Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores (revised version)

We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff vectors satisfying this condition. The additional requirement of transfer rate equilibrium refines the core concept and allows the selection of specific core payoff vectors. Lastly, the class of parametrized cooperative games is introduced. This new setting and its associated equilibrium-core solution extend the usual cooperative game framework and core solution to situations depending on an exogenous environment. A non-emptiness result for the equilibrium-core is also provided in the context of a parametrized cooperative game. Our proofs borrow mathematical tools and geometric constructions from general equilibrium theory with non convexities. Applications to extant results taken from game theory and economic theory are given.

Inequity version and team incentives

We study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity as modelled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). A "selfish" employer can profitably exploit such preferences among its employees by offering contracts which create inequity off-equilibrium and thus, they would leave employees feeling envy or guilt when they do not meet the employer's demands. Such contracts resemble team and relative performance contracts, and thus we derive conditions under which it may be beneficial to form work teams of employees with distributional concerns who were previously working individually. Similar results are obtained for status-seeking and efficiency concerns preferences.

Equilibrium play and best response to (Stated) beliefs in constant sum games

We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economists without previous experience in the laboratory. Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, 80% of actions taken in our experiment coincided with the prediction of the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and 73% of actions were best responses to elicited beliefs. We argue how social preferences, presentation effects and belief elicitation procedures may influence how subjects play in simple but non trivial games and explain the diferences we observe with respect to previous work.

La formación del Estado en el Valle Medio del Río Amarillo. Un acercamiento teórico y práctico a los inicios de la Edad del Bronce en China

L’objectiu de l’estudi és respondre a la pregunta: Quan i emprant quins criteris es possible afirmar l’existència d’Estat a la Xina? A l’apartat teòric es realitza una revisió crítica de la categoria “Mode de Producció Asiàtic” i de les diferents definicions i causes de desenvolupament de l’Estat. Es presenten els fonaments d’una concepció materialista històrica de l’Estat. A l’apartat pràctic es contrasta la hipòtesi de l’existència d’Estat analitzant dues societats successives: els grups neolítics Henan Longshan (2800-1900 cal ANE) i els Erlitou d’inicis de l’Edat del Bronze (1900-1500 cal ANE)

Anàlisi socio-ambiental dels usos tradicionals, actuals i futurs de les bordes : prova pilot a la zona del Bosc de Virós (Pallars Sobirà)

El present projecte ha estat desenvolupat entre l’octubre de 2006 i el febrer de 2007 per un equip de llicenciades en Ciències Ambientals per la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. L’objecte d’estudi han estat les bordes, construccions agro-ramaderes utilitzades tradicionalment per a emmagatzemar l’herba i estabular-hi el bestiar. L’àmbit d’estudi seleccionat ha estat el Bosc de Virós, contingut dins el municipi d’Alins, a la comarca del Pallars Sobirà, Catalunya. Part de la superfície estudiada es troba sota la protecció del Parc Natural de l’Alt Pirineu. Per a dur a terme aquest estudi, s’ha desenvolupat una metodologia d’estudi de bordes amb dues vessants diferenciades que requereixen de tècniques metodològiques específiques. La vessant tècnica d’aquestes construccions s’ha materialitzat en un inventari de bordes, desenvolupat a partir de dades obtingudes durant l’observació al camp. La vessant etnològica s’ha obtingut a través de la realització d’entrevistes als propietaris, usuaris i gestors de la zona. A partir de l’anàlisi dels resultats, s’ha detectat una pèrdua de la funció tradicional d’aquestes construccions, derivant a una diversificació dels usos i un elevat grau d’abandonament d’aquestes. La diagnosi de l’estat d’aquests edificis i la seva influència sobre l’entorn és que els nous usos desenvolupats generen pressions sobre el medi i que el desús implica la degradació de l’estructura, amb la conseqüent pèrdua de patrimoni.

The Rise of democracy in Europe and the fight against mass poverty in Latin America: the implications for marxist thought of some recent mainstream papers

Recently a number of mainstream papers have treated the rise of democracy in 19th century Europe and its instability in Latin America in an eminently Marxist fashion. This paper sets out their implications for Marxist thought. With respect to Europe, Marx's emphasis on political action backed by the threat of violence is vindicated but his justification for socialism is not. With respect to Latin America, the unequal distribution of wealth is the cause of political instability that is, in turn, the root cause of mass poverty. In addition it is possible to explain some of the paradoxical characteristics of neo-liberalism and to make a weak argument for socialism in spite of its rejection in Europe.

