Prime property institutions for a subprime era: Toward innovative models of homeownership

This Article breaks new ground toward contractual and institutional innovation in models of homeownership, equity building, and mortgage enforcement. Inspired by recent developments in the affordable housing sector and other types of public financing schemes, we suggest extending institutional and financial strategies such as time- and place-based division of property rights, conditional subsidies, and credit mediation to alleviate the systemic risks of mortgage foreclosure. Two new solutions offer a broad theoretical basis for such developments in the economic and legal institution of homeownership: a for-profit shared equity scheme led by local governments alongside a private market shared equity model, one of "bootstrapping home buying with purchase options".

Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment

Much like cognitive abilities, emotional skills can have major effects on performance and economic outcomes. This paper studies the behavior of professionalsubjects involved in a dynamic competition in their own natural environment. Thesetting is a penalty shoot-out in soccer where two teams compete in a tournamentframework taking turns in a sequence of five penalty kicks each. As the kicking order is determined by the random outcome of a coin flip, the treatment and control groups are determined via explicit randomization. Therefore, absent any psychological effects, both teams should have the same probability of winning regardless of the kicking order. Yet, we find a systematic first-kicker advantage. Using data on 2,731 penalty kicks from 262 shoot-outs for a three decade period, we find that teams kicking first win the penalty shoot-out 60.5% of the time. A dynamic panel data analysis shows that the psychological mechanism underlying this result arises from the asymmetry in the partial score. As most kicks are scored, kicking first typically means having the opportunity to lead in the partial score, whereas kicking second typically means lagging in the score and having the opportunity to, at most, get even. Having a worse prospect than the opponent hinders subjects' performance.Further, we also find that professionals are self-aware of their own psychological effects. When a recent change in regulations gives winners of the coin toss the chance to choose the kicking order, they rationally react to it by systematically choosing to kick first. A survey of professional players reveals that when asked to explain why they prefer to kick first, they precisely identify the psychological mechanism for which we find empirical support in the data: they want to lead in the score inorder to put pressure on the opponent.

A note on the convergence to competitive equilibria in economies with moral hazard

We examine the conditions under which competitive equilibria can beobtained as the limit, when the number of strategic traders getslarge, of Nash equilibria in economies with asymmetric informationon agents' effort and possibly imperfect observability of agents'trades. Convergence always occur when either effort is publiclyobserved (no matter what is the information available tointermediaries on agents' trades); or effort is private informationbut agents' trades are perfectly observed; or no information at allis available on agents' trades. On the other hand, when eachintermediary can observe its trades with an agent, but not theagent's trades with other intermediaries, the (Nash) equilibriawith strategic intermediaries do not converge to any of thecompetitive equilibria, for an open set of economies. The source ofthe difficulties for convergence is the combination of asymmetricinformation and the restrictions on the observability of tradeswhich prevent the formation of exclusive contractual relationshipsand generate barriers to entry in the markets for contracts.

Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard(hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium isdetermined by the interaction of financial intermediaries.The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is thatintermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: theagents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot bemonitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In thisset-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive constrainedinefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity isthat the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimalaction. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts doimplement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits andequilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definitionof third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture thenon-exclusivity of contracts).

The quasi-judicial role of large retailers: An efficiency hypothesis of their relation with suppliers

The paper explores an efficiency hypothesis regarding the contractual process between large retailers, such as Wal-Mart and Carrefour, and their suppliers. The empirical evidence presented supports the idea that large retailers play a quasi-judicial role, acting as "courts of first instance" in their relationships with suppliers. In this role, large retailers adjust the terms of trade to on-going changes and sanction performance failures, sometimes delaying payments. A potential abuse of their position is limited by the need for re-contracting and preserving their reputations. Suppliers renew their confidence in their retailers on a yearly basis, through writing new contracts. This renovation contradicts the alternative hypothesis that suppliers are expropriated by large retailers as a consequence of specific investments.

Model selection and error estimation

We study model selection strategies based on penalized empirical loss minimization. We point out a tight relationship between error estimation and data-based complexity penalization: any good error estimate may be converted into a data-based penalty function and the performance of the estimate is governed by the quality of the error estimate. We consider several penalty functions, involving error estimates on independent test data, empirical {\sc vc} dimension, empirical {\sc vc} entropy, andmargin-based quantities. We also consider the maximal difference between the error on the first half of the training data and the second half, and the expected maximal discrepancy, a closely related capacity estimate that can be calculated by Monte Carlo integration. Maximal discrepancy penalty functions are appealing for pattern classification problems, since their computation is equivalent to empirical risk minimization over the training data with some labels flipped.

