Evaluación de productos botánicos para el manejo del complejo mosca blanca (Bemisia tabaci, Gennadius)-Geminivirus y otros insectos plagas en el cultivo de tomate (Solanum lycopersicum L.), en Tisma, Masaya

La mosca blanca (Bemisia tabaci) y los Geminivirus son las principales plagas causantes de pérdidas económicas en el cultivo de tomate (Solanum lycopersicum, Mill) en el municipio de Tisma-Masaya. En base a esta situación se realizó un estudio para evaluar la efectividad que tiene para controlar plagas los tratamientos botánicos: Chile+Ajo+Jabón, Madero Negro, Crisantemo, Extracto alcohólico+Chile, Extracto alcohólico+ Chile+ Ajo y Testigo en el período comprendido entre Diciembre 2013 a Febrero 2014. Las variables evaluadas fueron: número de mosca blanca por planta, Incidencia del daño de virosis de mosca blanca por planta, severidad del daño de virosis de mosca blanca por planta, y otros organismos plagas en el rubro: Halticus sp por planta, áfidos (Aphis gossypii) por planta, y minador de la hoja (Liriomyza sp) por planta. De los tratamientos evaluados, el menor número de moscas blancas por planta y menor porcentaje de incidencia(47%) y severidad (51%) lo obtuvo el tratamiento Extracto Alcohólico + Chile+ Ajo. El tratamiento Madero Negro presentó la mayor efectividad en el manejo de poblaciones de Halticus sp. y Lyriomiza sp., mientras que el Extracto Alcohólico + Chile + Ajo presentó los mejores resultados para el manejo de Aphis gossypii. El análisis económico reveló que el mayor rendimiento lo obtuvo el Extracto Alcohólico+ Chile + Ajo con 34685.18 kg/ha seguido del tratamiento Chile+ Ajo+ Jabón (30614.28 kg/ha). En el análisis de retorno marginal resultó que el tratamiento Chile+ Ajo+ Jabón es el que obtuvo la mejor tasa de retorno marginal con 1476 %, es decir, 14.76 US$ por cada dólar invertido. El análisis realizado en la Universidad de Tucson Arizona en muestra de mosca blanca procedente de Tisma- Masaya determinó que de la muestra un 66.66% corresponde a la mosca blanca autóctona (biotipo A), y el 33.33% corresponde al biotipo B que es más agresivo que el A. Y el análisis de los begomovirus determinó: Enrollamiento severo de la hoja de tomate (ToSLCV) con 97.4% de identidad y el Virus del mosaico dorado de la chiltoma (PepGMV) con un 98% de identidad.

Evaluación de cultivares a pequeña escala, su adaptabilidad y respuesta a enmiendas orgánicas, en la microcuenca Orocuina, Somoto, 2011

Con el propósito de evaluar rendimientos y adaptabilidad de variedades mejoradas en granos básicos (maíz y frijol), hortalizas (cebolla) y pastos, ante las frecuentes sequías y su efecto a la mejora de la calidad de suelo en la microcuenca Orocuina, municipio de Somoto; se establecieron en tres fincas representativas del área un total de nueve parcelas ó ensayos productivos en sitios que oscilan entre 1 320 y 7 026 m2, en época de postrera 2011. Las variedades utilizadas fueron maíz Nutrader, maíz criollo Catacama, frijol INTA-Rojo y frijol balín como criollo, cebolla Orlando, pasto Mulato II y gamba. Previo al establecimiento de los ensayos, se seleccionaron localmente un grupo de indicadores sencillos entre los cuales están; el contenido de materia orgánica en el suelo, tasa de infiltración de agua en el suelo, textura, pendiente del terreno, profundidad del suelo, piedras en la superficie, espesor orgánico, pH y fósforo disponible. Los cálculos indican que el contenido de materia orgánica comprende niveles medios para las tres fincas bajo estudio, este indicador es el más importante ya que permite evaluar la calidad de suelos en vista de la influencia positiva en las propiedades y funciones básicas del suelo. Los niveles de fósforo disponible van de pobre a bueno, presenta suelos óptimos para la agricultura, textura es arcillosa, franca arcillo arenosa y franco arcillo limosa; sin embargo, estos suelos tienen potencial para establecer una alternativa que permita incrementar los rendimientos de los cultivos, mediante prácticas de manejo adecuado como obras de conservación de suelos garantizando de esta manera la sostenibilidad de este recurso. Los resultados obtenidos indicaron una respuesta propia a diferentes aplicaciones de las fuentes de fertilizantes, la fertilización sintética (urea) y abono orgánico (lombrihumus), los rendimientos obtenidos fueronde 1 6 82kg ha-1 (maíz Nutrader) y 1 954 kg ha-1(maíz Catacama);1045 kg ha-1 (frijol INTA-Rojo) y 1 136 kg ha 1 (frijol Balín); para el cultivo de Cebolla Orlando en la fertilización sintética 14 544 kg ha-1, compuesta 8 954 kg ha-1 y sin fertilizar 6 079 kg ha-1 respectivamente. Para la fertilización compuesta (18-46-0 más lombrihumus),20 271 kg ha-1 (pasto mulato II)y 15 180 kg ha-1 (pasto gamba) de materia seca. El análisis económico muestra que el cultivo de pasto gamba, fertilizado 18-46-0 y lombrihumus obtuvo los mayores beneficios económicos con C$ 2.69, donde se recupera el córdoba invertido más 1.69 córdoba adicional de ganancias.