Marxian insights from the mainstream

Starting in 1999 a group of papers have appeared in mainstream journals that treat of the relation between capitalism and democracy in an eminently Marxian fashion. These analyses bear on a number of papers published mainly in S&S, specifically those of Castañada, Ellman, Harnacker, Nimtz and Petras. This paper provides résumés of all of these works and then sets out the implications of the mainstream papers for the left wing ones. It concludes by emphasising the importance for the left of the mainstream results.

Las ideas de Marx llegan a la corriente principal de la economía

The paper first sets out simplified versions of recent mainstream papers which explain the rise of democracy in 19th century Europe and its instabliity in Latin America. Then it attempts to convince Marxists of the importance of these works for Marxist thought.

Neoliberalismo europeo y la transición española vista desde el enfoque de clase y explotación

Recientemente, ha aparecido en la corriente principal de la economía, un nuevo enfoque que se expresa en términos de clase y explotación y que se basa en un modelo analítico complejo y sofisticado. El objetivo de este artículo es exponer dos ejemplos de este enfoque de forma simplificada y demostrar cómo explican la tendencia neoliberal reciente de la Unión Europea y la transición Española desde la dictadura hacia la democracia.

Sobre "clase y explotación" en la corriente principal de la economía

Recently a number of articles have appeared in the mainstream that deal with the economy in terms of class and exploitation. This paper sets out two of them in a simplified maner and explains why they may be of interest to left wing Latin American economists.

Political autonomy and independence: theory and experimental evidence

We study the process by which subordinated regions of a country can obtain a more favourable political status. In our theoretical model a dominant and a dominated region first interact through a voting process that can lead to different degrees of autonomy. If this process fails then both regions engage in a costly political conflict which can only lead to the maintenance of the initial subordination of the region in question or to its complete independence. In the subgame-perfect equilibrium the voting process always leads to an intermediate arrangement acceptable for both parts. Hence, the costly political struggle never occurs. In contrast, in our experiments we observe a large amount of fighting involving high material losses, even in a case in which the possibilities for an arrangement without conflict are very salient. In our experimental environment intermediate solutions are feasible and stable, but purely emotional elements prevent them from being reached.

Entry and market selection of firms: a laboratory study

We study competition in experimental markets in which two incumbents face entry by three other firms. Our treatments vary with respect to three factors: sequential vs. block or simultaneous entry, the cost functions of entrants and the amount of time during which incumbents are protected from entry. Before entry incumbents are able to collude in all cases. When all firms' costs are the same entry always leads consumer surplus and profits to their equilibrium levels. When entrants are more efficient than incumbents, entry leads consumer surplus to equilibrium. However, total profits remain below equilibrium, due to the fact that the inefficient incumbents produce too much and efficient entrants produce too little. Market behavior is satisfactory from the consumers' standpoint, but does not yield adequate signals to other potential entrants. These results are not affected by whether entry is simultaneous or sequential. The length of the incumbency phase does have some subtle effects.

Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs

We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership. Experimental subjects interact in groups of four in a series of weak-link games. The treatment variable is the distribution of high and low effort cost across subjects. We present data for one, two and three low-cost subjects as well as control sessions with symmetric costs. The overall pattern of coordination improvement is common across treatments. Early coordination improvements depend on the distribution of high and low effort costs across subjects, but these differences disappear with time. We find that initial leadership in overcoming coordination failure is not driven by low-cost subjects but by subjects with the most frequent cost. This conformity effect can be due to a kind of group identity or to the cognitive simplicity of acting with identical others.

Personal relations and their effect on behavior in an organizational setting: an experimental study

We study how personal relations affect performance in organizations. In the experimental game we use a manager has to assign different degrees of decision power to two employees. These two employees then have to make distributive decisions which affect themselves and the manager. Our focus is on the effects on managers' assignment of decision power and on employees' distributive decisions of one of the employees and the manager knowing each other personally. Our evidence shows that managers tend to favor employees that they personally know and that these employees tend, more than other employees, to favor the manager in their distributive decisions. However, this behavior does not affect the performance of the employees that do not know the manager. All these effects are independent of whether the employees that know the manager are more or less productive than those who do not know the manager. The results shed light on discrimination and nepotism and its consequences for the performance of family firms and other organizations.

Financial incentives in academia: research versus development

This paper investigates the effects of monetary rewards on the pattern of research. We build a simple repeated model of a researcher capable to obtain innovative ideas. We analyse how the legal environment affects the allocation of researcher's time between research and development. Although technology transfer objectives reduce the time spent in research, they might also induce researchers to conduct research that is more basic in nature, contrary to what the skewing problem would presage. We also show that our results hold even if development delays publication.