Changes of mind in decision-making.

A decision is a commitment to a proposition or plan of action based on evidence and the expected costs and benefits associated with the outcome. Progress in a variety of fields has led to a quantitative understanding of the mechanisms that evaluate evidence and reach a decision. Several formalisms propose that a representation of noisy evidence is evaluated against a criterion to produce a decision. Without additional evidence, however, these formalisms fail to explain why a decision-maker would change their mind. Here we extend a model, developed to account for both the timing and the accuracy of the initial decision, to explain subsequent changes of mind. Subjects made decisions about a noisy visual stimulus, which they indicated by moving a handle. Although they received no additional information after initiating their movement, their hand trajectories betrayed a change of mind in some trials. We propose that noisy evidence is accumulated over time until it reaches a criterion level, or bound, which determines the initial decision, and that the brain exploits information that is in the processing pipeline when the initial decision is made to subsequently either reverse or reaffirm the initial decision. The model explains both the frequency of changes of mind as well as their dependence on both task difficulty and whether the initial decision was accurate or erroneous. The theoretical and experimental findings advance the understanding of decision-making to the highly flexible and cognitive acts of vacillation and self-correction.

Risk-sensitivity and the mean-variance trade-off: decision making in sensorimotor control.

Numerous psychophysical studies suggest that the sensorimotor system chooses actions that optimize the average cost associated with a movement. Recently, however, violations of this hypothesis have been reported in line with economic theories of decision-making that not only consider the mean payoff, but are also sensitive to risk, that is the variability of the payoff. Here, we examine the hypothesis that risk-sensitivity in sensorimotor control arises as a mean-variance trade-off in movement costs. We designed a motor task in which participants could choose between a sure motor action that resulted in a fixed amount of effort and a risky motor action that resulted in a variable amount of effort that could be either lower or higher than the fixed effort. By changing the mean effort of the risky action while experimentally fixing its variance, we determined indifference points at which participants chose equiprobably between the sure, fixed amount of effort option and the risky, variable effort option. Depending on whether participants accepted a variable effort with a mean that was higher, lower or equal to the fixed effort, they could be classified as risk-seeking, risk-averse or risk-neutral. Most subjects were risk-sensitive in our task consistent with a mean-variance trade-off in effort, thereby, underlining the importance of risk-sensitivity in computational models of sensorimotor control.

Supporting excavations in clay - From analysis to decision-making

Finite Element Analysis (FEA) is used to calibrate a decision-making tool based on an extension of the Mobilized Strength Design (MSD) method which permits the designer an extremely simple method of predicting ground displacements during construction. This newly extended MSD approach accommodates a number of issues which are important in underground construction between in-situ walls, including: alternative base heave mechanisms suitable either for wide excavations in relatively shallow soft clay strata, or narrow excavations in relatively deep soft strata; the influence of support system stiffness in relation to the sequence of propping of the wall; and the capability of dealing with stratified ground. These developments should make it possible for a design engineer to take informed decisions on the relationship between prop spacing and ground movements, or the influence of wall stiffness, or on the need for and influence of a jet-grouted base slab, for example, without having to conduct project-specific FEA. © 2009 Taylor & Francis Group.

Motor control is decision-making.

Motor behavior may be viewed as a problem of maximizing the utility of movement outcome in the face of sensory, motor and task uncertainty. Viewed in this way, and allowing for the availability of prior knowledge in the form of a probability distribution over possible states of the world, the choice of a movement plan and strategy for motor control becomes an application of statistical decision theory. This point of view has proven successful in recent years in accounting for movement under risk, inferring the loss function used in motor tasks, and explaining motor behavior in a wide variety of circumstances.

Proposal of a method to clarify and enhance decision-making at the front-end of innovation

Decision-making at the front-end of innovation is critical for the success of companies. This paper presents a simple visual method, called DMCA (Decision-Making Criteria Assessment), which was created to clarify and improve decision-making at the front-end of innovation. The method maps the uncertainty of project information and importance of decision criteria, compiling a measure that indicates whether the decision is highly uncertain, what information interferes with it, and what criteria are actually being considered. The DMCA method was tested in two projects that faced decision-making issues, and the results confirm the benefits of using this method in decision-making at the front-end. © 2012 IEEE.

The Silent Period of Evidence Integration in Fast Decision Making

In a typical experiment on decision making, one out of two possible stimuli is displayed and observers decide which one was presented. Recently, Stanford and colleagues (2010) introduced a new variant of this classical one-stimulus presentation paradigm to investigate the speed of decision making. They found evidence for "perceptual decision making in less than 30 ms". Here, we extended this one-stimulus compelled-response paradigm to a two-stimulus compelled-response paradigm in which a vernier was followed immediately by a second vernier with opposite offset direction. The two verniers and their offsets fuse. Only one vernier is perceived. When observers are asked to indicate the offset direction of the fused vernier, the offset of the second vernier dominates perception. Even for long vernier durations, the second vernier dominates decisions indicating that decision making can take substantial time. In accordance with previous studies, we suggest that our results are best explained with a two-stage model of decision making where a leaky evidence integration stage precedes a race-to-threshold process. © 2013 Rüter et al.