Chile and its "lateral" trade policy

Includes bibliography

Regional integration and macroeconomic coordination in Latin America

Includes bibliography

Structural enrichment reduces aggression in Tilapia rendalli

Environmental enrichment seeks to improve the behavior of captive animals. Few studies have developed enrichment strategies for fish, particularly for use in aquaculture. Environmental enrichment for territorial and aggressive animals has the potential to increase both the amount of defensible resources and the value of a disputed territory which can increase the level of aggression. This study evaluated this hypothesis for the redbreast tilapia, Tilapia rendaIli. We used a short-term approach for evaluation of fish aggressive behavior by recording it for 30 min after introduction of a pair of fish into each experimental aquarium. Our main finding was that the latency to start a fight was lower in an enriched environment, but the frequency of attacks was higher in a non-enriched environment (control). Furthermore, we observed clear hierarchical behavior (submissive dark stripes on the body and dominant light-colored bodies without stripes) only in the non-enriched environment. Structural enrichment of the environment for redbreast tilapia leads to decreased aggression and cohabitation without hierarchical dominance. © 2013 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.

Alívio de sobrecargas em redes de transmissão com o auxílio de geradores distribuídos

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

Interface gráfica no contexto de teoria dos jogos sob a forma de Java Apples

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

O setor sucroenergético no Brasil: Estado, hegemonia e relações internacionais - o caso da UNICA no agribusiness internacional

Pós-graduação em Ciências Sociais - FFC

Perspectivas históricas da pesquisa operacional

Pós-graduação em Educação Matemática - IGCE

Avaliação de Localizção e preço de contrato de geração distribuida em um ambiente competitivo

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Redespacho de reativos como ação corretiva para alívio de sobrecargas em Redes de transmissão

Pós-graduação em Engenharia Elétrica - FEIS

Alocação de perdas e custos pelo uso do sistema de transmissão

Pós-graduação em Engenharia Elétrica - FEIS

A influência do enriquecimento ambiental no comportamento agressivo da tilápia do Congo Tilapia rendalli

O enriquecimento ambiental tem sido proposto como uma prática para melhoria do bem-estar de animais de cativeiro ou de produções zootécnicas. No caso de animais territoriais e agressivos, ao se enriquecer o ambiente, aumenta-se a quantidade de recursos a se defender, bem como o valor do território em disputa, aumentando as interações agressivas. Esse aspecto foi mostrado recentemente para o peixe ciclídeo tilápia-do-Nilo (Oreochromis niloticus). Do ponto de vista comparativo, isso pode ser um fenômeno espécie-específico. Para avaliar isso devemos observar se em condições similares outro peixe ciclídeo sofre a mesma influência do enriquecimento do ambiente. Assim, seguindo a lógica do confronto obtido para tilápia-do-Nilo, aventamos a hipótese de que as atividades agressivas aumentam em função do enriquecimento. Este estudo avaliou essa hipótese para a tilápia do Congo Tilapia rendalli. Como principal resultado, observamos que a latência para iniciar a luta é menor no ambiente enriquecido, mas a frequência de ataques é maior no ambiente não enriquecido (controle). Além disso, observamos clara definição hierárquica por meio da sinalização de submissão (corpo com listras escuras) e dominância (corpo claro sem listras) na condição sem enriquecimento do ambiente. Concluímos que ao contrário da tilápia-do-Nilo, na tilápia do Congo o enriquecimento do ambiente leva a diminuição da agressividade sem clara definição da hierarquia de dominância

Variable assessment of wing colouration in aerial contests of the red-winged damselfly Mnesarete pudica (Zygoptera, Calopterygidae)

