The Lorenz-maximal core allocations and the kernel in some classes of assignment games

En aquest treball demostrem que en la classe de jocs d'assignació amb diagonal dominant (Solymosi i Raghavan, 2001), el repartiment de Thompson (que coincideix amb el valor tau) és l'únic punt del core que és maximal respecte de la relació de dominància de Lorenz, i a més coincideix amb la solucié de Dutta i Ray (1989), també coneguda com solució igualitària. En segon lloc, mitjançant una condició més forta que la de diagonal dominant, introduïm una nova classe de jocs d'assignació on cada agent obté amb la seva parella òptima almenys el doble que amb qualsevol altra parella. Per aquests jocs d'assignació amb diagonal 2-dominant, el repartiment de Thompson és l'únic punt del kernel, i per tant el nucleolo.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Monge assignment games

Un juego de asignación se define por una matriz A; donde cada fila representa un comprador y cada columna un vendedor. Si el comprador i se empareja a un vendedor j; el mercado produce aij unidades de utilidad. Estudiamos los juegos de asignación de Monge, es decir, aquellos juegos bilaterales de asignación en los cuales la matriz satisface la propiedad de Monge. Estas matrices pueden caracterizarse por el hecho de que en cualquier submatriz 2x2 un emparejamiento óptimo está situado en la diagonal principal. Para mercados cuadrados, describimos sus núcleos utilizando sólo la parte central tridiagonal de elementos de la matriz. Obtenemos una fórmula cerrada para el reparto óptimo de los compradores dentro del núcleo y para el reparto óptimo de los vendedores dentro del núcleo. Analizamos también los mercados no cuadrados reduciéndolos a matrices cuadradas apropiadas.

On the nucleolus of 2 x 2 assignment games

[spa] En este artículo hallamos fórmulas para el nucleolo de juegos de asignación arbitrarios con dos compradores y dos vendedores. Se analizan cinco casos distintos, dependiendo de las entradas en la matriz de asignación. Los resultados se extienden a los casos de juegos de asignación de tipo 2 x m o m x 2.

Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games

[cat] En aquest treball caracteritzem les solucions puntuals de jocs cooperatius d'utilitat transferible que compleixen selecció del core i monotonia agregada. També mostrem que aquestes dues propietats són compatibles amb la individualitat racional, la propietat del jugador fals i la propietat de simetria. Finalment, caracteritzem les solucions puntuals que compleixen les cinc propietats a l'hora.

Coalitionally monotonic set-solutions for cooperative TU games

A static comparative study on set-solutions for cooperative TU games is carried out. The analysis focuses on studying the compatibility between two classical and reasonable properties introduced by Young (1985) in the context of single valued solutions, namely core-selection and coalitional monotonicity. As the main result, it is showed that coalitional monotonicity is not only incompatible with the core-selection property but also with the bargaining-selection property. This new impossibility result reinforces the tradeoff between these kinds of interesting and intuitive economic properties. Positive results about compatibility between desirable economic properties are given replacing the core selection requirement by the core-extension property.

A Note on Shapley's convex measure games

L. S. Shapley, in his paper 'Cores of Convex Games', introduces Convex Measure Games, those that are induced by a convex function on R, acting over a measure on the coalitions. But in a note he states that if this function is a function of several variables, then convexity for the function does not imply convexity of the game or even superadditivity. We prove that if the function is directionally convex, the game is convex, and conversely, any convex game can be induced by a directionally convex function acting over measures on the coalitions, with as many measures as players

Security strategies and equilibria in multiobjetives matrix games

Multiobjective matrix games have been traditionally analyzed from two different points of view: equiibrium concepts and security strategies. This paper is based upon the idea that both players try to reach equilibrium points playing pairs of security strategies, as it happens in scalar matrix games. We show conditions guaranteeing the existence of equilibria in security strategies, named security equilibria

All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer-seller exact representative

Continuum bound states as surface states of a finite periodic system

We discuss the relation between continuum bound states (CBSs) localized on a defect, and surface states of a finite periodic system. We model an experiment of Capasso et al. [F. Capasso, C. Sirtori, J. Faist, D. L. Sivco, S-N. G. Chu, and A. Y. Cho, Nature (London) 358, 565 (1992)] using the transfer-matrix method. We compute the rate for intrasubband transitions from the ground state to the CBS and derive a sum rule. Finally we show how to improve the confinement of a CBS while keeping the energy fixed.

Generic finite-size enhancement of pairing in mesoscopic Fermi systems

The finite-size-dependent enhancement of pairing in mesoscopic Fermi systems is studied under the assumption that the BCS approach is valid and that the two-body force is size independent. Different systems are investigated such as superconducting metallic grains and films as well as atomic nuclei. It is shown that the finite size enhancement of pairing in these systems is in part due to the presence of a surface which accounts quite well for the data of nuclei and explains a good fraction of the enhancement in Al grains.

Design of electron band pass filters for electrically biased finite superlattices

We design optimal band pass filters for electrons in semiconductor heterostructures, under a uniform applied electric field. The inner cells are chosen to provide a desired transmission window. The outer cells are then designed to transform purely incoming or outgoing waves into Bloch states of the inner cells. The transfer matrix is interpreted as a conformal mapping in the complex plane, which allows us to write constraints on the outer cell parameters, from which physically useful values can be obtained.

Finite-size scaling analysis of the avalanches in the three-dimensional Gaussian random-field Ising model with metastable dynamics

A numerical study is presented of the third-dimensional Gaussian random-field Ising model at T=0 driven by an external field. Standard synchronous relaxation dynamics is employed to obtain the magnetization versus field hysteresis loops. The focus is on the analysis of the number and size distribution of the magnetization avalanches. They are classified as being nonspanning, one-dimensional-spanning, two-dimensional-spanning, or three-dimensional-spanning depending on whether or not they span the whole lattice in different space directions. Moreover, finite-size scaling analysis enables identification of two different types of nonspanning avalanches (critical and noncritical) and two different types of three-dimensional-spanning avalanches (critical and subcritical), whose numbers increase with L as a power law with different exponents. We conclude by giving a scenario for avalanche behavior in the thermodynamic limit.