Globalization and Europeanization: Analysing Change

The main motivation for exploring the relationship between globalization and Europeanization is the understanding of the importance of exogenous factors for policy change at the domestic level. Can we distinguish the impact of Europeanization to that of globalization? What is the relationship between globalization and Europeanization and what can we learn about the impact of the two phenomena upon political institutions, public policies, identities and values of EU member-states? Can we distinguish the traces of globalization to those of Europeanization upon the domestic level? The paper draws upon International Relations and International Political Economy theories of globalization as well as upon the Europeanization literature. Both phenomena are multi-dimensional and in order to assess their impact and their relationship three dimensions are explored: political institutions, public policies and values and identities. It is concluded that the two phenomena are interwoven and that there is no antithetical relationship between them. Their core is similar, based on the values of neo-liberalism, representative democracy and open market economy.

Democracy and the curse of natural resources

We propose a theoretical model to explain empirical regularities related to the curse of natural resources. This is an explicitly political model which emphasizes the behavior and incentives of politicians. We extend the standard voting model to give voters political control beyond the elections. This gives rise to a new restriction into our political economy model: policies should not give rise to a revolution. Our model clarifies when resource discoveries might lead to revolutions, namely, in countries with weak institutions. Natural resources may be bad for democracy by harming political turnover. Our model also suggests a non-linear dependence of human capital on natural resources. For low levels of democracy human capital depends negatively on natural resources, while for high levels of democracy the dependence is reversed. This theoretical finding is corroborated in both cross section and panel data regressions.

Electoral Uncertainty and the Deficit Bias in a New Keynesian Economy

Recent attempts to incorporate optimal fiscal policy into New Keynesian models subject to nominal inertia, have tended to assume that policy makers are benevolent and have access to a commitment technology. A separate literature, on the New Political Economy, has focused on real economies where there is strategic use of policy instruments in a world of political conflict. In this paper we combine these literatures and assume that policy is set in a New Keynesian economy by one of two policy makers facing electoral uncertainty (in terms of infrequent elections and an endogenous voting mechanism). The policy makers generally share the social welfare function, but differ in their preferences over fiscal expenditure (in its size and/or composition). Given the environment, policy shall be realistically constrained to be time-consistent. In a sticky-price economy, such heterogeneity gives rise to the possibility of one policy maker utilising (nominal) debt strategically to tie the hands of the other party, and influence the outcome of any future elections. This can give rise to a deficit bias, implying a sub-optimally high level of steady-state debt, and can also imply a sub-optimal response to shocks. The steady-state distortions and inflation bias this generates, combined with the volatility induced by the electoral cycle in a sticky-price environment, can significantly

Do political incentives matter for tax policies? Ideology, opportunism and the tax structure

This paper investigates the importance of political ideology and opportunism in the choice of the tax structure. In particular, we examine the effects of cabinet ideology and elections on the distribution of the tax burden across factors of production and consumption for 21 OECD countries over the period 1970-2000 by employing four alternative cabinet ideology measures and by using the methodology of effective tax rates. There is evidence of both opportunistic and partisan effects on tax policies. More precisely, we find that left-wing governments rely more on capital relative to labor income taxation and that they tend to increase consumption taxes. Moreover, we find that income tax rates (but not consumption taxes) tend to be reduced in preelectoral periods and that capital effective tax rates (defined broadly to include taxes on selfemployed income) are reduced by more than effective labor tax rates.

Gare aux hybrides : mythes et réalités de la gouvernance de la mondialisation

Hybrid is often used as a default attribute reflecting lack of clear understanding of the influence of new patterns and actors of structural change beyond states, firms and institutions traditionally involved in regulatory practices across nations. The article argues that the notion of hybrid has a distinct relevance for engaging shortcomings of global governance literature. It explores the lessons to be drawn from ancient mythology by highlighting that ontological ambiguity and emotional ambivalence represent core features of hybrid creatures. It then builds upon critical scholarship in global political economy to conceptualise three generic levels of transfers of authority at which situating the hybrid dimension of governance in contemporary capitalism. Following this approach, the concept of hybrid explicates the ambiguity between formal and informal transfers of authority, which in turn provides an insight into the contested nature of the procedures used to reinforce this type of governance practices.

Three Essays on the Formation and Impact of Economic Policy

Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.