Wing pigmentation is a trait that predicts the outcome of male contests in some damselflies. Thus, it is reasonable to suppose that males would have the ability to assess wing pigmentation and adjust investment in a fight according to the costs that the rival may potentially impose. Males of the damselfly Mnesarete pudica exhibit red-coloured wings and complex courtship behaviour and engage in striking male– male fights. In this study, we investigated male assessment behaviour during aerial contests. Theory suggests that the relationship between male resource-holding potential (RHP) and contest duration describes the kind of assessment adopted by males: self-assessment, opponent-only assessment or mutual assessment. A recent theory also suggests that weak and strong males exhibit variations in the assessment strategies adopted. We estimated male RHP through male body size and wing colouration (i.e. pigmentation, wing reflectance spectra and transmission spectra) and studied the relationship between male RHP and contest duration from videodocumented behavioural observations of naturally occurring individual contests in the field. The results showed that males with more opaque wings and larger red spots were more likely to win contests. The relationships between RHP and contest durations partly supported the self-assessment and the mutual assessment models. We then experimentally augmented the pigmented area of the wings, in order to evaluate whether strong and weak males assess rivals’ RHP through wing pigmentation. Our experimental manipulation, however, clearly demonstrated that strong males assess rivals’ wing pigmentation. We finally suggest that there is a variation in the assessment strategy adopted by males

Variable assessment of wing colouration in aerial contests of the red-winged damselfly Mnesarete pudica (Zygoptera, Calopterygidae)

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Teoria dos Jogos aplicada à inteligência competitiva organizacional no âmbito da Ciência da Informação

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Evolutionary methods for self-organizing cooperation in peer-to-peer networks

The Peer-to-Peer network paradigm is drawing the attention of both final users and researchers for its features. P2P networks shift from the classic client-server approach to a high level of decentralization where there is no central control and all the nodes should be able not only to require services, but to provide them to other peers as well. While on one hand such high level of decentralization might lead to interesting properties like scalability and fault tolerance, on the other hand it implies many new problems to deal with. A key feature of many P2P systems is openness, meaning that everybody is potentially able to join a network with no need for subscription or payment systems. The combination of openness and lack of central control makes it feasible for a user to free-ride, that is to increase its own benefit by using services without allocating resources to satisfy other peers’ requests. One of the main goals when designing a P2P system is therefore to achieve cooperation between users. Given the nature of P2P systems based on simple local interactions of many peers having partial knowledge of the whole system, an interesting way to achieve desired properties on a system scale might consist in obtaining them as emergent properties of the many interactions occurring at local node level. Two methods are typically used to face the problem of cooperation in P2P networks: 1) engineering emergent properties when designing the protocol; 2) study the system as a game and apply Game Theory techniques, especially to find Nash Equilibria in the game and to reach them making the system stable against possible deviant behaviors. In this work we present an evolutionary framework to enforce cooperative behaviour in P2P networks that is alternative to both the methods mentioned above. Our approach is based on an evolutionary algorithm inspired by computational sociology and evolutionary game theory, consisting in having each peer periodically trying to copy another peer which is performing better. The proposed algorithms, called SLAC and SLACER, draw inspiration from tag systems originated in computational sociology, the main idea behind the algorithm consists in having low performance nodes copying high performance ones. The algorithm is run locally by every node and leads to an evolution of the network both from the topology and from the nodes’ strategy point of view. Initial tests with a simple Prisoners’ Dilemma application show how SLAC is able to bring the network to a state of high cooperation independently from the initial network conditions. Interesting results are obtained when studying the effect of cheating nodes on SLAC algorithm. In fact in some cases selfish nodes rationally exploiting the system for their own benefit can actually improve system performance from the cooperation formation point of view. The final step is to apply our results to more realistic scenarios. We put our efforts in studying and improving the BitTorrent protocol. BitTorrent was chosen not only for its popularity but because it has many points in common with SLAC and SLACER algorithms, ranging from the game theoretical inspiration (tit-for-tat-like mechanism) to the swarms topology. We discovered fairness, meant as ratio between uploaded and downloaded data, to be a weakness of the original BitTorrent protocol and we drew inspiration from the knowledge of cooperation formation and maintenance mechanism derived from the development and analysis of SLAC and SLACER, to improve fairness and tackle freeriding and cheating in BitTorrent. We produced an extension of BitTorrent called BitFair that has been evaluated through simulation and has shown the abilities of enforcing fairness and tackling free-riding and cheating nodes.