Speculative securities

A speculative security is an asset whose payoff depends on a random shock uncorrelated with economic fundamentals (a sunspot) about which some traders have superior information. In this paper we show that agents may find it desirable to trade such a security in spite of the fact that it is a poorer hedge against their endowment risks as the time oftrade, and has an associated adverse selection cost. In the specific institutional setting of innovation of futures contracts, we show that a futures exchange may not have an incentive to introduce a speculative security even when all traders favor it.

Bank liquidity, interbank markets and monetary policy

A major lesson of the recent financial crisis is that the interbank lending marketis crucial for banks facing large uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs. Thispaper studies the efficiency of the interbank lending market in allocating funds. Weconsider two different types of liquidity shocks leading to different implications foroptimal policy by the central bank. We show that, when confronted with a distributional liquidity-shock crisis that causes a large disparity in the liquidity held amongbanks, the central bank should lower the interbank rate. This view implies that thetraditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and monetary policy should be abandoned. In addition, we show that, during an aggregateliquidity crisis, central banks should manage the aggregate volume of liquidity. Twodifferent instruments, interest rates and liquidity injection, are therefore required tocope with the two different types of liquidity shocks. Finally, we show that failureto cut interest rates during a crisis erodes financial stability by increasing the riskof bank runs.

Insurance with frequent trading: A dynamic analysis of efficient insurance markets

This paper extends existing insurance results on the type of insurance contracts needed for insurance market efficiency toa dynamic setting. It introduces continuosly open markets that allow for more efficient asset allocation. It alsoeliminates the role of preferences and endowments in the classification of risks, which is done primarily in terms of the actuarial properties of the underlying riskprocess. The paper further extends insurability to include correlated and catstrophic events. Under these very general conditions the paper defines a condition that determines whether a small number of standard insurance contracts (together with aggregate assets) suffice to complete markets or one needs to introduce such assets as mutual insurance.

Irreversible investment in stochastically cyclical markets

This paper presents a new framework for studying irreversible (dis)investment whena market follows a random number of random-length cycles (such as a high-tech productmarket). It is assumed that a firm facing such market evolution is always unsure aboutwhether the current cycle is the last one, although it can update its beliefs about theprobability of facing a permanent decline by observing that no further growth phasearrives. We show that the existence of regime shifts in fluctuating markets suffices for anoption value of waiting to (dis)invest to arise, and we provide a marginal interpretationof the optimal (dis)investment policies, absent in the real options literature. Thepaper also shows that, despite the stochastic process of the underlying variable has acontinuous sample path, the discreteness in the regime changes implies that the samplepath of the firm s value experiences jumps whenever the regime switches all of a sudden,irrespective of whether the firm is active or not.

Insurance with frequent trading

This paper looks at the dynamic management of risk in an economy with discrete time consumption and endowments and continuous trading. I study how agents in such an economy deal with all the risk in the economy and attain their Pareto optimal allocations by trading in a few natural securities: private insurance contracts and a common set of derivatives on the aggregate endowment. The parsimonious nature ofthe implied securities needed for Pareto optimality suggests that insuch contexts complete markets is a very reasonable assumption.

Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times: Creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects

In 2007, countries in the Euro periphery were enjoying stable growth, low deficits, and lowspreads. Then the financial crisis erupted and pushed them into deep recessions, raising theirdeficits and debt levels. By 2010, they were facing severe debt problems. Spreads increased and,surprisingly, so did the share of the debt held by domestic creditors. Credit was reallocatedfrom the private to the public sectors, reducing investment and deepening the recessions evenfurther. To account for these facts, we propose a simple model of sovereign risk in which debtcan be traded in secondary markets. The model has two key ingredients: creditor discriminationand crowding-out effects. Creditor discrimination arises because, in turbulent times, sovereigndebt offers a higher expected return to domestic creditors than to foreign ones. This providesincentives for domestic purchases of debt. Crowding-out effects arise because private borrowingis limited by financial frictions. This implies that domestic debt purchases displace productiveinvestment. The model shows that these purchases reduce growth and welfare, and may lead toself-fulfilling crises. It also shows how crowding-out effects can be transmitted to other countriesin the Eurozone, and how they may be addressed by policies at the European level.