Income and body mass index in Europe

The problem of obesity is alarming public health authorities around the world. Therefore, it is important to study its determinants. In this paper we explore the empirical relationship between household income and body mass index (BMI) in nine European Union countries. Our findings suggest that the association is negative for women, but we find no statistically significant relationship for men. However, we show that the different relationship for men and women appears to be driven by the negative relationship for women between BMI and individual income from work. We tentatively conclude that the negative relationship between household income and BMI for women may simply be capturing the wage penalty that obese women suffer in the labor market.

The three strands of intercultural polities: a comprehensive view. A critical review of Bouchard and Cantle recent books on interculturalism

Within the emerging policy debate on interculturalism we critically review two recent books in 2012: Bouchard’s L’interculturalisme: un point de vue quebecois, and Cantle’s Interculturalism: The New Era of Cohesion and Diversity. In my view, both contribute very directly to open a foundational debate on interculturalism. In addressing the point of convergence and the dividing lines of these two contributions, I will claim that in spite of having one core concept of interculturalism, there are, however, at least two basic conceptions that have to be interpreted in complementary ways: Bouchard’s essay represents the contractual strand, Cantle’s book the cohesion strand. At the end I would also suggest that these two strands do not manage to express explicitly that diversity can also be seen as a resource of innovation and creativity, and so can drive individual and social development. This view is based on the diversity advantage literature already informing most of the diversity debate in Europe and elsewhere. This is what I will call the constructivist strand. My ultimate purpose is to defend a comprehensive view, grounded on the argument that no one can have the sole authority to define intercultural policy, since the three strands can be applied at different moments, according to different purposes and policy needs. The challenge now is that policy managers be able to achieve a balance between these three policy drivers.

State of Iowa Employee Handbook, Revised October 2003

I hope you will find a great deal of challenge and personal satisfaction in your employment with the State. You have an important role in accomplishing the goals of your department and of state government. The State has a proud tradition built on the excellence of its employees and their work. We challenge you to help maintain and improve upon this tradition. You soon will discover that our pride is contagious! As a state employee, it is very important that you always present the best possible image to the public. Remember to act promptly, be courteous, and treat people, our customers, respectfully. Your actions will make a lasting impression .... be sure it is a positive one. This is your employee handbook. This information is based on Iowa Department of Administrative Services – Human Resources Enterprise (DAS-HRE) rules and policies. Much of the information in this handbook is also covered in the State’s collective bargaining agreements. Where there are differences between a collective bargaining agreement and this handbook, the collective bargaining agreement prevails for employees covered by the agreement. Where there are differences between this handbook and DAS-HRE rules and policies, DAS-HRE rules and policies prevail. Some of the employee benefit plans described in this handbook are subject to legal requirements concerning reporting and disclosure. This handbook contains highlights of those plans. For complete details about benefit plans, consult the benefit handbooks and the official plan documents. In case of any discrepancy, the official plan documents prevail. Of course, changes in laws may affect the benefit programs described in this handbook. The State of Iowa reserves the right to amend the contents of this handbook at any time without prior notice. The provisions of this handbook and other policies do not establish contractual rights or conditions of employment between the State and its employees.

Eficiència energètica aplicada a les instal·lacions de la Universitat de Vic

En termes generals, es pot definir l’Eficiència Energètica com la reducció del consum d’energia mantenint els mateixos serveis energètics, sense disminuir el nostre confort i qualitat de vida, protegint el medi ambient, assegurant el proveïment i fomentant un comportament Sostenible al seu ús. L’objectiu principal d’aquest treball, és reduir el consum d’energia i terme de potència contractat a la Universitat de Vic, aplicant un programa d’estalvi amb mesures correctores en el funcionament de les seves instal·lacions o espais. Per tal de poder arribar a aquest objectiu marcat, prèviament s’ha realitzat un estudi acurat, obtenint tota la informació necessària per poder aplicar les mesures correctores a la bossa més important de consum. Un cop trobada, dur a terme l’estudi de la viabilitat de la inversió de les mesures correctores més eficients, optimitzant els recursos destinats. L’espai on s’ha dut a terme l’estudi, ha estat a l’edifici F del Campus Miramarges, seguint les indicacions d’Arnau Bardolet (Cap de Manteniment de la UVIC). Aquest edifici consta d’un entresol, baixos i quatre plantes. L’equip de mesura que s’ha fet servir per realitzar l’estudi, és de la marca Circutor sèrie AR5-L, aquests equips són programables que mesuren, calculen i emmagatzemen en memòria els principals paràmetres elèctrics en xarxes trifàsiques. Els projectes futurs complementaris que es podrien realitzar a part d’aquest són: instal·lar sensors, instal·lar mòduls convertidors TCP/IP, aprofitar la xarxa intranet i crear un escada amb un sinòptic de control i gestió des d’un punt de treball. Aquest aplicatiu permet visualitzar en una pantalla d’un PC tots els estats dels elements controlats mitjançant un sinòptic (encendre/parar manualment l’enllumenat i endolls de les aules, estat d’enllumenat i endolls de les aules, consums instantanis/acumulats energètics, estat dels passadissos entre altres) i explotar les dades recollides a la base de dades. Cada espai tindria la seva lògica de funcionament automàtic específic. Entre les conclusions més rellevants obtingudes en aquest treball s’observa: · Que és pot reduir la potència contractada a la factura a l’estar per sota de la realment consumida. · Que no hi ha penalitzacions a la factura per consum de reactiva, ja que el compensador funciona correctament. · Que es pot reduir l’horari de l’inici del consum d’energia, ja que no correspon a l’activitat docent. · Els valors de la tensió i freqüència estan dintre de la normalitat. · Els harmònics estan al llindar màxim. Analitzant aquestes conclusions, voldria destacar les mesures correctores més importants que es poden dur a terme: canvi tecnològic a LED, temporitzar automàticament l’encesa i apagada dels fluorescents i equips informàtics de les aules “seguint calendari docent”, instal·lar sensors de moviment amb detecció lumínica als passadissos. Totes les conclusions extretes d’aquest treball, es poden aplicar a tots els edificis de la facultat, prèviament realitzant l’estudi individual de cadascuna, seguint els mateixos criteris per tal d’optimitzar la inversió.

