Think global, act global: Corporate content streaming and Australian media policy

Australia ’s media policy agenda has recently been dominated by debate over two key issues: media ownership reform, and the local content provisions of the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement. Challenging the tendency to analyse these issues separately, the article considers them as interlinked indicators of fundamental shifts occurring in the digital media environment. Converged media corporations increasingly seek to achieve economies of scale through ‘content streaming’: multi-purposing proprietary content across numerous digitally enabled platforms. This has resulted in rivalries for control of delivery technologies (as witnessed in media ownership debates) as well as over market access for corporate content (in the case of local content debates). The article contextualises Australia’s contemporary media policy flashpoints within international developments and longer-term industry strategising. It further questions the power of media policy as it is currently conceived to deal adequately with the challenges raised by a converging digital media marketplace.

Do you know where your arm is if you think your head has moved?

Reproduction of a previously presented elbow position is affected by changes in head position. As movement of the head is associated with local biomechanical changes, the aim of the present study was to determine if illusory changes in head position could induce similar effects on the reproduction of elbow position. Galvanic vestibular stimulation (GVS) was applied to healthy subjects in supine lying. The stimulus was applied during the presentation of an elbow position, which the subject then reproduced without stimulation. In the first study, 13 subjects received 1.5 mA stimuli, which caused postural sway in standing, confirming that the firing of vestibular afferents was affected, but no illusory changes in head position were reported. In the second study, 13 subjects received 2.0-3.0 mA GVS. Six out of 13 subjects reported consistent illusory changes in head position, away from the side of the anode. In these subjects, anode right stimulation induced illusory left lateral flexion and elbow joint position error towards extension (p=0.03), while anode left tended to have the opposite effect (p=0.16). The GVS had no effect on error in subjects who did not experience illusory head movement with either 1.5 mA stimulus (p=0.8) or 2.0-3.0 mA stimulus (p=0.7). This study demonstrates that the accuracy of elbow repositioning is affected by illusory changes in head position. These results support the hypothesis that the perceived position of proximal body segments is used in the planning and performance of accurate upper limb movements.

What does the community think about lifespan extension technologies? The need for an empirical base for ethical and policy debates

Objectives: This paper examines public understandings of possibilities for increasing life expectancy, interest in taking up lifespan-extending interventions, and motivations influencing these intentions. Methods: Structured interviews were conducted with 31 adults, aged 50 and over. Results: Participants believed that technological advances would increase life expectancy but questioned the value of quantity over quality of life. Life in itself was not considered valuable without the ability to put it to good use. Participants would not use technologies to extend their own lifespan unless the result would also enhance their health. Conclusions: These findings may not be generalisable to the general public but they provide the first empirical evidence on the plausibility of common assumptions about public interest in 'anti-ageing' interventions. Surveys of the views of representative samples of the population are needed to inform the development of a research agenda on the ethical, legal and social implications of lifespan extension.

How many thoughts can you think?

In ordinary computer programs, the relationship between data in a machine and the concepts it represents is defined arbitrarily by the programmer. It is argued here that the Strong AI hypothesis suggests that no such arbitrariness is possible in the relationship between brain states and mental experiences, and that this may place surprising limitations on the possible variety of mental experiences. Possible psychology experiments are sketched which aim to falsify the Strong AI hypothesis by indicating that these limits can be exceeded. It is concluded that although such experiments might be valuable, they are unlikely to succeed in this aim.