Impact of PL 94-566 on agricultural employers and UI trust funds in selected states.

"Prepared by G. Joachim [i.e. Joachim G.] Elterich and Linda Graham"--Prelim. p.

Impact of extension of coverage to agricultural workers under PL 94-566, their characteristics and economic welfare.

"Prepared by G. Joachim [i.e. Joachim G.] Elterich and Linda Graham"--Prelim. p.

Essays on labor economics.

Doctor of Philosophy in subject of Economics

Economic profile, Central SC Alliance

This document contains statistics on economic data, demographic data, industry data, occupation and employment data and education data for the Midlands Region of South Carolina. Also included is a list and directory of higher educational institutions in the region.

Economic profile, Charleston Regional Development Alliance

This document contains statistics on economic data, demographic data, industry data, occupation and employment data and education data for the Charleston Region. Also included is a list and directory of higher educational institutions in the region.

Economic profile, Charlotte Regional Partnership

This document contains statistics on economic data, demographic data, industry data, occupation and employment data and education data for the Upper South Carolina Region. Also included is a list and directory of higher educational institutions in the region.

Economic profile, Lowcountry Economic Network

This document contains statistics on economic data, demographic data, industry data, occupation and employment data and education data for the Lowcountry Region. Also included is a list and directory of higher educational institutions in the region.

Economic profile, NESA

This document contains statistics on economic data, demographic data, industry data, occupation and employment data and education data for the Pee Dee Region. Also included is a list and directory of higher educational institutions in the region.

Economic profile, Economic Development Partnership

This document contains statistics on economic data, demographic data, industry data, occupation and employment data and education data for the Upper Savannah Region. Also included is a list and directory of higher educational institutions in the region.

Economic profile, Southern Carolina Regional Development

This document contains statistics on economic data, demographic data, industry data, occupation and employment data and education data for the Lower Savannah Region. Also included is a list and directory of higher educational institutions in the region.

Economic profile, Upstate Alliance

This document contains statistics on economic data, demographic data, industry data, occupation and employment data and education data for the Upstate Region. Also included is a list and directory of higher educational institutions in the region.

Business solutions

This brochure gives a listing of telephone numbers for SCDEW workforce centers throughout the state. It also gives information on employment services, unemployment services and labor market information.

The Unemployment Benefit System: a Redistributive or an Insurance Institution?

[eng] In this paper we analyze how the composition of labor taxation affects unemployment in a unionized economy with capital accumulation and an unemployment benefit system. We show that if the unemployment benefit system is gross Bismarckian then the unemployment rate is reduced if wage taxes are decreased (and thus payroll taxes are increased). However, if the unemployment benefit system is net Bismarckian then the unemployment rate does not depend on how the system is financed. Besides, in a Beveridgean system the labor tax composition does not affect the unemployment rate if and only if the unemployed do not pay taxes and the employed pay a constant marginal tax rate. We also analyze when an unemployment benefit budget-balanced rule makes the economy to have a hysteresis process.

The Unemployment Benefit System: a Redistributive or an Insurance Institution?

[eng] In this paper we analyze how the composition of labor taxation affects unemployment in a unionized economy with capital accumulation and an unemployment benefit system. We show that if the unemployment benefit system is gross Bismarckian then the unemployment rate is reduced if wage taxes are decreased (and thus payroll taxes are increased). However, if the unemployment benefit system is net Bismarckian then the unemployment rate does not depend on how the system is financed. Besides, in a Beveridgean system the labor tax composition does not affect the unemployment rate if and only if the unemployed do not pay taxes and the employed pay a constant marginal tax rate. We also analyze when an unemployment benefit budget-balanced rule makes the economy to have a hysteresis process.

Essays in dynamic optimal taxation: working experience, unemployment scarring and poverty

This thesis investigates the design of optimal tax systems in dynamic environments. The first essay characterizes the optimal tax system where wages depend on stochastic shocks and work experience. In addition to redistributive and efficiency motives, the taxation of inexperienced workers depends on a second-best requirement that encourages work experience, a social insurance motive and incentive effects. Calibrations using U.S. data yield higher expected optimal marginal income tax rates for experienced workers for most of the inexperienced workers. They confirm that the average marginal income tax rate increases (decreases) with age when shocks and work experience are substitutes (complements). Finally, more variability in experienced workers' earnings prospects leads to increasing tax rates since income taxation acts as a social insurance mechanism. In the second essay, the properties of an optimal tax system are investigated in a dynamic private information economy where labor market frictions create unemployment that destroys workers' human capital. A two-skill type model is considered where wages and employment are endogenous. I find that the optimal tax system distorts the first-period wages of all workers below their efficient levels which leads to more employment. The standard no-distortion-at-the-top result no longer holds due to the combination of private information and the destruction of human capital. I show this result analytically under the Maximin social welfare function and confirm it numerically for a general social welfare function. I also investigate the use of a training program and job creation subsidies. The final essay analyzes the optimal linear tax system when there is a population of individuals whose perceptions of savings are linked to their disposable income and their family background through family cultural transmission. Aside from the standard equity/efficiency trade-off, taxes account for the endogeneity of perceptions through two channels. First, taxing labor decreases income, which decreases the perception of savings through time. Second, taxation on savings corrects for the misperceptions of workers and thus savings and labor decisions. Numerical simulations confirm that behavioral issues push labor income taxes upward to finance saving subsidies. Government transfers to individuals are also decreased to finance those same subsidies.