Decentralization, happiness and the perception of institutions

This paper analyses whether the different powers and resources at the disposal of local and regional governments across Europe deliver greater satisfaction with political institutions and lead to greater personal happiness. The analysis uses microdata from the four available waves of the European social survey (2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008), including more than 160,000 observations of individuals living in 29 European countries. Our results reveal that political and fiscal decentralization have a positive and significant effect on individuals’ overall happiness. Fiscal decentralization also exerts a significant effect on the level of satisfaction with political and economic institutions and with the education and health systems, whereas the effect of political decentralization on these variables is more limited. The results show that citizens seem to be happier with the actual capacity of their local governments to deliver than with the general principle that they can have a say on their daily politics and policies. Keywords: Happiness, well-being, satisfaction, fiscal and political decentralization, Europe. JEL codes: H11, H77

Global regulation of the knowledge-based economy: The rise of standards in educational services

This article examines the extent and limits of non-state forms of authority in international relations. It analyses how the information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure for the tradability of services in a global knowledge-based economy relies on informal regulatory practices for adjustment of ICT-related skills. Companies and associations provide training and certification programmes as part of a growing market for educational services setting their own standards. The existing literature on non-conventional forms of authority in the global political economy has emphasised that the consent of actors subject to informal rules and explicit or implicit state recognition remains crucial for the effectiveness of those new forms of power. However, analyses based on a limited sample of actors tend toward a narrow understanding of the issues and fail to fully explore the differentiated space in which non-state authority is emerging. This paper examines the form of authority underpinning the global knowledge-based economy within the broader perspective of the issues likely to be standardised by technical ICT specification, the wide range of actors involved, and the highly differentiated space where standards become authoritative. The empirical findings highlight the role of different private actors in establishing international educational norms in this field. They also pinpoint the limits of profit-oriented standard-settings, notably with regard to generic norms.

Assessing the Political Viability of Labour Market Reform: The Case of Employment Protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation. Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot of attention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process. In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employees trade off lower living standards (because employment protection maintains workers in less productive activities) against longer job duration. The support for employment protection will then depend on the value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. We highlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers' bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more precisely its rate of creative destruction.

Assesing the political viability of labour market reform: The case of employment protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation.Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot ofattention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process.In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employeestrade off lower living standards (because employment protectionmaintains workers in less productive activities) against longer jobduration. The support for employment protection will then depend onthe value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. Wehighlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers'bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more preciselyits rate of creative destruction.

The political consequences of unemployment

We analyze the channels by which an ill-functioning labor market changes the preferences of the people for public policy and therefore the decisions that are made. We not only discuss labour market reform but other important aspects of policy making such as the size and structure of government spending. Theclass of mechanisms that we highlight can be summarized as the very existence of unemployment generating political support for "sclerosis". This may help to explain the timid pace of reform, in particular the fact that any recovery sends them at the backfront of the political agenda, and the sometimes violent opposition generated by some measures, as we have seen mostly in France.

Will EMU increase eurosclerosis?

In this paper we study the relationship between labor market institutions and monetary policy. We use a simple macroeconomic framework to show how optimal monetary policy rules depend on labor institutions (labor adjustment costs, and nominal and real wage rigitidy) and social preferences regarding inflation, employment, and real wages. We also calibrate our model tocompute how the change in social welfare brought about by giving up monetary policy as a result of joining the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) depends on institutions and preferences. We then use the calibrated model to analyze how EMU affects the incentives for labor market reform, both for reformsthat increase the economy's adjustment potential and for those that affect the long-run unemployment rate.

Transnational authority in the knowledge-based economy: Who sets the standards of ICT training and certification?

This article examines the extent and limits of nonstate forms of authority in international relations. It analyzes how the information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure for the tradability of services in a global knowledge-based economy relies on informal regulatory practices for the adjustment of ICT-related skills. By focusing on the challenge that highly volatile and short-lived cycles of demands for this type of knowledge pose for ensuring the right qualification of the labor force, the article explores how companies and associations provide training and certification programs as part of a growing market for educational services setting their own standards. The existing literature on non-conventional forms of authority in the global political economy has emphasized that the consent of actors, subject to informal rules and some form of state support, remains crucial for the effectiveness of those new forms of power. However, analyses based on a limited sample of actors tend toward a narrow understanding of the issues concerned and fail to fully explore the differentiated space in which non state authority is emerging. This article develops a three-dimensional analytical framework that brings together the scope of the issues involved, the range of nonstate actors concerned, and the spatial scope of their authority. The empirical findings highlight the limits of these new forms of nonstate authority and shed light on the role of the state and international governmental organizations in this new context.

Monnaie, citoyenneté et globalisation financière. Les citoyens entre protection sociale et promesses de la capitalisation boursière

