The attractiveness of nations in global competition : an empirical assessment of the effects of country attractiveness on the success of strategy for hosting international sports events, 1990-2012

This dissertation aims to investigate empirical evidence on the importance and influence of attractiveness of nations in global competition. The notion of country attractiveness, which has been widely developed in the research areas of international business, tourism and migration, is a multi-dimensional construct to measure a country's characteristics with regard to its market or destination that attract international investors, tourists and migrants. This analytical concept provides an account of the mechanism as to how potential stakeholders evaluate more attractive countries based on certain criteria. Thus, in the field of international sport-event bidding, do international sport event owners also have specific country attractiveness for their sport event hosts? The dissertation attempts to address this research question by statistically assessing the effects of country attractiveness on the success of strategy for hosting international sports events. Based on theories of signaling and soft power, country attractiveness is defined and measured as the three dimensions of sustainable development: economic, social, and environmental attractiveness. This thesis proceeds to examine the concept of sport-event-hosting strategy and explore multi-level factors affecting the success in international sport-event bidding. By exploring past history of the Olympic Movement from theoretical perspectives, the thesis proposes and tests the hypotheses that economic, social and environmental attractiveness of a country may be correlated with its bid wins or the success of sport-event-hosting strategy. Quantitative analytical methods with various robustness checks are employed with using collected data on bidding results of major events in Olympic sports during the period from 1990 to 2012. The analysis results reveal that event owners of international Olympic sports are likely to prefer countries that have higher economic, social, and environmental attractiveness. The empirical assessment of this thesis suggests that high country attractiveness can be an essential element of prerequisites for a city/country to secure in order to bid with an increased chance of success.

State-Society Relationships, Social Trust and the Development of Labour Market Policies in Italy and Sweden

The first decade of the twenty-first century may be remembered for the rebirth of consensus on labour market policy. After three decades of bitter political and ideological controversy between a neo-liberal and a traditional social democratic approach, a new model, often labelled flexicurity, has emerged. This model is promoted by numerous political organisations since it promises to put an end to the old trade-off between equality and efficiency. Several countries are embracing the flexicurity model as a blueprint for labour market reform, but others, mostly belonging to the 'Mediterranean Rim', are clearly lagging behind. Why is it so difficult for these countries to implement the flexicurity model? This paper argues that the application of a flexicurity strategy in these countries is complicated by the lack of social trust between social partners and the state as well as political economy traditions that highlight the role of labour market regulation as a source of social protection.

Subjective health assessments and active labor market participation of older men: evidence from a semiparametric binary choice model with nonadditive correlated individual-specific effects

We use panel data from the U. S. Health and Retirement Study, 1992-2002, to estimate the effect of self-assessed health limitations on the active labor market participation of older men. Self-assessments of health are likely to be endogenous to labor supply due to justification bias and individual-specific heterogeneity in subjective evaluations. We address both concerns. We propose a semiparametric binary choice procedure that incorporates nonadditive correlated individual-specific effects. Our estimation strategy identifies and estimates the average partial effects of health and functioning on labor market participation. The results indicate that poor health plays a major role in labor market exit decisions.

Vertical Product Differentiation, Entry-Deterrence Strategies, and Entry Qualities, September 2005

We analyze the entry of a new product into a vertically differentiated market in which an entrant and an incumbent compete in prices. Here the entry-deterrence strategies of the incumbent firm rely on “limit qualities.” With a sequential choice of quality, a quality-dependent marginal production cost, and a fixed entry cost, we relate the entry-quality decision and the entry-deterrence strategies to the level of entry cost and the degree of consumer heterogeneity. Quality-dependent marginal production costs in the model entail the possibility of inferior-quality entry as well as an incumbent’s aggressive entry-deterrence strategies of increasing its quality level toward potential entry. Welfare evaluation confirms that social welfare is not necessarily improved when entry is encouraged rather than deterred.

Inspection Intensity and Market Structure, October 2005

An investigation of financing an inspection policy while allowing the enforcement of a market regulation is described. A simple model shows that the intensity of controls depends on the market structure. Under a given number of firms, the per-firm probability of controls is lower than one, since firms’ incentive to comply with regulation holds under positive profits. In this case, a lump-sum tax is used for limiting distortions coming from financing with a fixed fee. Under free entry, the per-firm probability of controls is equal to one, and only a fixed fee that prevents excess entry is used to finance inspection.

Interbank Competition with Costly Screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loans are largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks have differing screening abilities.

Expansion of undergraduate courses in nursing: dilemmas and contradictions facing the labor market

We sought to analyze, from the perspective of professors and students, the reasons and consequences of the expansion of undergraduate courses in nursing, discussing the dilemmas and the contradictions confronting the labor market. It was a qualitative study with data obtained from focus groups, conducted in 18 undergraduate nursing courses in the state of Minas Gerais, during the period of February to October of 2011. The narratives were submitted to critical discourse analysis. The results indicated that the education of the nurse was permeated by insecurity as to the future integration into the labor market. The insecurity translates into dilemmas that referred to employability and the precariousness of the working conditions. In this context, employment in the family health strategy emerges as a mirage. One glimpses the need for a political agenda with the purpose of discussion about education, the labor market and the determinants of these processes.