Efecto de diferentes densidades de siembra sobre el crecimiento y rendimiento del cultivo de chía (Salvia hispánica L.) Sébaco, Matagalpa, 2015

Este trabajo se realizó con la finalidad de d eterminar la influencia de diferentes densidades de siembra (10, 20, 30 y 40 plantas/m) , sobre el crecimiento, desarrollo y rendimiento de l cultivo de chía ( Salvia hispánica L.) ; se efectuó análisis económico a través de cálculo de costos de producción para determinar la rentabilidad de los tratamientos . Se estableció en el periodo de septiembre 2014 a febrero 2015, en la finca Tamarindo de Oro, de la ciudad de Sébaco, Matagalpa, ubicado a 1 02 km al N orte de Managua. Se utilizó un diseño experimental uní - factorial en arreglos de b loques completos al azar, con 4 tratamientos y 6 repeticiones. Las variables evaluadas fueron, altura de planta, diámetro de tallo, número de ramas primarias y secundarias, número de espigas y r endimiento a la cosecha, presentando en todas ellas diferencia estadística significativa , a excepción de la variable de rendimiento . Para la variable altura de planta, en la densidad más alta (40 plantas/m) , se obtuvo la m ayor altura con un promedio de 1.24 metros. La densidad más baja (10 plantas/m), fue la que logró los mejores resultado en las variables diámetro ( 0.83 mm ) , ramas primarias ( 12 unidad ) , secundarias (15 unidad ) , espigas ( 27 unidad ) y rendimiento (826.46 kg/ha) . El análisis económico demuestra una relación beneficio costos mayor de 1 esto quiere decir que todos los tratamiento s presenta ron una rentabilidad viable, donde el tratamiento a 1 de 10 plantas/m, es mayor en relación a los demás

Profit as Cost versus Profit as Surplus over Cost: A Case Study on Varian's "Intermediate Microeconomics"

On the analysis of Varian’s textbook on Microeconomics, which I take to be a representative of the standard view, I argue that Varian provides two contrary notions of profit, namely, profit as surplus over cost and profit as cost. Varian starts by defining profit as the surplus of revenues over cost and, thus, as the part of the value of commodities that is not any cost; however, he provides a second definition of profit as a cost, namely, as the opportunity cost of capital. I also argue that the definition of competitive profit as the opportunity cost of capital involves a self-contradictory notion of opportunity cost.

Two-part tariff licensing mechanisms

Most of the patent licensing agreements that are observed include royalties, in particular per-unit or ad valorem royalties. This paper shows that in a differ entiated duopoly that competes á la Cournot the optimal contract for an internal patentee always includes a positive royalty. Moreover, we show that the patentee would prefer to use ad valorem royalties rather than per-unit royalties when goods are complements or when they are substitutes and the degree of differentiation is suffciently low. The reason is that by including an ad valorem royalty in the licensing contract the patentee can commit strategically to be more (less) aggressive when goods are complements (substitutes) since his licensing revenues become increasing with the price of output of his rival. As a result, licensing may hurt consumers although it always increases social welfare.

Asymmetric flow networks

This paper provides a new model of network formation that bridges the gap between the two benchmark models by Bala and Goyal, the one-way flow model, and the two-way flow model, and includes both as particular extreme cases. As in both benchmark models, in what we call an "asymmetric flow" network a link can be initiated unilaterally by any player with any other, and the flow through a link towards the player who supports it is perfect. Unlike those models, in the opposite direction there is friction or decay. When this decay is complete there is no flow and this corresponds to the one-way flow model. The limit case when the decay in the opposite direction (and asymmetry) disappears, corresponds to the two-way flow model. We characterize stable and strictly stable architectures for the whole range of parameters of this "intermediate" and more general model. We also prove the convergence of Bala and Goyal's dynamic model in this context.

Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria

We extend Aumann's [3] theorem deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker notion, joint p-belief of rationality, where agents believe the other agents are rational with probabilities p = (pi)i2I or more. We show that behavior in this case constitutes a constrained correlated equilibrium of a doubled game satisfying certain p-belief constraints and characterize the topological structure of the resulting set of p-rational outcomes. We establish continuity in the parameters p and show that, for p su ciently close to one, the p-rational outcomes are close to the correlated equilibria and, with high probability, supported on strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Finally, we extend Aumann and Dreze's [4] theorem on rational expectations of interim types to the broader p-rational belief systems, and also discuss the case of non-common priors.

Evolution of Cooperation in the Snowdrift Game with Incomplete Information and Heterogeneous Population

Differently from previous studies of tag-based cooperation, we assume that individuals fail to recognize their own tag. Due to such incomplete information, the action taken against the opponent cannot be based on similarity, although it is still motivated by the tag displayed by the opponent. We present stability conditions for the case when individuals play unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection or conditional cooperation. We then consider the removal of one or two strategies. Results show that conditional cooperators are the most resilient agents against extinction and that the removal of unconditional cooperators may lead to the extinction of unconditional defectors.

Games with perceptions

We assume that 2 x 2 matrix games are publicly known and that players perceive a dichotomous characteristic on their opponents which defines two types for each player. In turn, each type has beliefs concerning her opponent's types, and payoffs are assumed to be type-independent. We analyze whether the mere possibility of different types playing different strategies generates discriminatory equilibria. Given a specific information structure we find that in equilibrium a player discriminates between her types if and only if her opponent does so. We also find that for dominant solvable 2x2 games no discriminatory equilibrium exists, while under different conditions of concordance between players' beliefs discrimination appears for coordination and for competitive games. A complete characterization of the set of Bayesian equilibria is provided.

The von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets for 2x2 games

We analyze the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of 2 2 games when only single profitable deviations are allowed. We show that the games without a strict Nash equilibrium have a unique vN&M stable set and otherwise they have infinite sets.

Learning in Network Games

We report the findings of an experiment designed to study how people learn and make decisions in network games. Network games offer new opportunities to identify learning rules, since on networks (compared to e.g. random matching) more rules differ in terms of their information requirements. Our experimental design enables us to observe both which actions participants choose and which information they consult before making their choices. We use this information to estimate learning types using maximum likelihood methods. There is substantial heterogeneity in learning types. However, the vast majority of our participants' decisions are best characterized by reinforcement learning or (myopic) best-response learning. The distribution of learning types seems fairly stable across contexts. Neither network topology nor the position of a player in the network seem to substantially affect the estimated distribution of learning types.

Long-Term Growth and Persistence with Endogenous Depreciation: Theory and Evidence

Previous research has shown a strong positive correlation between short-term persistence and long-term output growth as well as between depreciation rates and long-term output growth. This evidence, therefore, contradicts the standard predictions from traditional neoclassical or AK-type growth models with exogenous depreciation. In this paper, we first confirm these findings for a larger sample of 101 countries. We then study the dynamics of growth and persistence in a model where both the depreciation rate and growth are endogenous and procyclical. We find that the model s predictions become consistent with the empirical evidence on persistence, long-term growth and depreciation rates.

A monotonic core concept for convex games: The SD-prenucleolus

We prove that the SD-prenucleolus satisfies monotonicity in the class of convex games. The SD-prenucleolus is thus the only known continuous core concept that satisfies monotonicity for convex games. We also prove that for convex games the SD-prenucleolus and the SD-prekernel coincide.

Consumption and portfolio rules whit stochastic hyperbolic discounting

We extend the classic Merton (1969, 1971) problem that investigates the joint consumption-savings and portfolio-selection problem under capital risk by assuming sophisticated but time-inconsistent agents. We introduce stochastic hyperbolic preferences as in Harris and Laibson (2013) and find closed-form solutions for Merton's optimal consumption and portfolio selection problem in continuous time. We find that the portfolio rule remains identical to the time-consistent solution with power utility and no borrowing constraints. However,the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is unambiguously greater than the time-consistent, exponential case and,importantly, it is also more responsive to changes in risk. These results suggest that hyperbolic discounting with sophisticated agents offers promise for contributing to explaining important aspects of asset market data.

Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and farsighted behavior

This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or reject, and con ict is solved bilaterally between the rejector and the proposer. We allow the proposer to make sequential proposals over several periods. If responders are myopic maximizers (i.e. consider each period in isolation), the only equilibrium outcome is the serial rule of Arin and Feltkamp (2012) regardless of the order of moves. If all players are farsighted, the serial rule still arises as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if the order of moves is such that stronger players respond to the proposal after weaker ones.