793 resultados para Income tax.
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The Australian government is currently considering options for the rewrite and reform of the current provisions which apply to the taxation of trust income. This article provides a discussion of the current regime and the proposed reforms. It is suggested that a major revamp of taxation of trust income in Australia is problematic and a simpler approach may be to leave the law as is, with modification where necessary to address key issues as and when they arise.
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One of very few field experiments in tax compliance, this study generates a unique data set on Swiss taxpayers’ underdeclaration of income and wealth and overdeduction of tax credits by obtaining exclusive access to tax-return corrections made by the tax administration. Using this commune-level data from Switzerland, it explores the influence on tax compliance of moral suasion, introduced through a treatment in which taxpayers receive a letter containing normative appeals signed by the commune’s fiscal commissioner. This letter also serves to operationalize elements of social identity and (mutual) trust. Interestingly, the results not only echo the earlier finding that moral suasion has barely any effect on taxpayer compliance, but show clear differences between underdeclaration and overdeduction.
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It is observed in the real world that taxes matter for location decisions and that multinationals shift profits by transfer pricing. The US and Canada use so-called formula apportionment (FA) to tax corporate income, and the EU is debating a switch from separate accounting (SA) to FA. This paper develops a theoretical model that compares basic properties of FA to SA. The focal point of the analysis is how changes in tax rates affect capital formation, input choice, and transfer pricing, as well as on spillovers on tax revenue in other countries. The analysis shows that a move from SA to FA will not eliminate such spillovers and will, in cases identified in the paper, actually aggravate them.
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This paper estimates the extent of income underreporting by the self-employed in Finland using the expenditure based approach developed by Pissarides & Weber (1989). Household spending data are for the years 1994 to 1996. The results suggest that self-employment income in Finland is underreported by some 27% on average. Since income for the self-employed is about 8 % of all incomes in Finland, the size of this part of the black economy in Finland is estimated to be about 2,3% of GDP.
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The Basic Income has been defined as a relatively small income that the public Administration unconditionally provides to all its members as a citizenship right. Its principal objective consists on guaranteeing the entire population with an income enough to satisfy living basic needs, but it could have other positive effects such as a more equally income redistribution or tax fraud fighting, as well as some drawbacks, like the labor supply disincentives. In this essay we present the argument in favor and against this policy and ultimately define how it could be financed according to the actual tax and social benefits’ system in Navarra. The research also approaches the main economic implications of the proposal, both in terms of static income redistribution and discusses other relevant dynamic uncertainties.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2013
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The difference between the statutory and effective tax rate for listed groups is a complex variable influenced by a variety of factors. This paper aims to analyze whether this difference exists for listed groups in the German market and tests which factors have an impact on it. Thus the sample consists of 130 corporations listed in the three major German stock indices. The findings suggest that the companies that pay less than the statutory rate clearly outweigh the ones that pay more, and that the income earned from associated companies has a significant impact on this difference.
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We compute the optimal non-linear tax policy for a dynastic economy with uninsurable risk, where generations are linked by dynastic wealth accumulation and correlated incomes. Unlike earlier studies, we find that the optimal long-run tax policy is moderately regressive. Regressive taxes lead to higher output and consumption, at the expense of larger after-tax income inequality. Nevertheless, equilibrium effects and the availability of self-insurance via bequests mitigate the impact of regressive taxes on consumption inequality, resulting in improved average welfare overall. We also consider the optimal once-and-for-all change in the tax system, taking into account the transition dynamics. Starting at the U.S. status quo, the optimal tax reform is slightly more progressive than the current system.
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Latin America is well known as an inequitable region. As it is recognized, inequality and corruption perception weaken the way that political institutions works and the democratic system. Focusing on Latin American and Caribbean countries, this paper analyzes what are the elements shaping tax morale. In particular, how the context influences ethical grounds decisions such as the predisposition to pay taxes is analyzed, using the survey carried out in 2005 by Latinobarometro. The objective is to analyze how country performance determines tax morale. To do so, four probitmodels are estimated using Gini index, Transparency International Corruption Perception Index and Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPpc) as explanatory variables. As expected we found that some socio-demographic variables play a relevant role. Interestingly, we also found that, in this attitude, LAC countries do not register a gender bias. However, those are not our main contributions to the literature on the field. The most important results are linked to: 1) the levelmatters, GDPpc increases the probability of people having tax morale, 2) moreover, income distributionalso influence on tax morale but in opposite direction and 3) corruption perception also reduces tax morale. Those results show that the quality of institutions matters and therefore, the way that democracy works play a relevant role.
