Truth commissions: a barrier to the provision of judicial assistance?

Truth commissions and criminal trials have come to be perceived as complementary transitional justice mechanisms. However, where effective prosecutions are dependent on the exchange of information and transfer of suspects between states under existing mutual legal assistance and extradition arrangements, the operation of a truth commission in the state of territoriality may act as an obstacle to international cooperation. At the same time, requests for assistance from a third state pursuing prosecutions may impact negatively on the truth commission process in the requested state by inhibiting those reluctant to become involved in criminal proceedings from offering testimony. This article demonstrates a practical discord between these bodies when they operate in different states and questions whether they can truly be considered “complementary”.

The EU, counter-terrorism and the protection of Muslims as European minorities

This article examines the EU’s promotion of the religious identity of Muslims within the context of European counter-terrorism measures. Counter-terrorism laws of the EU and its Member States impact on the religious identity of Muslims. They have an arguably disproportionate effect on the civil rights of individuals in the quest to combat terrorism and can be seen to increase Islamophobia in two ways: a rise in general discrimination against Muslims and a requirement on Muslims to distance their connection to Islamic practice and traditions. EU law dealing with terrorist offences speak little of this backlash that Muslims face in European countries. Although the EU has somewhat of a framework in place which concerns the protection of Islamic identity, the reluctance of the EU to take a determined stance on the issue of the protection of religious identity is illustrated through the ambiguous nature of its legislation.

Do soldiers' lives matter? A view from proportionality

A military operation is about to take place during an ongoing international armed conflict; it can be carried out either by aerial attack, which is expected to cause the deaths of enemy civilians, or by using ground troops, which is expected to cause the deaths of fewer enemy civilians but is expected to result in more deaths of compatriot soldiers. Does the principle of proportionality in international humanitarian law impose a duty on an attacker to expose its soldiers to life-threatening risks in order to minimise or avert risks of incidental damage to enemy civilians? If such a duty exists, is it absolute or qualified? And if it is a qualified duty, what considerations may be taken into account in determining its character and scope? This article presents an analytic framework under the current international humanitarian law (IHL) legal structure, following a proportionality analysis. The proposed framework identifies five main positions for addressing the above queries. The five positions are arranged along two ‘axes’: a value ‘axis’, which identifies the value assigned to the lives of compatriot soldiers in relation to lives of enemy civilians; and a justification ‘axis’, which outlines the justificatory bases for assigning certain values to lives of compatriot soldiers and enemy civilians: intrinsic, instrumental or a combination thereof. The article critically assesses these positions, and favours a position which attributes a value to compatriot soldiers’ lives, premised on a justificatory basis which marries intrinsic considerations with circumscribed instrumental considerations, avoiding the indeterminacy and normative questionability entailed by more expansive instrumental considerations.

The responsibility to record civilian casualties

The responsibility to record civilian casualties in both armed conflict and civil disturbances must be an integral element of the responsibility to protect, particularly in the application of the just cause principles. The first part of this article examines the threshold issue of the possibility of large-scale civilian casualties which triggers the international community’s responsibility to react. The reports recommending the responsibility to protect emphasise the need to establish the actuality or risk of ‘large scale’ loss of life which is not possible in the current context without a civilian casualty recording structure. The second part of the article outlines the international legal obligation to record civilian casualties based on international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Thirdly, the responsibility to protect and the legal obligation to record casualties are brought together within the framework of Ban Ki-moon’s reports on implementation of the Responsibility to Protect. The fourth and final part of the article reviews the situations in Sri Lanka and Syria. Both states represent egregious examples of governments hiding the existence of casualties, resulting in paralysis within the international community. These situations establish, beyond doubt, that the national obligation to record civilian casualties must be part and parcel of the responsibility to protect.

Identifying and recording every casualty of armed conflict

This article discusses the international legal obligation to identify and record every casualty of armed conflict that finds its basis in the treaties and customs of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The article applies the various facets of the legal obligation to the armed conflicts in Iraq and Sri Lanka and argues that the parties in these conflicts failed in their international legal responsibility to civilians.

Non-Refoulement between 'Common Article 1' and 'Common Article 3'

This article considers whether, in the context of armed conflicts, certain non-refoulement obligations of non-belligerent States can be derived from the 1949 Geneva Conventions. According to Common Article 1 (CA1) thereof, all High Contracting Parties (HCPs) undertake to ‘respect and to ensure respect’ for the four conventions ‘in all circumstances’. It is contended that CA1 applies both in international armed conflicts (IACs) and in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). In turn, it is suggested that Common Article 3 (CA3) which regulates conduct in NIACs serves as a ‘minimum yardstick’ also applicable in IACs. It is widely (though not uniformly) acknowledged that the undertaking to ‘ensure respect’ in a given armed conflict extends to HCPs that are not parties to it; nevertheless, the precise scope of this undertaking is subject to scholarly debate. This article concerns situations where, in the course of an (international or non-international) armed conflict, persons ’taking no active part in hostilities’ flee from States where violations of CA3 are (likely to be) occurring to a non-belligerent State. Based on the undertaking in CA1, the central claim of this article is that, as long as risk of exposure to these violations persists, persons should not be refouled notwithstanding possible assessment of whether they qualify as refugees based on the 1951 Refugee Convention definition, or could be eligible for complementary or subsidiary forms of protection that are regulated in regional arrangements. The analysis does not affect the explicit protection from refoulement that the Fourth Geneva Convention accords to ‘protected persons’ (as defined in Article 4 thereof). It is submitted that CA1 should be read in tandem with other obligations of non-belligerent States under the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Most pertinently, all HCPs are required to take specific measures to repress ‘grave breaches’ and to take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the 1949 Geneva Conventions other than the grave breaches. A HCP that is capable of protecting displaced persons from exposure to risks of violations of CA3 and nonetheless refoules them to face such risks is arguably failing to take lawful measures at its disposal in order to suppress acts contrary to the conventions and, consequently, fails to ‘ensure respect’ for the conventions. KEYWORDS Non-refoulement; International Armed Conflict; Non-International Armed Conflict; Common Article 1; Common Article 3