The Minimum Safety Standard, Consumers’ Information, and Competition, February 2007

This paper explores the effects of a standard influencing care choice. Firm(s) may increase the probability of offering safe products by incurring a cost. Under duopoly, they compete either in prices or in quantities. Under perfect information about safety for consumers, the selected standard that corrects a safety underinvestment is always compatible with competition. Safety over investment only emerges under competition in quantities and relatively low values of the cost. Under imperfect information about safety for consumers, the standard leads to a monopoly situation. However, for relatively large values of the cost, a standard cannot impede the market failure coming from the lack of information.

Iowa Department of Public Safety Agency Performance Plan, 2007

Agency Performance Plan

Audit report on Highway Safety Projects administered by The Integer Group Midwest for the year ended September 30, 2006

Audit report on Highway Safety Projects administered by The Integer Group Midwest for the year ended September 30, 2006

Audit report on the Iowa Department of Public Safety for the year ended June 30, 2006

Audit report on the Iowa Department of Public Safety for the year ended June 30, 2006

Safety Impacts of Pavement Edge Drop-offs, 2006

A vehicle may leave its travel lane for a number of reasons, such as driver error, poor surface conditions, or avoidance of a collision with another vehicle in the travel lane. When a vehicle leaves the travel lane, pavement edge drop-off poses a potential safety hazard because significant vertical differences between surfaces can affect vehicle stability and reduce a driver’s ability to handle the vehicle. Numerous controlled studies have tested driver response to encountering drop-offs under various conditions, including different speeds, vehicle types, drop-off height and shape, and tire scrubbing versus non-scrubbing conditions. The studies evaluated the drivers’ ability to return to and recover within their own travel lane after leaving the roadway and encountering a drop-off. Many of these studies, however, have used professional drivers as test subjects, so results may not always apply to the population of average drivers. Furthermore, test subjects are always briefed on what generally is to be expected and how to respond; thus, the sense of surprise that a truly naïve driver may experience upon realizing that one or two of his or her tires have just dropped off the edge of the pavement, is very likely diminished. Additionally, the studies were carried out under controlled conditions. The actual impact of pavement edge drop-off on drivers’ ability to recover safely once they leave the roadway, however, is not well understood under actual driving conditions. Additionally, little information is available that quantifies the number or severity of crashes that occur where pavement edge drop-off may have been a contributing factor. Without sufficient information about the frequency of edge drop-off-related crashes, agencies are not fully able to measure the economic benefits of investment decisions, evaluate the effectiveness of different treatments to mitigate edge drop-off, or focus maintenance resources. To address these issues, this report details research to quantify the contribution of pavement edge drop-off to crash frequency and severity. Additionally, the study evaluated federal and state guidance in sampling and addressing pavement edge drop-off and quantified the extent of pavement edge drop-off in two states. This study focused on rural two-lane paved roadways with unpaved shoulders, since they are often high speed facilities (55+ mph), have varying levels of maintenance, and are likely to be characterized by adverse roadway conditions such as narrow lanes or no shoulders.

Transfers, social safety nets and economic growth

The role of social safety nets in the form of redistributional transfersand wage subsidies is analyzed using a simple model of criminal behavior. Itis argued that public welfare programs act as a crime--preventing ordisruption--preventing devices because they tend to increase the opportunitycost of engaging in crime or disruptive activities. It is shown that, in thepresence of a leisure choice, wage subsidies may be better than pure transfers. Using a simple growth model, it is shown that it is not optimal for the governmentto try to fully eliminate crime. The optimal size of the public welfare programis found and it is argued that public welfare should be financed with income(not lump--sum) taxes, despite the fact that income taxes are distortionary.The intuition for this result is that income taxes act as a user fee oncongested public goods and transfers can be thought of as {\it productive}public goods {\it subject to congestion}. Finally, using a cross-section of 75 countries, the partial correlation betweentransfers and growth is shown to be significantly positive.

CrossRoads, Spring/Summer 2005; quarterly publication of the Governor's Traffic Safety Bureau, Iowa Department of Public Safety

Quarterly publication of the Governor's Traffic Safety Bureau, Iowa Department of Public Safety containing traffic safety and related information and news articles

CrossRoads, Autumn 2006; quarterly publication of the Governor's Traffic Safety Bureau, Iowa Department of Public Safety

Quarterly publication of the Governor's Traffic Safety Bureau, Iowa Department of Public Safety containing traffic safety and related information and news articles

Report on the Iowa Department of Public Safety for the year ended June 30, 2007

Report on the Iowa Department of Public Safety for the year ended June 30, 2007

Iowa Department of Public Safety Performance Plan, FY 2009

Agency Performance Plan, Iowa Department of Public Safety

Iowa Department of Public Safety Strategic Plan, 2008

This report outlines the strategic plan for Iowa Department of Public Safety, goals and mission.

Location models for airline hubs behaving as M/D/c queues

Models are presented for the optimal location of hubs in airline networks, that take into consideration the congestion effects. Hubs, which are the most congested airports, are modeled as M/D/c queuing systems, that is, Poisson arrivals, deterministic service time, and {\em c} servers. A formula is derived for the probability of a number of customers in the system, which is later used to propose a probabilistic constraint. This constraint limits the probability of {\em b} airplanes in queue, to be lesser than a value $\alpha$. Due to the computational complexity of the formulation. The model is solved using a meta-heuristic based on tabu search. Computational experience is presented.