A Law and Economics Analysis of Lobbying Regulation Towards an optimal structure through the Cost Indicator Index

This research primarily represents a contribution to the lobbying regulation research arena. It introduces an index which for the first time attempts to measure the direct compliance costs of lobbying regulation. The Cost Indicator Index (CII) offers a brand new platform for qualitative and quantitative assessment of adopted lobbying laws and proposals of those laws, both in the comparative and the sui generis dimension. The CII is not just the only new tool introduced in the last decade, but it is the only tool available for comparative assessments of the costs of lobbying regulations. Beside the qualitative contribution, the research introduces an additional theoretical framework for complementary qualitative analysis of the lobbying laws. The Ninefold theory allows a more structured assessment and classification of lobbying regulations, both by indication of benefits and costs. Lastly, this research introduces the Cost-Benefit Labels (CBL). These labels might improve an ex-ante lobbying regulation impact assessment procedure, primarily in the sui generis perspective. In its final part, the research focuses on four South East European countries (Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia), and for the first time brings them into the discussion and calculates their CPI and CII scores. The special focus of the application was on Serbia, whose proposal on the Law on Lobbying has been extensively analysed in qualitative and quantitative terms, taking into consideration specific political and economic circumstances of the country. Although the obtained results are of an indicative nature, the CII will probably find its place within the academic and policymaking arena, and will hopefully contribute to a better understanding of lobbying regulations worldwide.

Judges and Mass Litigation - a (Behavioural) Law and Economics Perspective

Judicial duties have for decades extended far beyond the scope of traditional adjudication, judges being progressively called upon to occupy the role of social engineers. Meanwhile, contexts in which judges evolve have transformed: mass damage nowadays tends to multiply and create new challenges not only for legal actors, but also for society at large. In spring 2011, the replies received by the European Commission to its public consultation on collective redress indicated European stakeholders’ strong interest in seeing judiciaries play prominent and leading roles in the supervision and monitoring of procedures which enable groups of claimants to seek together compensation for damage caused by mass events. Judges are thus expected to be neutral and robust agents while assuming heavy responsibilities under a considerable burden. Insights from social sciences however invite us to revisit policymakers expectations and may shed new light on current debates about mass litigation.

A Law and Economics Analysis of Trade Secrets: Optimal Scope of Law, Misappropriation and Alternative Damages Regimes

This thesis is primarily based on three core chapters, focused on the fundamental issues of trade secrets law. The goal of this thesis is to come up with policy recommendations to improve legal structure governing trade secrets. The focal points of this research are the following. What is the optimal scope of trade secrets law? How does it depend on the market characteristics such as degree of product differentiation between competing products? What factors need to be considered to balance the contradicting objectives of promoting innovation and knowledge diffusion? The second strand of this research focuses on the desirability of lost profits or unjust enrichment damage regimes in case of misappropriation of a trade secret. A comparison between these regimes is made and simple policy implications are extracted from the analysis. The last part of this research is an empirical analysis of a possible relationship between trade secrets sharing and misappropriation instances faced by firms.

Fighting corruption with pyramids: A Law and Economics approach to combating corruption in post-socialist countries

Corruption is, in the last two decades, considered as one of the biggest problems within the international community, which harms not only a particular state or society but the whole world. The discussion on corruption in law and economics approach is mainly run under the veil of Public choice theory and principal-agent model. Based on this approach the strong international initiatives taken by the UN, the OECD and the Council of Europe, provided various measures and tools in order to support and guide countries in their combat against corruption. These anti-corruption policies created a repression -prevention-transparency model for corruption combat. Applying this model, countries around the world adopted anti-corruption strategies as part of their legal rules. Nevertheless, the recent researches on the effects of this move show non impressive results. Critics argue that “one size does not fit all” because the institutional setting of countries around the world varies. Among the countries which experience problems of corruption, even though they follow the dominant anti-corruption trends, are transitional, post-socialist countries. To this group belong the countries which are emerging from centrally planned to an open market economy. The socialist past left traces on institutional setting, mentality of the individuals and their interrelation, particularly in the domain of public administration. If the idiosyncrasy of these countries is taken into account the suggestion in this thesis is that in public administration in post-socialist countries, instead of dominant anti-corruption scheme repression-prevention-transparency, corruption combat should be improved through the implementation of a new one, structure-conduct-performance. The implementation of this model is based on three regulatory pyramids: anti-corruption, disciplinary anti-corruption and criminal anti-corruption pyramid. This approach asks public administration itself to engage in corruption combat, leaving criminal justice system as the ultimate weapon, used only for the very harmful misdeeds.

Trade Law and Responsible Investment

There is broad international agreement that investment flows to the agricultural sector in developing countries need to be increased. In addition, there is broad agreement that such investments need to be responsible, and that they will only be responsible and beneficial to poor people if they contribute to the prudent development of the agricultural sector. Less studied is the link between responsible investment and trade. In this brief, the assumption is made that responsible investment flows presume a responsible trade regime, i.e. a trade regime that contributes to the prudent development of the agricultural sector in developing countries. Such a prudent, sustainable trade regime will promote investments in the agricultural sector that are responsible to the people involved and to the environment. It builds the “channel” through which investments flow. By contrast, an unsustainable trade framework will create an investment climate that promotes problematic investment practices.