease, they do not appear to influence, at this early stage, the neuralbasis for cooperation-enhancing social interactions.

Social security in theory and practice (II): Efficiency theories, narrative theories and implications for reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "governmenteconomizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory".The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Social security and democracy

Many political economic theories use and emphasize the process of votingin their explanation of the growth of Social Security, governmentspending, and other public policies. But is there an empirical connectionbetween democracy and Social Security program size or design? Using somenew international data sets to produce both country-panel econometricestimates as well as case studies of South American and southern Europeancountries, we find that Social Security policy varies according toeconomic and demographic factors, but that very different politicalhistories can result in the same Social Security policy. We find littlepartial effect of democracy on the size of Social Security budgets, onhow those budgets are allocated, or how economic and demographic factorsaffect Social Security. If there is any observed difference, democraciesspend a little less of their GDP on Social Security, grow their budgetsa bit more slowly, and cap their payroll tax more often, than doeconomically and demographically similar nondemocracies. Democracies andnondemocracies are equally likely to have benefit formulas inducingretirement and, conditional on GDP per capita, equally likely to induceretirement with a retirement test vs. an earnings test.

Política de benefícios fiscais em cabo verde. Estudo de caso: Impacto dos benefícios fiscais na economia Cabo-verdiana no período 2008 a 2010

Com a globalização e a competitividade da economia, o Governo cabo-verdiano sentiu a necessidade de adotar instrumentos e mecanismos fiscais flexíveis, modernos e eficientes para dar mais ênfase ao sector empresarial e não só. A PBF constitui uma das formas do Estado intervir na economia, ou seja, forma de estimular a criação do emprego, visando elevar o bem-estar da população. Essa intervenção assume uma grande importância em economias de poucos rendimentos económicos, sendo a sua eficácia e eficiência dependente do volume de recursos financeiros arrecadados, quer através do meio produtivo próprio, quer através da imposição de contributos dos cidadãos. Os BF é um instrumento importante do Estado porque mesmo nos países com sistemas fiscais desenvolvidos e sofisticados, o Estado recorre ao BF para intervir e conformar a realidade económica e social. Há incentivos fiscais que estimulam o investimento e a produção, como as isenções e as reduções de imposto que têm por objectivo privilegiar o consumo de alguns bens ou o desenvolvimento de certas actividades e, os mais relevantes estão centrados no imposto único sobre rendimento – IUR de pessoas colectivas e nos direitos de importação – DI. Actualmente, em Cabo Verde, existe um número elevado de incentivos fiscais que estão ligados a vários sectores económicos, concedidos sem avaliação. Os Benefícios Fiscais, enquanto instrumento privilegiado de política fiscal, têm sido concedidos há alguns anos em Cabo Verde sem uma orientação específica da sua aplicação e da sua eficácia, de forma que venham a causar um maior impacto na vida das empresas e da economia nacional. O sistema fiscal Cabo-Verdiano prevê várias formas de Benefícios Fiscais, que se encontravam dispersos em vários diplomas, mas em 21 de Janeiro de 2013, a Lei nº 26/VIII/2013 cria o Código de Benefícios Fiscais, constituindo um instrumento de extrema relevância para o desenvolvimento de qualquer país, pois são consideradas ferramentas importantes para incentivar o desenvolvimento económico-social do País.

What social security: Beveridgean or Bismarckian?

Why are Bismarckian social security systems associated with largerpublic pension expenditures, a smaller fraction of private pension andlower income in-equality than Beveridgean systems? These facts arepuzzling for political economy theories of social security whichpredict that Beveridgean systems, involving intra-generationalredistribution, should enjoy larger support among low-income people andthus be larger. This paper explains these features in a bidimensionalpolitical economy model. In an economy with three income groups,low-income support a large, redistributive system; middle-income favoran earning-related system, while high-income oppose any public system,since they have access to a superior saving technology, a privatesystem. We show that, if income inequality is large, the voting majorityof high-income and low-income supports a (small) Beveridgean system,and a large private pillar arises; the opposite occurs with lowinequality. Additionally, when the capital market provides higherreturns, a Beveridgean system is more likely to emerge.

Protestants and Catholics: Similar work ethic, different social ethic

This article develops two hypotheses about economically-relevant values of Christianbelievers, according to which Protestants should work more and more effectively, as in the work ethic argument of Max Weber, or display a stronger social ethic that would lead themto monitor each other s conduct, support political and legal institutions and hold morehomogeneous values. Tests using current survey data confirm substantial partial correlations andpossible different effects in mutual social control, institutional performance and homogeneityof values but no difference in work ethics. Protestantism therefore seems conducive to capitalisteconomic development, not by the direct psychological route of the Weberian work ethic butrather by promoting an alternative social ethic that facilitates impersonal trade.

Social preferences and skill segregation

This paper shows that models where preferences of individuals dependnot only on their allocations, but also on the well-being of otherpersons, can produce both large and testable effects. We study theallocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to firms. Weshow that even small deviations from purely selfish preferences leadsto widespread workplace skill segregation. That is, workers ofdifferent abilities tend to work in di¤erent firms, as long as theycare somewhat more about the utilities of workers who are close .

Is altruism important for understanding the long-run effects of social security?

This paper quantifies the effects of social security on capital accumulation and wealth distribution in a life cycle framework with altruistic individuals. The main findings of this paper are that the current U.S. social security system has a significant impact on capital accumulation and wealth distribution. I find that social security crowds out 8\% of the capital stock of an economy without social security. This effect is driven by the distortions of labor supply due to the taxation of labor income rather than by the intergenerational redistribution of income imposed by the social security system. In contrast to previous analysis of social security, I found that social security does not affect the savings rate of the economy. Another interesting finding is that even though the current U.S. social security system is progressive in its benefits, it may lead to a more disperse distribution of wealth.

Social preferences: Some simple tests and a new model

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary choices that test these theories more directly than the array of games conventionally considered. Our experiments show strong support for the prevalence of "quasi-maximin" preferences: People sacrifice to increase the payoffs for all recipients, but especially for the lowest-payoff recipients. People are also motivated by reciprocity: While people are reluctant to sacrifice to reciprocate good or bad behavior beyond what they would sacrifice for neutral parties, they withdraw willingness to sacrifice to achieve a fair outcome when others are themselves unwilling to sacrifice. Some participants are averse to getting different payoffs than others, but based on our experiments and reinterpretation of previous experiments we argue that behavior that has been presented as "difference aversion" in recent papers is actually a combination of reciprocal and quasi-maximin motivations. We formulate a model in which each player is willing to sacrifice to allocate the quasi-maximin allocation only to those players also believed to be pursuing the quasi-maximin allocation, and may sacrifice to punish unfair players.

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do?

We use subjects actions in modified dictator games to perform a within-subject classification ofindividuals into four different types of interdependent preferences: Selfish, Social Welfaremaximizers, Inequity Averse and Competitive. We elicit beliefs about other subjects actions inthe same modified dictator games to test how much of the existent heterogeneity in others actions is known by subjects. We find that subjects with different interdependent preferences infact have different beliefs about others actions. In particular, Selfish individuals cannotconceive others being non-Selfish while Social Welfare maximizers are closest to the actualdistribution of others actions. We finally provide subjects with information on other subjects actions and re-classify individuals according to their (new) actions in the same modified dictatorgames. We find that social information does not affect Selfish individuals, but that individualswith interdependent preferences are more likely to change their behavior and tend to behavemore selfishly.