Compendium of Scheduled Violations and Scheduled Fines, July 2015

When a court imposes a fine or forfeiture for a violation of state law, or city or county ordinance, except an ordinance regulating the parking of motor vehicles, the court or the clerk of the district court shall assess an additional penalty in the form of a criminal penalty surcharge equal to thirty-five percent of the fine or forfeiture imposed.

A territorial model of commuting in Catalonia, 1986-1996

Commuting consists in the fact that an important fraction of workers in developed countries do not reside close to their workplaces but at long distances from them, so they have to travel to their jobs and then back home daily. Although most workers hold a job in the same municipality where they live or in a neighbouring one, an important fraction of workers face long daily trips to get to their workplace and then back home.Even if we divide Catalonia (Spain) in small aggregations of municipalities, trying to make them as close to local labour markets as possible, we will find out that some of them have a positive commuting balance, attracting many workers from other areas and providing local jobs for almost all their resident workers. On the other side, other zones seem to be mostly residential, so an important fraction of their resident workers hold jobs in different local labour markets. Which variables influence an area¿s role as an attraction pole or a residential zone? In previous papers (Artís et al, 1998a, 2000; Romaní, 1999) we have brought out the main individual variables that influence commuting by analysing a sample of Catalan workers and their commuting decisions. In this paper we perform an analysis of the territorial variables that influence commuting, using data for aggregate commuting flows in Catalonia from the 1991 and 1996 Spanish Population Censuses.These variables influence commuting in two different ways: a zone with a dense, welldeveloped economical structure will have a high density of jobs. Work demand cannot be fulfilled with resident workers, so it spills over local boundaries. On the other side, this economical activity has a series of side-effects like pollution, congestion or high land prices which make these areas less desirable to live in. Workers who can afford it may prefer to live in less populated, less congested zones, where they can find cheaper land, larger homes and a better quality of life. The penalty of this decision is an increased commuting time. Our aim in this paper is to highlight the influence of local economical structure and amenities endowment in the workplace-residence location decision. A place-to-place logit commuting models is estimated for 1991 and 1996 in order to find the economical and amenities variables with higher influence in commuting decisions. From these models, we can outline a first approximation to the evolution of these variables in the 1986-1996 period. Data have been obtained from aggregate flow travel-matrix from the 1986, 1991 and 1996 Spanish Population Censuses

Le travail des sans-emploi : analyse sociologique de l'assignation à un programme d'emploi temporaire

