859 resultados para Collision theory model
Resumo:
1. We investigated experimentally predation by the flatworm Dugesia lugubris on the snail Physa acuta in relation to predator body length and to prey morphology [shell length (SL) and aperture width (AW)]. 2. SL and AW correlate strongly in the field, but display significant and independent variance among populations. In the laboratory, predation by Dugesia resulted in large and significant selection differentials on both SL and AW. Analysis of partial effects suggests that selection on AW was indirect, and mediated through its strong correlation with SL. 3. The probability P(ij) for a snail of size category i (SL) to be preyed upon by a flatworm of size category j was fitted with a Poisson-probability distribution, the mean of which increased linearly with predator size (i). Despite the low number of parameters, the fit was excellent (r2 = 0.96). We offer brief biological interpretations of this relationship with reference to optimal foraging theory. 4. The largest size class of Dugesia (>2 cm) did not prey on snails larger than 7 mm shell length. This size threshold might offer Physa a refuge against flatworm predation and thereby allow coexistence in the field. 5. Our results are further discussed with respect to previous field and laboratory observations on P acuta life-history patterns, in particular its phenotypic variance in adult body size.
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In the framework of the classical compound Poisson process in collective risk theory, we study a modification of the horizontal dividend barrier strategy by introducing random observation times at which dividends can be paid and ruin can be observed. This model contains both the continuous-time and the discrete-time risk model as a limit and represents a certain type of bridge between them which still enables the explicit calculation of moments of total discounted dividend payments until ruin. Numerical illustrations for several sets of parameters are given and the effect of random observation times on the performance of the dividend strategy is studied.
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We propose a method to evaluate cyclical models which does not require knowledge of the DGP and the exact empirical specification of the aggregate decision rules. We derive robust restrictions in a class of models; use some to identify structural shocks and others to evaluate the model or contrast sub-models. The approach has good size and excellent power properties, even in small samples. We show how to examine the validity of a class of models, sort out the relevance of certain frictions, evaluate the importance of an added feature, and indirectly estimate structural parameters.
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Glutathione (GSH), a major redox regulator and anti-oxidant, is decreased in cerebrospinal fluid and prefrontal cortex of schizophrenia patients. The gene of the key GSH-synthesizing enzyme, glutamate-cysteine ligase, modifier (GCLM) subunit, is associated with schizophrenia, suggesting that the deficit in the GSH system is of genetic origin. Using the GCLM knock-out (KO) mouse model with 60% decreased brain GSH levels, we have shown that redox dysregulation results in abnormal brain morphology and function. Current theory holds that schizophrenia is a developmental disease involving progressive anatomical and functional brain pathology. Here, we used GCLM KO mice to investigate the impact of a genetically dysregulated redox system on the neurochemical profile of the developing brain. The anterior and posterior cortical neurochemical profile of male and female GCLM KO, heterozygous and wildtype mice was determined by localised in vivo 1H NMR spectroscopy at 14.1 T (Varian/Magnex spectrometer) on post-natal days 10, 20, 30, 60 and 90. We show, for the first time, (1) that high quality 1H NMR spectra can be acquired from early developing mouse brains and (2) that recurrent anaesthesia by itself when administered at the same developmental days has no adverse effects on brain metabolites nor on adult behaviour. (3) Most importantly, our results reveal genotype and age specific changes for a number of metabolites revealing insight into normal brain development and about the impact of genetic GSH dysregulation.
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This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.
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We present a theory of choice among lotteries in which the decision maker's attention is drawn to (precisely defined) salient payoffs. This leads the decision maker to a context-dependent representation of lotteries in which true probabilities are replaced by decision weights distorted in favor of salient payoffs. By endogenizing decision weights as a function of payoffs, our model provides a novel and unified account of many empirical phenomena, including frequent risk-seeking behavior, invariance failures such as the Allais paradox, and preference reversals. It also yields new predictions, including some that distinguish it from Prospect Theory, which we test.
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When individuals in a population can acquire traits through learning, each individual may express a certain number of distinct cultural traits. These traits may have been either invented by the individual himself or acquired from others in the population. Here, we develop a game theoretic model for the accumulation of cultural traits through individual and social learning. We explore how the rates of innovation, decay, and transmission of cultural traits affect the evolutionary stable (ES) levels of individual and social learning and the number of cultural traits expressed by an individual when cultural dynamics are at a steady-state. We explore the evolution of these phenotypes in both panmictic and structured population settings. Our results suggest that in panmictic populations, the ES level of learning and number of traits tend to be independent of the social transmission rate of cultural traits and is mainly affected by the innovation and decay rates. By contrast, in structured populations, where interactions occur between relatives, the ES level of learning and the number of traits per individual can be increased (relative to the panmictic case) and may then markedly depend on the transmission rate of cultural traits. This suggests that kin selection may be one additional solution to Rogers's paradox of nonadaptive culture.