Information acquisition and entry

Before firms decide whether to enter a new market or not, they havethe opportunity to buy information about several variables that might affectthe profitability of this market. Our model differs from the existing literatureon endogenous information acquisition in two respects: (1) there is uncertaintyabout more than one variable, and (2) information is acquired secretly. Whenthe cost of acquiring information is small, entry decisions will be as ifthere was perfect information. Equilibria where each firm acquires only asmall amount of information are more robust than the socially undesirableequilibria where all firms gather all information. Examples illustrate theimportance of assumptions (1) and (2).

Free entry does not imply zero profits

Traditional economic wisdom says that free entry in a market will drive profits down to zero. This conclusion is usually drawn under the assumption of perfect information. We assumethat a priori there exists imperfect information about theprofitability of the market, but that potential entrants maylearn the demand curve perfectly at negligible cost byengaging in market research. Even if in equilibrium firmslearn the demand perfectly, profits may be strictly positivebecause of insufficient entry. The mere fact that it will notbecome common knowledge that every entrant has perfectinformation about demand causes this surprising result. Belief means doubt. Knowing means certainty. Introduction to the Kabalah.

Interbank comptetition with costly screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loansare largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks havediffering screening abilities.

Labour market in the Catalan cotton textile sector: Employment and fertility (1850-1913)

This paper deals whit the dynamics of the Catalan textile labour market (theSpanish region that concentrated most of the industrial and factory activity duringthe 19 Century) and offers hypotheses and results on the impact it had on livingstandards and fertility levels. We observe the formation of an uneven labourmarket in which male supply for labour (excluding women and children) grewmuch faster than the demand. We stress the fact that labour supply is verydependant on institutional factors liked to the transmition of household propertybetween generations. Instead the slow path of growth of adult males demand forlabour is witnessing the limits of this industry to expand and to compete ininternational markets. The strategy of working class families to adapt to scarceopportunities of employment we document here is the diminution of legitimatefertility levels. Fertility control is the direct instrument we think workers have tocontrol their number in a situation that was likely to create labour surpluses in theshort and mid run.

Auctions of licences and market structure

This paper studies sequential auctions of licences to operate in amarket where those firms that obtain at least one licence then engage ina symmetric market game. I employ a new refinement of Nash equilibrium,the concept of {\sl Markovian recursively undominated equilibrium}.The unique solution satisfies the following properties: (i) when severalfirms own licences before the auction (incumbents), new entrants buylicences in each stage, and (ii) when there is no more than one incumbent,either the single firm preempts entry altogether or entry occurs inevery stage, depending on the parameter configuration.

Wage inequality in a frictional labor market

Wage inequality in the United States has grown substantially in thepast two decades. Standard supply-demand analysis in the empiricsof inequality (e.g.Katz and Murphy (1992)) indicates that we mayattribute some of this trend to an outward shift in the demand forhigh skilled labor. In this paper we examine a simple static channelin which the wage premium for skill may grow -increased firm entry.We consider a model of wage dispersion where there are two types ofworkers and homogeneous firms must set wages and preferences forwhat type of worker they would like to hire. We find that both thewage differential and the demand for high skill workers can increasewith the proportion of high skill workers -these high skill workerstherefore 'create' their own demand without exogenous factors. Inaddition, within group wage inequality can increase in step with thebetween group wage inequality. Simulations of the model are providedin order to compare the findings with empirical results.

Effects of employment protection and product market regulations on the Italian labor market

Labor market regulations have often being blamed for high and persistentunemployment in Europe, but evidence on their impact remains mixed. Morerecently, attention has turned to the impact of product market regulationson employment growth. This paper analyzes how labor and product marketregulations interact to affect turnover and employment. We present a matchingmodel which illustrates how barriers to entry in the product market mitigatethe impact of labor market deregulation. We, then, use the Italian SocialSecurity employer-employee panel to study the interaction between barriersto entry and dismissal costs. We exploit the fact that costs for unjustdismissals in Italy increased for firms below 15 employees relative to biggerfirms after 1990. We find that the increase in dismissal costs after 1990decreased accessions and separations in small relative to big firms,especially for women. Moreover, consistent with our model, we find evidencethat the increase in dismissal costs had smaller effects on turnover for womenin sectors faced with strict product market regulations.

Reputation and honesty in a market for information

Previous works on asymmetric information in asset markets tendto focus on the potential gains in the asset market itself. We focus on the market for information and conduct an experimental study to explore, in a game of finite but uncertain duration, whether reputation can be an effective constraint on deliberate misinformation. At the beginning of each period, an uninformed potential asset buyer can purchase information, at a fixed price and from a fully-informed source, about the value of the asset in that period. The informational insiders cannot purchase the asset and are given short-term incentives to provide false information when the asset value is low. Our model predicts that, in accordance with the Folk Theorem, Pareto-superior outcomes featuring truthful revelation should be sustainable. However, this depends critically on beliefs about rationality and behavior. We find that, overall, sellers are truthful 89% of the time. More significantly, the observed frequency of truthfulness is 81% when the asset value is low. Our result is consistent with both mixed-strategy and trigger strategy interpretations and provides evidence that most subjects correctly anticipate rational behavior. We discuss applications to financial markets, media regulation, and the stability of cartels.