821 resultados para Cooperative games (Mathematics)
Resumo:
Article analysing the use of Olympic villages once the Games are finished. This article was published in the book entitled ‘Olympic Villages: a hundred years of urban planning and shared experiences’ compiling the papers given at the 1997 International Symposium on International Chair in Olympism (IOC-UAB).
Resumo:
The present thesis is a contribution to the debate on the applicability of mathematics; it examines the interplay between mathematics and the world, using historical case studies. The first part of the thesis consists of four small case studies. In chapter 1, I criticize "ante rem structuralism", proposed by Stewart Shapiro, by showing that his so-called "finite cardinal structures" are in conflict with mathematical practice. In chapter 2, I discuss Leonhard Euler's solution to the Königsberg bridges problem. I propose interpreting Euler's solution both as an explanation within mathematics and as a scientific explanation. I put the insights from the historical case to work against recent philosophical accounts of the Königsberg case. In chapter 3, I analyze the predator-prey model, proposed by Lotka and Volterra. I extract some interesting philosophical lessons from Volterra's original account of the model, such as: Volterra's remarks on mathematical methodology; the relation between mathematics and idealization in the construction of the model; some relevant details in the derivation of the Third Law, and; notions of intervention that are motivated by one of Volterra's main mathematical tools, phase spaces. In chapter 4, I discuss scientific and mathematical attempts to explain the structure of the bee's honeycomb. In the first part, I discuss a candidate explanation, based on the mathematical Honeycomb Conjecture, presented in Lyon and Colyvan (2008). I argue that this explanation is not scientifically adequate. In the second part, I discuss other mathematical, physical and biological studies that could contribute to an explanation of the bee's honeycomb. The upshot is that most of the relevant mathematics is not yet sufficiently understood, and there is also an ongoing debate as to the biological details of the construction of the bee's honeycomb. The second part of the thesis is a bigger case study from physics: the genesis of GR. Chapter 5 is a short introduction to the history, physics and mathematics that is relevant to the genesis of general relativity (GR). Chapter 6 discusses the historical question as to what Marcel Grossmann contributed to the genesis of GR. I will examine the so-called "Entwurf" paper, an important joint publication by Einstein and Grossmann, containing the first tensorial formulation of GR. By comparing Grossmann's part with the mathematical theories he used, we can gain a better understanding of what is involved in the first steps of assimilating a mathematical theory to a physical question. In chapter 7, I introduce, and discuss, a recent account of the applicability of mathematics to the world, the Inferential Conception (IC), proposed by Bueno and Colyvan (2011). I give a short exposition of the IC, offer some critical remarks on the account, discuss potential philosophical objections, and I propose some extensions of the IC. In chapter 8, I put the Inferential Conception (IC) to work in the historical case study: the genesis of GR. I analyze three historical episodes, using the conceptual apparatus provided by the IC. In episode one, I investigate how the starting point of the application process, the "assumed structure", is chosen. Then I analyze two small application cycles that led to revisions of the initial assumed structure. In episode two, I examine how the application of "new" mathematics - the application of the Absolute Differential Calculus (ADC) to gravitational theory - meshes with the IC. In episode three, I take a closer look at two of Einstein's failed attempts to find a suitable differential operator for the field equations, and apply the conceptual tools provided by the IC so as to better understand why he erroneously rejected both the Ricci tensor and the November tensor in the Zurich Notebook.
Resumo:
In the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games, besides the country-versus-country typical showdown in the backdrop of Olympics, and the economic and political impulses for the host city, there was a third factor complicating the celebration: rivalry between the Catalan hosts and the Spanish state. By guiding the development of and eventual Olympic projection of national identity, Catalan and Spanish politicians hoped to create a resounding rallying point around which they could unite disparate individuals. The text is made up of: an introduction, five paragraphs on the different political perspective, conclusions, a commentary on the tallying of score and a note section with bibliographical references.
Resumo:
Les comunicacions cooperatives estan guanyant un gran interès en les comunicacions modernes degut a que permeten millorar la transmissió dʼinformació entre un emissor i un receptor utilitzant una sèrie de terminals situats entre ells. Aquest projecte és un estudi complet del sistemes cooperatius, analitzant el seu rendiment i comparant lʼús dʼun sol dʼaquests terminals amb lʼús del codi Alamouti, que utilitza dos terminals. Primer hi ha una introducció als sistemes cooperatius i a la teoria de la informació. Després hem estudiat un sistema cooperatiu amb la teoria de la informació com a base, en termes de probabilitat de fallada del sistema, i posteriorment lʼhem adaptat a un sistema cooperatiu real utilitzant una modulació QPSK, estudiant la seva probabilitat dʼerror de paquet. Finalment es proposen diversos protocols que permeten millorar el rendiment del sistema cooperatiu estudiat.