RESUMECette recherche empirique porte sur les emplois temporaires subventionnés (ETS) instaurés dans le cadre du chômage et de l'aide sociale en Suisse depuis une dizaine d'années. La mise en place de politiques d'activation dans le cadre de la protection sociale met l'accent sur les liens explicites, souvent réglementaires, qu'entretiennent actuellement la protection sociale, les politiques de l'emploi et le marché du travail dans les pays industrialisés. Ces transformations ont largement contribué au développement d'activités exercées en marge du marché de l'emploi. Dans le cadre du chômage, comme dans celui de l'aide sociale, une mise au travail peut être exigée en contrepartie du versement des indemnités ; en Suisse, on nomme ce procédé l'assignation au travail. L'assignation est le processus par lequel un-e conseiller?ère en placement peut contraindre, sous peine de sanction (suppression des indemnités pour un temps déterminé) une personne au chômage (inscrit-e auprès d'un office régional de placement) à souscrire à une mesure du marché du travail (MMT), particulièrement les ETS.Cette recherche propose une analyse de l'assignation à un programme d'emploi temporaire sous l'éclairage de la sociologie du travail. Elle adopte une perspective compréhensive attentive aux tensions que vivent les individus pris dans une situation de travail hybride et inédite qui les place aux frontières des différentes catégories administratives de chômage, d'inactivité et de population occupée. Partant d'une étude empirique auprès de personnes assignées, cette recherche mène une analyse qualitative des conditions et de l'organisation du travail en ETS, des modalités contractuelles et statutaires des personnes assignées à une activité de travail contrainte et matériellement non reconnue, puisque non salariée. Elle s'attache également à cerner le vécu de l'assignation au travail, ainsi que le sens que les personnes lui attribuent dans leur trajectoire biographique et professionnelle.SUMMARYThis research investigates a specific and new form of labor, namely «temporary subsidized jobs» {emplois temporaires subventionnés, ETS) that have been developed since the late 1990s in Switzerland in the context of unemployment and social assistance benefits. Although ETS are specific to Switzerland, they echo similar «workfare» measures imposed on unemployed and welfare recipients introduced in recent years in almost all industrialized countries. Indeed, the evolution of public policies and the generalization of «active labour-market policies» {politiques d'activation) have become central to social protection in the majority of Western countries and have emerged in parallel to the expansion of work activities situated at the margins of traditional wage- labor.My analysis of the ETS phenomenon is informed by labor sociology and discusses the pertinence of a classical approach in grasping this hybrid and new work situation, which sets individual persons at the border between various administrative categories such as «unemployed», «inactive» and «at work». I investigate in particular the issue of contractual and statutory modalities imposed on persons who have been assigned to a form of activity that is both constraining as well as materially non-recognized (as it remains outside of traditional wage-labor forms). In order to understand ETS conditions and labor organization, my fieldwork consist of interviews of persons who have been assigned to it and observations. I investigate their personal experience, as well as the meaning that these individuals attribute to the ETS experience in the context of their biographical and professional trajectory.

A territorial model of commuting in Catalonia, 1986-1996

Commuting consists in the fact that an important fraction of workers in developed countries do not reside close to their workplaces but at long distances from them, so they have to travel to their jobs and then back home daily. Although most workers hold a job in the same municipality where they live or in a neighbouring one, an important fraction of workers face long daily trips to get to their workplace and then back home.Even if we divide Catalonia (Spain) in small aggregations of municipalities, trying to make them as close to local labour markets as possible, we will find out that some of them have a positive commuting balance, attracting many workers from other areas and providing local jobs for almost all their resident workers. On the other side, other zones seem to be mostly residential, so an important fraction of their resident workers hold jobs in different local labour markets. Which variables influence an area¿s role as an attraction pole or a residential zone? In previous papers (Artís et al, 1998a, 2000; Romaní, 1999) we have brought out the main individual variables that influence commuting by analysing a sample of Catalan workers and their commuting decisions. In this paper we perform an analysis of the territorial variables that influence commuting, using data for aggregate commuting flows in Catalonia from the 1991 and 1996 Spanish Population Censuses.These variables influence commuting in two different ways: a zone with a dense, welldeveloped economical structure will have a high density of jobs. Work demand cannot be fulfilled with resident workers, so it spills over local boundaries. On the other side, this economical activity has a series of side-effects like pollution, congestion or high land prices which make these areas less desirable to live in. Workers who can afford it may prefer to live in less populated, less congested zones, where they can find cheaper land, larger homes and a better quality of life. The penalty of this decision is an increased commuting time. Our aim in this paper is to highlight the influence of local economical structure and amenities endowment in the workplace-residence location decision. A place-to-place logit commuting models is estimated for 1991 and 1996 in order to find the economical and amenities variables with higher influence in commuting decisions. From these models, we can outline a first approximation to the evolution of these variables in the 1986-1996 period. Data have been obtained from aggregate flow travel-matrix from the 1986, 1991 and 1996 Spanish Population Censuses

Less Risk, More Effort : Demand Risk Allocation in Incomplete Contracts

This article investigates the allocation of demand risk within an incomplete contract framework. We consider an incomplete contractual relationship between a public authority and a private provider (i.e. a public-private partnership), in which the latter invests in non-verifiable cost-reducing efforts and the former invests in non-verifiable adaptation efforts to respond to changing consumer demand over time. We show that the party that bears the demand risk has fewer hold-up opportunities and that this leads the other contracting party to make more effort. Thus, in our model, bearing less risk can lead to more effort, which we describe as a new example of âeuro~counter-incentivesâeuro?. We further show that when the benefits of adaptation are important, it is socially preferable to design a contract in which the demand risk remains with the private provider, whereas when the benefits of cost-reducing efforts are important, it is socially preferable to place the demand risk on the public authority. We then apply these results to explain two well-known case studies.