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First, we survey recent research in the application of optimal tax theory to housing. This work suggests that the under-taxation of housing for owner occupation distorts investment so that owner occupiers are encouraged to over-invest in housing. Simulations of the US economy suggest that this is true there. But, the theoretical work excludes consideration of land and the simulations exclude consideration of taxes other than income taxes. These exclusions are important for the US and UK economies. In the US, the property tax is relatively high. We argue that excluding the property tax is wrong, so that, when the property tax is taken into account, owner occupied housing is not undertaxed in the US. In the UK, property taxes are relatively low but the cost of land has been increasing in real terms for forty years as a result of a policy of constraining land for development. The price of land for housing is now higher than elsewhere. Effectively, an implicit tax is paid by first time buyers which has reduced housing investment. When land is taken into account over-investment in housing is not encouraged in the UK either.
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Our work is based on a simpliÖed heterogenous-agent shoppingtime economy in which economic agents present distinct productivities in the production of the consumption good, and di§erentiated access to transacting assets. The purpose of the model is to investigate whether, by focusing the analysis solely on endogenously determined shopping times, one can generate a positive correlation between ináation and income inequality. Our main result is to show that, provided the productivity of the interest-bearing asset in the transacting technology is high enough, it is true true that a positive link between ináation and income inequality is generated. Our next step is to show, through analysis of the steady-state equations, that our approach can be interpreted as a mirror image of the usual ináation-tax argument for income concentration. An example is o§ered to illustrate the mechanism.
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The optimal taxation of goods, labor and capital income is considered in a two period model where: i) private information changes through time; ii) savings are not observed, and; iii) savings a§ect preferences conditional on the realization of types. The simultaneous appearance of these three elements cause optimal commodity taxes to depend on o§-equilibrium savings. As a consequence, separability no longer su¢ ces for the uniform taxation prescription of Atkinson and Stiglitz (AS) to obtain. If preferences are homothetic AS is partially restored: taxes are uniform within periods, however, future consumption is taxed at a higher rate than current consumption.
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If household choices can be rationalized by the maximization of a well defined utility function, allowing spouses to file individually or jointly is equivalent to offering the envelope of the two tax schedules. If, instead, household ’preferences’ are constantly being redefined through bargaining, the option to file separately may affect outcomes even if it is never chosen. We use Lundberg and Pollak’s (1993) separate spheres bargaining model to assess the impact of filing options on the outcomes of primary and secondary earners. Threat points of the household’s bargain are given for each spouse by the utility that he or she attains as a follower of a counter-factual off-equilibrium Stackelberg game played by the couple. For a benchmark tax system which treats a couple’s average taxable income as if it were that of a single individual, we prove that if choices are not at kinks, allowing couples to choose whether to file jointly or individually usually benefits the secondary earner. In our numeric exercises this is also the case when choices are at kinks as well. These findings are, however, quite sensitive to the details of the tax system, as made evident by the examination of an alternative tax system.
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This paper explores the evolution of the cross-section income distribution in economies where endogenous neighborhood formation interacts with positive within-neighborhood feedback effects. We study an economy in which the economic success of adults is determined by the characteristics of the families in the neighborhood in which a person grows up. These feedbacks take two forms. First, the tax base of a neighborhood affects the leveI of education investment in offspring. Second, the effectiveness of education investment is affected by a neighborhood's in come distribution, reflecting factors such as role model or labor market connection effects. Conditions are developed under which endogenous stratification, defined as the tendency for families wi th similar incomes to choose to form common communities, will occur. When families are allowed to choose their neighborhoods, wealthy families will have an incentive to segregate themselves from the rest of the population. This resulting stratification is supported by house price differences between ricli and poor communities. Endogenous stratification can lead to pronounced intertemporal inequality as different families provide very different interaction environments for offspring. When the transformation of human capital into in come exhibits constant retums to scale, cross-section in come differences may also grow across time. As a result, endogenous stratification and neighborhood feedbacks can interact to produce long run inequality.
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We study the optimal “inflation tax in an environment with heterogeneous agents and non-linear income taxes. We first derive the general conditions needed for the optimality of the Friedman rule in this setup. These general conditions are distinct in nature and more easily interpretable than those obtained in the literature with a representative agent and linear taxation. We then study two standard monetary specifications and derive their implications for the optimality of the Friedman rule. For the shopping-time model the Friedman rule is optimal with essentially no restrictions on preferences or transaction technologies. For the cash-credit model the Friedman rule is optimal if preferences are separable between the consumption goods and leisure, or if leisure shifts consumption towards the credit good. We also study a generalized model which nests both models as special cases.