860 resultados para political equilibrium
Resumo:
The sensitivity of parameters that govern the stability of population size in Chrysomya albiceps and describe its spatial dynamics was evaluated in this study. The dynamics was modeled using a density-dependent model of population growth. Our simulations show that variation in fecundity and mainly in survival has marked effect on the dynamics and indicates the possibility of transitions from one-point equilibrium to bounded oscillations. C. albiceps exhibits a two-point limit cycle, but the introduction of diffusive dispersal induces an evident qualitative shift from two-point limit cycle to a one fixed-point dynamics. Population dynamics of C. albiceps is here compared to dynamics of Cochliomyia macellaria, C. megacephala and C. putoria.
Resumo:
We use numerical simulations to investigate how the chain length and topology of freely fluctuating knotted polymer rings affect their various spatial characteristics such as the radius of the smallest sphere enclosing momentary configurations of simulated polymer chains. We describe how the average value of a characteristic changes with the chain size and how this change depends on the topology of the modeled polymers. Although the scaling profiles of a spatial characteristic for distinct knot types do not intersect (at least, in the range of our data), the profiles for nontrivial knots intersect the corresponding profile obtained for phantom polymers, i.e., those that are free to explore all available topological states. For each knot type, this point of intersection defines its equilibrium length with respect to the spatial characteristic. At this chain length, a polymer forming a given knot type will not tend to increase or decrease. on average, the value of the spatial characteristic when the polymer is released from its topological constraint. We show interrelations between equilibrium lengths defined with respect to spatial characteristics of different character and observe that they are related to the lengths of ideal geometric configurations of the corresponding knot types.
Resumo:
This thesis consists of four essays in equilibrium asset pricing. The main topic is investors' heterogeneity: I investigates the equilibrium implications for the financial markets when investors have different attitudes toward risk. The first chapter studies why expected risk and remuneration on the aggregate market are negatively related, even if intuition and standard theory suggest a positive relation. I show that the negative trade-off can obtain in equilibrium if investors' beliefs about economic fundamentals are procyclically biased and the market Sharpe ratio is countercyclical. I verify that such conditions hold in the real markets and I find empirical support for the risk-return dynamics predicted by the model. The second chapter consists of two essays. The first essay studies how het¬erogeneity in risk preferences interacts with other sources of heterogeneity and how this affects asset prices in equilibrium. Using perceived macroeconomic un¬certainty as source of heterogeneity, the model helps to explain some patterns of financial returns, even if heterogeneity is small as suggested by survey data. The second essay determines conditions such that equilibrium prices have analytical solutions when investors have heterogeneous risk attitudes and macroeconomic fundamentals feature latent uncertainty. This approach provides additional in-sights to the previous literature where models require numerical solutions. The third chapter studies why equity claims (i.e. assets paying a single future dividend) feature premia and risk decreasing with the horizon, even if standard models imply the opposite shape. I show that labor relations helps to explain the puzzle. When workers have bargaining power to exploit partial income insurance within the firm, wages are smoother and dividends are riskier than in a standard economy. Distributional risk among workers and shareholders provides a rationale to the equity short-term risk, which leads to downward sloping term structures of premia and risk for equity claim. Résumé Cette thèse se compose de quatre essais dans l'évaluation des actifs d'équilibre. Le sujet principal est l'hétérogénéité des investisseurs: J'étudie les implications d'équilibre pour les marchés financiers où les investisseurs ont des attitudes différentes face au risque. Le première chapitre étudie pourquoi attendus risque et la rémunération sur le marché global sont liées négativement, même si l'intuition et la théorie standard suggèrent une relation positive. Je montre que le compromis négatif peut obtenir en équilibre si les croyances des investisseurs sur les fondamentaux économiques sont procyclique biaisées et le ratio de Sharpe du marché est anticyclique. Je vérifier que ces conditions sont réalisées dans les marchés réels et je trouve un appui empirique à la dynamique risque-rendement prédites par le modèle. Le deuxième chapitre se compose de deux essais. Le première essai étudie com¬ment hétérogénéité dans les préférences de risque inter agit avec d'autres sources d'hétérogénéité et comment cela affecte les prix des actifs en équilibre. Utili¬sation de l'incertitude macroéconomique perù comme source d'hétérogénéité, le modèle permet d'expliquer certaines tendances de rendements financiers, même si l'hétérogénéité est faible comme suggéré par les données d'enquête. Le deuxième essai détermine des conditions telles que les prix d'équilibre disposer de solutions analytiques lorsque les investisseurs ont des attitudes des risques hétérogènes et les fondamentaux macroéconomiques disposent d'incertitude latente. Cette approche fournit un éclairage supplémentaire à la littérature antérieure où les modèles nécessitent des solutions numériques. Le troisième chapitre étudie pourquoi les equity-claims (actifs que paient un seul dividende futur) ont les primes et le risque décroissante avec l'horizon, mme si les modèles standards impliquent la forme opposée. Je montre que les relations de travail contribue à expliquer l'énigme. Lorsque les travailleurs ont le pouvoir de négociation d'exploiter assurance revenu partiel dans l'entreprise, les salaires sont plus lisses et les dividendes sont plus risqués que dans une économie standard. Risque de répartition entre les travailleurs et les actionnaires fournit une justification à le risque à court terme, ce qui conduit à des term-structures en pente descendante des primes et des risques pour les equity-claims.
Resumo:
In this chapter I will present some observations and results about Ritual Kinship and political mobilization of popular groups in an Alpine valley: the Val de Bagnes, in the Swiss canton of Valais, - a mountain valley, well known today thanks to the tourist station of Verbier - where we can rely on excellent sources about local families. This region presents a particular political situation, because the 11 major villages of the valley form only one commune, which includes the whole valley.¦There are two major reasons to choose the Val de Bagnes for our inquiry on kinship and social networks in a rural society:¦A. The existence of sharp political and social conflicts during the 18th and the 19th centuries;¦B. The existence of almost systematic genealogical data between 1700 and 1900. (Casanova, Gard, Perrenoud 2005-08)¦The 18th century was characterized by the struggle of an important part of the community of Bagnes against the feudal lord, the abbot of St-Maurice. The culminating point was a local upheaval in 1745 in Le Châble, during which the abbot was forced to sign several documents in accordance with the wishes of the rebels (Guzzi-Heeb 2007). In the 19th century feudal lordship was abolished, but now the struggle confronted a liberal-radical faction and the conservative majority in the commune.¦The starting point of my presentation focuses on this question: which role did spiritual kinship play in the political mobilization of popular groups and in the organization of competing factions? This question allows us to shed light on some utilizations and meanings of spiritual kinship in the local society. Was spiritual kinship a significant instrument for economic cooperation? Or was it a channel for privileged social contacts and transactions?