922 resultados para political thought
Resumo:
The Dark Ages are generally held to be a time of technological and intellectual stagnation in western development. But that is not necessarily the case. Indeed, from a certain perspective, nothing could be further from the truth. In this paper we draw historical comparisons, focusing especially on the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, between the technological and intellectual ruptures in Europe during the Dark Ages, and those of our current period. Our analysis is framed in part by Harold Innis’s2 notion of "knowledge monopolies". We give an overview of how these were affected by new media, new power struggles, and new intellectual debates that emerged in thirteenth and fourteenth century Europe. The historical salience of our focus may seem elusive. Our world has changed so much, and history seems to be an increasingly far-from-favoured method for understanding our own period and its future potentials. Yet our seemingly distant historical focus provides some surprising insights into the social dynamics that are at work today: the fracturing of established knowledge and power bases; the democratisation of certain "sacred" forms of communication and knowledge, and, conversely, the "sacrosanct" appropriation of certain vernacular forms; challenges and innovations in social and scientific method and thought; the emergence of social world-shattering media practices; struggles over control of vast networks of media and knowledge monopolies; and the enclosure of public discursive and social spaces for singular, manipulative purposes. The period between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries in Europe prefigured what we now call the Enlightenment, perhaps moreso than any other period before or after; it shaped what the Enlightenment was to become. We claim no knowledge of the future here. But in the "post-everything" society, where history is as much up for sale as it is for argument, we argue that our historical perspective provides a useful analogy for grasping the wider trends in the political economy of media, and for recognising clear and actual threats to the future of the public sphere in supposedly democratic societies.
Resumo:
The Dark Ages are generally held to be a time of technological and intellectual stagnation in western development. But that is not necessarily the case. Indeed, from a certain perspective, nothing could be further from the truth. In this paper we draw historical comparisons, focusing especially on the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, between the technological and intellectual ruptures in Europe during the Dark Ages, and those of our current period. Our analysis is framed in part by Harold Innis’s2 notion of "knowledge monopolies". We give an overview of how these were affected by new media, new power struggles, and new intellectual debates that emerged in thirteenth and fourteenth century Europe. The historical salience of our focus may seem elusive. Our world has changed so much, and history seems to be an increasingly far-from-favoured method for understanding our own period and its future potentials. Yet our seemingly distant historical focus provides some surprising insights into the social dynamics that are at work today: the fracturing of established knowledge and power bases; the democratisation of certain "sacred" forms of communication and knowledge, and, conversely, the "sacrosanct" appropriation of certain vernacular forms; challenges and innovations in social and scientific method and thought; the emergence of social world-shattering media practices; struggles over control of vast networks of media and knowledge monopolies; and the enclosure of public discursive and social spaces for singular, manipulative purposes. The period between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries in Europe prefigured what we now call the Enlightenment, perhaps moreso than any other period before or after; it shaped what the Enlightenment was to become. We claim no knowledge of the future here. But in the "post-everything" society, where history is as much up for sale as it is for argument, we argue that our historical perspective provides a useful analogy for grasping the wider trends in the political economy of media, and for recognising clear and actual threats to the future of the public sphere in supposedly democratic societies.
Resumo:
This is a deliberately contentious paper about the future of the socio-political sphere in the West based on what we know about its past. I argue that the predominant public discourse in Western countries is best characterised as one of selective forgetfulness; a semi-blissful, amnesiacal state of collective dementia that manifests itself in symbolic idealism: informationalism. Informationalism is merely the latest form of idealism. It is a lot like religion insofar as it causally relates abstract concepts with reality and, consequently, becomes confused between the two. Historically, this has proven to be a dangerous state of affairs, especially when elites becomes confused between ideas about how a society should work, and the way it actually does work. Central to the idealism of the information age, at least in intellectual spheres, is the so called "problem of the subject". I argue that the "problem of the subject" is a largely synthetic, destabilising, and ultimately fruitless theoretical abstraction which turns on a synthetically derived, generalised intradiscursive space; existentialist nihilism; and the theoretical baubles of ontological metaphysics. These philosophical aberrations are, in turn, historically concomitant with especially destructive political and social configurations. This paper sketches a theoretical framework for identity formation which rejects the problem of the subject, and proposes potential resources, sources, and strategies with which to engage the idealism that underpins this obfuscating problematic in an age of turbulent social uncertainty. Quite simply, I turn to history as the source of human identity. While informationalism, like religion, is mostly focused on utopian futures, I assert that history, not the future, holds the solutions for substantive problematics concerning individual and social identities. I argue here that history, language, thought, and identity are indissolubly entangled and so should be understood as such: they are the fundamental parts of 'identities in action'. From this perspective, the ‘problem of the subject’ becomes less a substantive intellectual problematic and more a theoretical red herring.
Resumo:
In this paper, I focus on the growing "nonsense industry" which is most apparent in the writing typical of business, government departments, and the financial press. This writing, like technical writing, is characterised by heavy reliance on grammatical metaphor. It endows shibboleths - for instance, "globalisation"; "efficiencies"; "competition"; "modernisation"; "consumer sentiment"; "reform"; and so on - with anthropomorphic qualities. These anthropomorphic artefacts of technocratised language are then presented as having immutable powers over people. Thus they become banal public excuses for negligent practices in both business and government.