La monnaie a été étudiée par des économistes hétérodoxes, des sociologues et des historiens qui ont souligné ses rapports à l'ordre collectif, mais elle n'est que rarement analysée sous l'angle de la citoyenneté. Notre thèse propose une réflexion théorique sur quatre types de fonctions (politique, symbolique, socioéconomique et psychoaffective) qui permettent à la monnaie de jouer un rôle de médiation de la citoyenneté. A partir d'une perspective qui combine les apports de l'économie politique internationale et de l'école de la régulation, nous montrons que cette médiation ne mobilise pas seulement des mécanismes sociopolitiques nationaux, mais aussi des mécanismes internationaux qui rétroagissent sur la sphère domestique des États et affectent leur capacité à définir leur régime de citoyenneté. Cette relation est analysée dans le contexte de l'institutionnalisation du système monétaire international de Bretton Woods (1944) et du développement de la globalisation financière depuis les années 1970. Si la monnaie a été mise au service d'un principe de protection des droits sociaux des citoyens contre les pressions financières extérieures après la Seconde guerre mondiale, elle contribue aujourd'hui à l'ouverture de la sphère domestique des Etats aux flux de capitaux transnationaux et à la création d'un ordre politique et juridique favorable aux droits des investisseurs. Cette dynamique est impulsée par l'essor de nouveaux intermédiaires financiers (notamment les agences de notation et les investisseurs institutionnels) et l'émergence concomitante d'une nouvelle forme d'Etat légitimée à partir d'un discours politique néolibéral insistant sur la quête de compétitivité, la réduction de la protection sociale et la responsabilisation individuelle. Elle se traduit par la privatisation des régimes de retraite et le développement des politiques d'éducation financière qui incitent les citoyens à se comporter en « preneurs de risques » actifs et responsables, assurant eux-mêmes leur sécurité économique à travers le placement de leur épargne retraite sur les marchés financiers. Nous soulignons toutefois les difficultés institutionnelles, cognitives et socioéconomiques qui rendent cette transformation de la citoyenneté contradictoire et problématique. Money has been studied by heterodox economists, sociologists and historians who stressed its relationship to collective order. However, it has hardly been analysed from the viewpoint of its relationship to citizenship. We propose a theoretical account of four types of functions (political, symbolic, socioeconomic and psychoaffective) enabling money to operate as a mediation of citizenship. From a perspective that combines the contributions of international political economy and the regulation school, we show that this mediation mobilises not only national sociopolitical mechanisms, but also international mechanisms which feed back on the domestic sphere of states and affect their capacity to define their regime of citizenship. This relationship is analysed in the context of the institutionalisation of the international monetary system of Bretton Woods (1944) and the development of financial globalization since the 1970s. If money has served to protect the social rights of citizens against external financial pressures after the Second World War, today it contributes to the opening of the domestic sphere of states to transnational capital flows and to the creation of a political and legal order favorable to the rights of investors. This dynamic is driven by the rise of new financial intermediaries (in particular rating agencies and institutional investisors) and the simultaneous emergence of a new form of state legitimized from a neoliberal political discourse emphasizing the quest for competitiveness, reduced social protection and individual responsibilization. It results in the privatization of pension systems and the development of policies of financial education that encourage citizens to behave as active and responsible « risk takers », ensuring their own economic security through the investment of their savings retirement on financial markets. However, we emphasize the institutional, cognitive and socioeconomic difficulties that make this transformation of citizenship contradictory and problematic. - Money has been studied by heterodox economists, sociologists and historians who stressed its relationship to collective order. However, it has hardly been analysed from the viewpoint of its relationship to citizenship. We propose a theoretical account of four types of functions (political, symbolic, socioeconomic and psychoaffective) enabling money to operate as a mediation of citizenship. From a perspective that combines the contributions of international political economy and the regulation school, we show that this mediation mobilises not only national sociopolitical mechanisms, but also international mechanisms which feed back on the domestic sphere of states and affect their capacity to define their regime of citizenship. This relationship is analysed in the context of the institutionalisation of the international monetary system of Bretton Woods (1944) and the development of financial globalization since the 1970s. If money has served to protect the social rights of citizens against external financial pressures after the Second World War, today it contributes to the opening of the domestic sphere of states to transnational capital flows and to the creation of a political and legal order favorable to the rights of investors. This dynamic is driven by the rise of new financial intermediaries (in particular rating agencies and institutional investisors) and the simultaneous emergence of a new form of state legitimized from a neoliberal political discourse emphasizing the quest for competitiveness, reduced social protection and individual responsibilization. It results in the privatization of pension systems and the development of policies of financial education that encourage citizens to behave as active and responsible « risk takers », ensuring their own economic security through the investment of their savings retirement on financial markets. However, we emphasize the institutional, cognitive and socioeconomic difficulties that make this transformation of citizenship problematic.

La normalisation des services aux Etats-Unis et en Europe : une analyse institutionnelle des formes d'autorité privée

This chapter explores the institutional environments in which standards for the service sector are expected to support the rise of a global knowledgebased economy. The analysis relies on global political economy approaches to extend to the area of services standards the assumption that the process of globalisation is not opposing states and markets, but a joint expression of both of them including new patterns and agents of structural change through formal and informal power and regulatory practices. It analyses how services standards gain authority in the institutional environment in Europe and in the United States and the extent to which this authority is recognised at the transnational level. In contrast to conventional views opposing the European and American standardisation systems, the chapter shows that institutional developments of services standards are likely to face trade-offs and compromises across those systems.