961 resultados para Game Engine Technology
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The work agenda includes the production of a report on different doctoral programmes on “Technology Assessment” in Europe, the US and Japan, in order to analyse collaborative post-graduation activities. Finally, the proposals on collaborative post-graduation programme between FCTUNL and ITAS-FZK will be organised by an ongoing discussion process with colleagues from ITAS.
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This technical report describes the implementation details of the Implicit GTS Allocation Mechanism (i-GAME), for the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol. The i-GAME was implemented in nesC/TinyOS for the CrossBow MICAz mote, over our own implementation of the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol stack. This document provides the implementation details, including a description of the i-GAME software interfaces.
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This paper discusses the technology of smart floors as a enabler of smart cities. The discussion will be based on technology that is embedded into the environment that enable location, navigation but also wireless power transmission for powering up elements siting on it, typically mobile devices. One of those examples is the smart floor, this implementation follows two paths, one where the floor is passive, and normally passive RFID's are embedded into the floor, they are used to provide intelligence into the surrounding space, this is normally complemented with a battery powered mobile unit that scans the floor for the sensors and communicates the information to a database which locates the mobile device in the environment. The other path for the smart city enabler is where the floor is active and delivers energy for the objects standing on top of it. In this paper these two approaches will be presented, by discussing the technology behind it. © 2014 IEEE.
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This paper presents a methodology to establish investment and trading strategies of a power generation company. These strategies are integrated in the ITEM-Game simulator in order to test their results when played against defined strategies used by other players. The developed strategies are focused on investment decisions, although trading strategies are also implemented to obtain base case results. Two cases are studied considering three players with the same trading strategy. In case 1, all players also have the same investment strategy driven by a market target share. In case 2, player 1 has an improved investment strategy with a target share twice of the target of players 2 and 3. Results put in evidence the influence of the CO2 and fuel prices in the company investment decision. It is also observed the influence of the budget constraint which might prevent the player to take the desired investment decision.
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This paper presents a layered Smart Grid architecture enhancing security and reliability, having the ability to act in order to maintain and correct infrastructure components without affecting the client service. The architecture presented is based in the core of well design software engineering, standing upon standards developed over the years. The layered Smart Grid offers a base tool to ease new standards and energy policies implementation. The ZigBee technology implementation test methodology for the Smart Grid is presented, and provides field tests using ZigBee technology to control the new Smart Grid architecture approach. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Dissertation presented to obtain a Masters degree in Computer Science
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Dissertação apresentada para a obtenção do Grau de Doutor em Informática pela Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia.
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We show that a self-generated set of combinatorial games, S. may not be hereditarily closed but, strong self-generation and hereditary closure are equivalent in the universe of short games. In [13], the question "Is there a set which will give a non-distributive but modular lattice?" appears. A useful necessary condition for the existence of a finite non-distributive modular L(S) is proved. We show the existence of S such that L(S) is modular and not distributive, exhibiting the first known example. More, we prove a Representation Theorem with Games that allows the generation of all finite lattices in game context. Finally, a computational tool for drawing lattices of games is presented. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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We consider a Bertrand duopoly model with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the price of its product according to the well-known concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The chooses are made simultaneously by both firms. In this paper, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that this game has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We analyse the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the technology with highest production cost versus the one with cheapest production cost. We prove that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also show that the expected price of each good increases with both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected production costs of the rival dominated by the effect of the own expected production costs.
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Trabalho apresentado no âmbito do Mestrado em Engenharia Informática, como requisito parcial para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Engenharia Informática
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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Geospatial Technologies
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We study the effects of entry of two foreign firms on domestic welfare in the presence of licensing, when the incumbent is technologically superior to the entrants. We consider two different situations: (i) the cost-reducing innovation is licensed to both entrants; (ii) the cost- reducing innovation is licensed to just one of the entrants. We analyse three kind of license: (lump- sum) fixed-fee; (per-unit) royalty; and two-part tariff, that is a combination of a fixed-fee and a royalty. We prove that a two part tariff is never an optimal licensing scheme for the incumbent. Moreover, (i) when the technology is licensed to the two entrants, the optimal contract consists of a licensing with only output royalty; and (ii) when the technology is licensed to just one of the entrants, the optimal contract consists of a licensing with only a fixed-fee.
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Standards for learning objects focus primarily on content presentation. They were already extended to support automatic evaluation but it is limited to exercises with a predefined set of answers. The existing standards lack the metadata required by specialized evaluators to handle types of exercises with an indefinite set of solutions. To address this issue we extended existing learning object standards to the particular requirements of a specialized domain. We present a definition of programming problems as learning objects that is compatible both with Learning Management Systems and with systems performing automatic evaluation of programs. The proposed definition includes metadata that cannot be conveniently represented using existing standards, such as: the type of automatic evaluation; the requirements of the valuation engine; and the roles of different assets - tests cases, program solutions, etc. We present also the EduJudge project and its main services as a case study on the use of the proposed definition of programming problems as learning objects.