Strategic behaviours in healthcare : evidence from primary care and pharmaceutical markets

We analyse the strategic behaviours of agents in a market through the appropriate¬ness of their skills to the market. If agents' skills are well adapted to market and they can reach their target, they will not need to adopt strategic behaviours. The agents will behave as selfish individuals. However, if their skills are not well adapted and they cannot attain their target alone, they will adopt strategic behaviours to reach their objectives. These behaviours will have a different impact on the utilities of other agents, depending on the skills and the objectives of the agent. If these agents need other agents to reach their objectives, they will behave as altruistic individuals who internalise the utilities of other agents in reaching their objectives and will adopt cooperative behaviours. However, if these agents fear that other agents could prevent them from reaching their target because they can foresee that the skills of other agents are better adapted than their own skills, the agents will then behave as predator individuals and will adopt destructive behaviours to attain their objective. It is in the interests of these agents to manipulate information to increase disorder and dissimulate their lack of skills. They will reproduce the strategies of animals that modify their appearance to escape predators or simulate being bait to attract their prey. These agents will seek to induce chaos into the behaviours of other agents to amplify the impact of their strategies. The appropriateness of skills to the market allows an understanding of the emer-gence of networks and associated strategies. The members of a networks are inputs who are excluded when their costs are higher than their benefits. A network simul-taneously allows cooperation and selfish, predatory behaviours among its members. A network may adopt informational strategies when seeking to become the leader in a market or when it cannot survive. The creation of networks and the manipulation of information are two overlapping evolutionary strategies, with the first strategy favouring the second. In our model, an agent does not behave like a firm that aims only to maximise the profits of the firm but rather as a member of a network who adopts strategic behaviours as a function of the interests of this network. If his skills are well adapted to the market and he can innovate, he will not invest in erroneous input; in contrast, if his skills are not adapted, the agent will invest in the erroneous input of information into the market in order to survive. Therefore, when any informational asymmetries between the agents and their principals characterise the market, the price cannot be the main element that allows equilibrium to be reached in the market; instead, the appropriateness of skills to the market enables equilibrium. We will now apply these hypotheses to explain the strategic behaviours of physicians and pharmaceutical companies.

Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and Rrommate markets

We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. In these so-called roommate markets agents are consumers and resources at the same time. Klaus (Games Econ Behav 72:172-186, 2011) introduced two new "population sensitivity" properties that capture the effect newcomers have on incumbent agents: competition sensitivity and resource sensitivity. On various roommate market domains (marriage markets, no-odd-rings roommate markets, solvable roommate markets),we characterize the core using either of the population sensitivity properties in addition to weak unanimity and consistency. On the domain of all roommate markets, we obtain two associated impossibility results.

The Impact of Monetary Union on EU-15 Sovereign Debt Yield Spreads

With European Monetary Union (EMU), there was an increase in the adjusted spreads (corrected from the foreign exchange risk) of euro participating countries' sovereign securities over Germany and a decrease in those of non-euro countries. The objective of this paper is to study the reasons for this result, and in particular, whether the change in the price assigned by markets was due to domestic factors such as credit risk and/or market liquidity, or to international risk factors. The empirical evidence suggests that market size scale economies have increased since EMU for all European markets, so the effect of the various risk factors, even though it differs between euro and non-euro countries, is always dependent on the size of the market.

Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the nucleolus and the core-center

En aquest treball mostrem que, a diferència del cas bilateral, per als mercats multilaterals d'assignació coneguts amb el nom de Böhm-Bawerk assignment games, el nucleolus i el core-center, i. e. el centre de masses del core, no coincideixen en general. Per demostrar-ho provem que donant un m-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game les dues solucions anteriors poden obtenir-se respectivament del nucleolus i el core-center d'un joc convex definit en el conjunt format pels m sectors. Encara més, provem que per calcular el nucleolus d'aquest últim joc només les coalicions formades per un jugador o m-1 jugadors són importants. Aquests resultats simplifiquen el càlcul del nucleolus d'un multi-sided ¿¿ohm-Bawerk assignment market amb un número molt elevat d'agents.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] Aquest treball tracta d’extendre la noció d’equilibri simètric de negociació bilateral introduït per Rochford (1983) a jocs d’assignació multilateral. Un pagament corresponent a un equilibri simètric de negociación multilateral (SMB) és una imputación del core que garanteix que qualsevol agent es troba en equilibri respecte a un procés de negociación entre tots els agents basat en allò que cadascun d’ells podria rebre -i fer servir com a amenaça- en un ’matching’ òptim diferent al que s’ha format. Es prova que, en el cas de jocs d’assignació multilaterals, el conjunt de SMB és sempre no buit i que, a diferència del cas bilateral, no sempre coincideix amb el kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). Finalment, responem una pregunta oberta per Rochford (1982) tot introduïnt un conjunt basat en la idea de kernel, que, conjuntament amb el core, ens permet caracteritzar el conjunt de SMB.