Resumo:
This book traces the evolution of thinking of the American adult educator, Malcolm Knowles, and maps the development of his conceptual framework over the period 1950 to 1995. It constructs an overall narrative history of Knowles’ thought, and shows how andragogy provided him with both a label and a unifying theme for his practical-theoretical framework aimed at producing self-directed lifelong learners. Knowles died in 1997 and left a large legacy of books and journal articles. The book examines the writings that constitute Knowles' principal works. It identifies the major elements of his thought, shows the interrelationships between ideas and indicates the major phases through which his thinking passed. Importantly, the book establishes that Knowles’ theorising was traceable and that he possessed a clear and coherent conceptual framework.
Resumo:
This thesis examines the ways in which citizens find out about socio-political issues. The project set out to discover how audience characteristics such as scepticism towards the media, gratifications sought, need for cognition and political interest influence information selection. While most previous information choice studies have focused on how individuals select from a narrow range of media types, this thesis considered a much wider sweep of the information landscape. This approach was taken to obtain an understanding of information choices in a more authentic context - in everyday life, people are not simply restricted to one or two news sources. Rather, they may obtain political information from a vast range of information sources, including media sources (e.g. radio, television, newspapers) and sources from beyond the media (eg. interpersonal sources, public speaking events, social networking websites). Thus, the study included both media and non-news media information sources. Data collection for the project consisted of a written, postal survey. The survey was administered to a probability sample in the greater Brisbane region, which is the third largest city in Australia. Data was collected during March and April 2008, approximately four months after the 2007 Australian Federal Election. Hence, the study was conducted in a non-election context. 585 usable surveys were obtained. In addition to measuring the attitudinal characteristics listed above, respondents were surveyed as to which information sources (eg. television shows, radio stations, websites and festivals) they usually use to find out about socio-political issues. Multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to explore patterns of influence between the audience characteristics and information consumption patterns. The results of this analysis indicated an apparent difference between the way citizens use news media sources and the way they use information sources from beyond the news media. In essence, it appears that non-news media information sources are used very deliberately to seek socio-political information, while media sources are used in a less purposeful way. If media use in a non-election context, such as that of the present study, is not primarily concerned with deliberate information seeking, media use must instead have other primary purposes, with political information acquisition as either a secondary driver, or a by-product of that primary purpose. It appears, then, that political information consumption in a media-saturated society is more about routine ‘practices’ than it is about ‘information seeking’. The suggestion that media use is no longer primarily concerned with information seeking, but rather, is simply a behaviour which occurs within the broader set of everyday practices reflects Couldry’s (2004) media as practice paradigm. These findings highlight the need for more authentic and holistic contexts for media research. It is insufficient to consider information choices in isolation, or even from a wider range of information sources, such as that incorporated in the present study. Future media research must take greater account of the broader social contexts and practices in which media-oriented behaviours occur. The findings also call into question the previously assumed centrality of trust to information selection decisions. Citizens regularly use media they do not trust to find out about politics. If people are willing to use information sources they do not trust for democratically important topics such as politics, it is important that citizens possess the media literacy skills to effectively understand and evaluate the information they are presented with. Without the application of such media literacy skills, a steady diet of ‘fast food’ media may result in uninformed or misinformed voting decisions, which have implications for the effectiveness of democratic processes. This research has emphasized the need for further holistic and authentically contextualised media use research, to better understand how citizens use information sources to find out about important topics such as politics.
Resumo:
Purpose – This article aims to consider success in terms of the financial returns and risks of new public management (NPM) in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Design/methodology/approach – Financial returns of New Zealand SOEs were examined through a review of their annual reports over a five-year period. Dimensions of risk were examined through interviews conducted in two phases over a two-year period with senior executives from 12 of the (then) 17 SOEs operating in New Zealand. Findings – Findings indicate the potential for SOEs to operate as profitable government investments, with clear support for positive financial returns under NPM. However, variations noted within individual SOEs also indicate that profitable and commercial operations may not be possible in all cases. An examination of the risks associated with SOEs’ operations reveals a number of dimensions of risk, encompassing financial, political (including regulatory), reputational, and public accountability aspects. Practical implications – There is a need for an enhanced awareness on the part of internal and external stakeholders (such as the government and general public) of the risks SOEs face in pursuing higher levels of profitability. Also required, is a more acute understanding on the part of internal and external stakeholders (e.g. government and the public) of the need for SOEs to manage the range of risks identified, given the potentially delicate balance between risk and return. Originality/value – While previous studies have considered the financial returns of SOEs, or the risks faced by the public sector in terms of accountability, few have addressed the two issues collectively in a single context.
Resumo:
Everything is Political Ben Eltham, Kieran Lord, Jeff Brand, Truna. Chair: Daniel Golding Videogames don’t exist in isolation. They are part of artistic, cultural, and political spheres – even if some would much rather they weren’t. This panel takes a look at the way videogames are used as political tools and how we as developers and critics can better engage with that, and perhaps wrestle some of the conversation back into our hands.