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We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The “TASP” (Time Average of the Shapley Polygon) gives a precise prediction about what happens when there is divergence from equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We use two 4 x 4 games each with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium; one is stable and one is unstable under learning. Both games are versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a fourth strategy, Dumb. Nash equilibrium places a weight of 1/2 on Dumb in both games, but the TASP places no weight on Dumb when the equilibrium is unstable. We also vary the level of monetary payoffs with higher payoffs predicted to increase instability. We find that the high payoff unstable treatment differs from the others. Frequency of Dumb is lower and play is further from Nash than in the other treatments. That is, we find support for the comparative statics prediction of learning theory, although the frequency of Dumb is substantially greater than zero in the unstable treatments.
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This paper was presented at the International Sport Business Symposium, held by the Capital University of Economics and Business in Beijing, in 2008. The speakers, Ferran Brunet, as a professor at the Autonomous University of Barcelona and Zuo Xinwen, as a member of Beijing Development and Reform Commission, both set out to analyze changes in the economic and social development of the city which were undertaken with the aim to celebrate the 2008 Olympic Games. They discuss aspects as a transformation in the mode of economic growth, resources of the Organizing Committee, investments related to the Games, transport and communications, industries, the balance of urban and rural development, urban construction and management service and operations into a well-off society.
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Two logically distinct and permissive extensions of iterative weak dominance are introduced for games with possibly vector-valued payoffs. The first, iterative partial dominance, builds on an easy-to check condition but may lead to solutions that do not include any (generalized) Nash equilibria. However, the second and intuitively more demanding extension, iterative essential dominance, is shown to be an equilibrium refinement. The latter result includes Moulin’s (1979) classic theorem as a special case when all players’ payoffs are real-valued. Therefore, essential dominance solvability can be a useful solution concept for making sharper predictions in multicriteria games that feature a plethora of equilibria.
Resumo:
This Working Paper was presented at the international workshop "Game Theory in International Relations at 50", organized and coordinated by Professor Jacint Jordana and Dr. Yannis Karagiannis at the Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals on May 22, 2009. The day-long Workshop was inspired by the desire to honour the ground-breaking work of Professor Thomas Schelling in 1959-1960, and to understand where the discipline International Relations lies today vis-à-vis game theory.
Resumo:
In this paper we unify, simplify, and extend previous work on the evolutionary dynamics of symmetric N-player matrix games with two pure strategies. In such games, gains from switching strategies depend, in general, on how many other individuals in the group play a given strategy. As a consequence, the gain function determining the gradient of selection can be a polynomial of degree N-1. In order to deal with the intricacy of the resulting evolutionary dynamics, we make use of the theory of polynomials in Bernstein form. This theory implies a tight link between the sign pattern of the gains from switching on the one hand and the number and stability of the rest points of the replicator dynamics on the other hand. While this relationship is a general one, it is most informative if gains from switching have at most two sign changes, as is the case for most multi-player matrix games considered in the literature. We demonstrate that previous results for public goods games are easily recovered and extended using this observation. Further examples illustrate how focusing on the sign pattern of the gains from switching obviates the need for a more involved analysis.
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The objective of this paper is to re-examine the risk-and effort attitude in the context of strategic dynamic interactions stated as a discrete-time finite-horizon Nash game. The analysis is based on the assumption that players are endogenously risk-and effort-averse. Each player is characterized by distinct risk-and effort-aversion types that are unknown to his opponent. The goal of the game is the optimal risk-and effort-sharing between the players. It generally depends on the individual strategies adopted and, implicitly, on the the players' types or characteristics.
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We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.
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We report the identification of a 48kDa antigen targeted by antibodies which inhibit Plasmodium falciparum in vitro growth by cooperation with blood monocytes in an ADCI assay correlated to the naturally acquired protection. This protein is located on the surface of the merozoite stage of P. falciparum, and is detectable in all isolates tested. Epidemiological studies demonstrated that peptides derived from the amino acid sequence of MSP-3 contain potent B and T-cell epitopes recognized by a majority of individuals living in endemic areas. Moreover human antibodies either purified on the recombinant protein, or on the synthetic peptide MSP-3b, as well as antibodies raised in mice, were all found to promote parasite killing mediated by monocytes.
Resumo:
"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."