Letter to S.D. Woodruff from Jarvis, Conklin and Morgan Farm Mortgages

Letter to S.D. Woodruff which accompanied the Underwood abstract. It is signed Jarvis, Conklin and Morgan, May 4, 1885.

Letter to S.D. Woodruff regarding a resolution passed that the engineer be requested to examine the fence built by the contractors alongside of the Henry Vandenburgh Farm

Letter to S.D. Woodruff regarding a resolution passed that the engineer be requested to examine the fence built by the contractors alongside of the Henry Vandenburgh Farm and report to the secretary as to whether this is a lawful fence, completed according to Williams’ contract. This is signed by Duncan McFarland, president. There is a reply written by S.D. Woodruff at the bottom of the letter stating that the fence is not built in accordance with the contract, Dec. 18, 1856.

List entitled “Farm” including produce and prices

List entitled “Farm” including produce and prices, 1866-1867.

List entitled “Fruit farm”

List entitled “Fruit farm”, 1871.

List entitled “Memo of receipts – farm”

List entitled “Memo of receipts – farm”, 1872.

List entitled “Memo of receipts – farm

List entitled “Memo of receipts – farm, 1873.

List entitled “Receipts of farm”

List entitled “Receipts of farm”, 1874.

List entitled “Memo of receipts of farm”

List entitled “Memo of receipts of farm”, 1875.

List entitled “Memo of receipts of farm”

List entitled “Memo of receipts of farm”, 1876.

List entitled “farm” including produce and prices

List entitled “farm” including produce and prices, 1888.

Brook farm : its members, scholars, and visitors

UANL

Legal Institutions, Sectoral Heterogeneity, and Economic Development

Poor countries have lower PPP–adjusted investment rates and face higher relative prices of investment goods. It has been suggested that this happens either because these countries have a relatively lower TFP in industries producing capital goods, or because they are subject to greater investment distortions. This paper provides a micro–foundation for the cross–country dispersion in investment distortions. We first document that firms producing capital goods face a higher level of idiosyncratic risk than their counterparts producing consumption goods. In a model of capital accumulation where the protection of investors’ rights is incomplete, this difference in risk induces a wedge between the returns on investment in the two sectors. The wedge is bigger, the poorer the investor protection. In turn, this implies that countries endowed with weaker institutions face higher relative prices of investment goods, invest a lower fraction of their income, and end up being poorer. We find that our mechanism may be quantitatively important.