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A critical feature of cooperative animal societies is the reproductive skew, a shorthand term for the degree to which a dominant individual monopolizes overall reproduction in the group. Our theoretical analysis of the evolutionarily stable skew in matrifilial (i.e., mother-daughter) societies, in which relatednesses to offspring are asymmetrical, predicts that reproductive skews in such societies should tend to be greater than those of semisocial societies (i.e., societies composed of individuals of the same generation, such as siblings), in which relatednesses to offspring are symmetrical. Quantitative data on reproductive skews in semisocial and matrifilial associations within the same species for 17 eusocial Hymenoptera support this prediction. Likewise, a survey of reproductive partitioning within 20 vertebrate societies demonstrates that complete reproductive monopoly is more likely to occur in matrifilial than in semisocial societies, also as predicted by the optimal skew model.
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An incentives based theory of policing is developed which can explain the phenomenon of random “crackdowns,” i.e., intermittent periods of high interdiction/surveillance. For a variety of police objective functions, random crackdowns can be part of the optimal monitoring strategy. We demonstrate support for implications of the crackdown theory using traffic data gathered by the Belgian Police Department and use the model to estimate the deterrence effectof additional resources spent on speeding interdiction.
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We estimate a forward-looking monetary policy reaction function for thepostwar United States economy, before and after Volcker's appointmentas Fed Chairman in 1979. Our results point to substantial differencesin the estimated rule across periods. In particular, interest ratepolicy in the Volcker-Greenspan period appears to have been much moresensitive to changes in expected inflation than in the pre-Volckerperiod. We then compare some of the implications of the estimated rulesfor the equilibrium properties of inflation and output, using a simplemacroeconomic model, and show that the Volcker-Greenspan rule is stabilizing.
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We reformulate the Smets-Wouters (2007) framework by embedding the theory of unemployment proposed in Galí (2011a,b). Weestimate the resulting model using postwar U.S. data, while treatingthe unemployment rate as an additional observable variable. Our approach overcomes the lack of identification of wage markup and laborsupply shocks highlighted by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2008) intheir criticism of New Keynesian models, and allows us to estimate a"correct" measure of the output gap. In addition, the estimated modelcan be used to analyze the sources of unemployment fluctuations.
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Alan S. Milward was an economic historian who developed an implicit theory ofhistorical change. His interpretation which was neither liberal nor Marxist positedthat social, political, and economic change, for it to be sustainable, had to be agradual process rather than one resulting from a sudden, cataclysmicrevolutionary event occurring in one sector of the economy or society. Benignchange depended much less on natural resource endowment or technologicaldevelopments than on the ability of state institutions to respond to changingpolitical demands from within each society. State bureaucracies were fundamentalto formulating those political demands and advising politicians of ways to meetthem. Since each society was different there was no single model of developmentto be adopted or which could be imposed successfully by one nation-state onothers, either through force or through foreign aid programs. Nor coulddevelopment be promoted simply by copying the model of a more successfuleconomy. Each nation-state had to find its own response to the political demandsarising from within its society. Integration occurred when a number of nation states shared similar political objectives which they could not meet individuallybut could meet collectively. It was not simply the result of their increasinginterdependence. It was how and whether nation-states responded to thesedomestic demands which determined the nature of historical change.
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The mechanisms in the Nash program for cooperative games are madecompatible with the framework of the theory of implementation. This is donethrough a reinterpretation of the characteristic function that avoids feasibilityproblems, thereby allowing an analysis that focuses exclusively on the payoff space. In this framework, we show that the core is the only majorcooperative solution that is Maskin monotonic. Thus, implementation of mostcooperative solutions must rely on refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept(like most papers in the Nash program do). Finally, the mechanisms in theNash program are adapted into the model.
Resumo:
A method to evaluate cyclical models not requiring knowledge of the DGP and the exact specificationof the aggregate decision rules is proposed. We derive robust restrictions in a class of models; use someto identify structural shocks in the data and others to evaluate the class or contrast sub-models. Theapproach has good properties, even in small samples, and when the class of models is misspecified. Themethod is used to sort out the relevance of a certain friction (the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers)in a standard class of models.
Resumo:
In this paper we propose a simple and general model for computing the Ramsey optimal inflation tax, which includes several models from the previous literature as special cases. We show that it cannot be claimed that the Friedman rule is always optimal (or always non--optimal) on theoretical grounds. The Friedman rule is optimal or not, depending on conditions related to the shape of various relevant functions. One contribution of this paper is to relate these conditions to {\it measurable} variables such as the interest rate or the consumption elasticity of money demand. We find that it tends to be optimal to tax money when there are economies of scale in the demand for money (the scale elasticity is smaller than one) and/or when money is required for the payment of consumption or wage taxes. We find that it tends to be optimal to tax money more heavily when the interest elasticity of money demand is small. We present empirical evidence on the parameters that determine the optimal inflation tax. Calibrating the model to a variety of empirical studies yields a optimal nominal interest rate of less than 1\%/year, although that finding is sensitive to the calibration.