Can border carbon taxes fit into the global trade regime? Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/06, 9 December 2013

One complement to domestic climate policies could be the regulation of carbon dioxide emissions arising during the production of imported products. Such ‘border carbon adjustments’ (BCAs) are said to have several benefits, but are also severely criticised. This Policy Brief highlights some weaknesses in the standard argumentation for BCAs. But there is an alternative argument for border carbon measures, based on the fact that countries expose each other to climate externalities. The reformulated argument is economically more convincing, and provides a more convincing justification for the extraterritorial feature of border carbon measures. However, there are also several important factors mitigating against the implementation of such measures, including the risk that these measures will be used for protectionism. One complement to domestic climate policies could be the regulation of carbon dioxide emissions arising during the production of imported products. Such ‘border carbon adjustments’ (BCAs) are said to have several benefits, but are also severely criticised. This Policy Brief highlights some weaknesses in the standard argumentation for BCAs. But there is an alternative argument for border carbon measures, based on the fact that countries expose each other to climate externalities. The reformulated argument is economically more convincing, and provides a more convincing justification for the extraterritorial feature of border carbon measures. However, there are also several important factors mitigating against the implementation of such measures, including the risk that these measures will be used for protectionism.

GATS and the Social Regulation of Services. IES WORKING PAPER 3/2010

Many service transactions are highly complex, and their quality is difficult to ascertain for consumers. In order to have properly functioning service markets, the services thus often require regulation. However, with the advent of the WTO, international trade in services has become increasingly rule-bound. GATS has considerable, intricate effects on social regulation due to the characteristics of services. The allocation of regulatory jurisdiction between home and host country, for example, is rendered difficult by the process-based nature of a lot of services. The WTO US – Gambling dispute settlement report is the first to address GATS disciplines on social regulation in a detailed manner. This working paper submits that the US - Gambling report has increased interference with domestic social regulation and created regulatory uncertainty for WTO members. However, it is also argued that the real impact of the GATS on social regulation can only be understood by looking beyond the text of the GATS. GATS disciplines may become amplified through their interaction with domestic and other international law. The GATS also contains some “political” counterbalancing mechanisms that allow members to renegotiate their commitments. It is argued that these political mechanisms strengthen subsidiarity in the GATS, and make WTO dispute settlement bodies accountable to WTO members.

The Regulatory Framework of Export Restrictions in WTO Law and Regional Free Trade Agreements. IES WORKING PAPER 8/2013

The use of export restrictions has become more and more common in recent years, evidencing the substantial loopholes existing in the WTO regulation on the matter. As a result of this deficient legal framework, the WTO membership experiences important losses of welfare and increasing political tensions. The multilateral negotiations for an updated discipline on export restrictions, in the context of the Doha Development Round, are blocked. Consequently, members have established a set of preferential bilateral and multilateral agreements to relieve the negative effects of these measures. Likewise, some recent WTO members have committed to stricter regulations as part of their Accession Protocols. Nevertheless, these methods have evidenced some important flaws, and the multilateral scene remains the optimum forum to address export restrictions. This Working Paper proposes a number of measures to improve the legal framework of the quantitative export restrictions and export duties, as well as their notification procedures.

TTIP’s Hard Core: Technical barriers to trade and standards. Paper No. 13 in the CEPS-CTR project ‘TTIP in the Balance’ and CEPS Special Report No. 117/August 2015

Michelle Egan and Jacques Pelkmans provide an overview of the TBT chapter in TTIP and the various issues between the US and the EU in this area, which in turn requires extensive expositions of domestic regulation in the US and the EU. TBTs, outside heavily regulated sectors such as chemicals, automobiles or medicines (which have separate chapters in TTIP), can be caused by divergent (voluntary) standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment. Indeed, in all three the US and the EU have long experienced frictions with considerable trading costs. The 1998 Mutual Recognition Agreement about conformity assessment only succeeded in two out of six sectors. The US and European standardisation traditions differ and this paper explains why it is so hard, also economically, to realise convergence. However, the authors reject the unproductive ‘stand-off’ between US and EU negotiators on standardisation and suggest to clarify the enormous economic ‘installed base’ of prominent US standards in the world economy and build a solution from there. As to technical regulation, the prospect of converging regulation (via harmonisation) is often dim, but equivalence (given similar levels of regulatory protection) can be an option.

Conciliation act, 1896, and Industrial courts act, 1919. Report on conciliation and arbitration including particulars of proceedings under the Conciliation act, 1896, the Coal mines (minimum wage) act, 1912, the Wages (temporary regulation) acts, 1918 and 1919, the Restoration of pre-war practices act, 1919, and the Industrial courts act, 1919 ... 1919[-1920] ...

Title varies slightly.

An economic analysis of taxicab regulation /

Item 535

Farm size and regional distribution of the benefit under Federal milk market regulation /

At head of title: Economic report.

Quality stabilization act. : Report to accompany H.R. 3669, a bill to amend the Federal Trade Commission act, to promote quality and price stabilization, to define and restrain certain unfair methods of distribution and to confirm, define and equalize the rights of producers and resellers in the distribution of goods identified by distinguishing brands, names, or trademarks, and for other purposes.

Mode of access: Internet.

Airport access problems : lessons learned from slot regulation by the FAA : an economic policy analysis /

Item 535

Public regulation of competitive practices in business enterprise /

Includes indexes.

Economic impact of change in pH regulation, R76-21 /

"Project no. 80.112."

Plant closing legislation and regulation in the United States and Western Europe : a survey /

"Contract L0458"--issued cover.

Optimal price regulation in a growth model with monopolistic suppliers of intermediate goods

In this paper we investigate the trade-off faced by regulators who must set a price for an intermediate good somewhere between the marginal cost and the monopoly price. We utilize a growth model with monopolistic suppliers of intermediate goods. Investment in innovation is required to produce a new intermediate good. Marginal cost pricing deters innovation, while monopoly pricing maximizes innovation and economic growth at the cost of some static inefficiency. We demonstrate the existence of a second-best price above the marginal cost but below the monopoly price, which maximizes consumer welfare. Simulation results suggest that substantial reductions in consumption, production, growth, and welfare occur where regulators focus on static efficiency issues by setting prices at or near marginal cost.

Food colours:a study of the effects of regulation

In the 1960s the benefits of government regulation of technology were believed to outweigh any costs. But recent studies have claimed that regulation has negative effects on innovation, health and consumer choice. This case study on food colours examines such claims. EFFECTS ON HEALTH were measured by allocating a hazard rating to each colour. The negative list of 1925 removed three harmful colours which were rapidly replaced, so the benefits were short-lived. Had a proposed ban been adopted in the 1860s it would have prevented many years exposure to hazardous mineral colours. The positive list of 1957 reduced the proportion of harmful coal tar dyes from 54% of the total to 20%. Regulations brought a greater reduction in hazard levels than voluntary trade action. Delays in the introduction of a positive list created a significant hazard burden. EFFECTS ON INNOVATION were assessed from patents and discovery dates. Until the 1950s food colours were adopted from textile colours. The major period of innovation for coal tar colours was between 1856 and 1910, finishing well before regulations were made in 1957, so regulations cannot be blamed for the decline. Regulations appear to have spurred the development of at least one new coal tar dye, and many new plant colours, creating a new sector of the dye industry. EFFECTS ON CONSUMER CHOICE were assessed by case studies. Coloured milk, for example, was banned despite its popularity. Regulations have restricted choice, but have removed from the market foods that were nutritionally impoverished and poor value for money. Compositional regulations provided health protection because they reduced total exposure to colours from certain staple foods. Restricting colours to a smaller range of foods would be an effective way of coping with problems of quality and imperfect toxicological knowledge today.