Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need toborrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitiveequilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs withadditional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of thisadditional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be ableto simultaneously borrow from many different lenders operating in it. This makes it possible toattain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in themarket for bank loans.

Attentional networks efficiency in preterm children.

Recent studies have reported specific executive and attentional deficits in preterm children. However, the majority of this research has used multidetermined tasks to assess these abilities, and the interpretation of the results lacks an explicit theoretical backdrop to better understand the origin of the difficulties observed. In the present study, we used the Child Attention Network Task (Child ANT; Rueda et al. 2004) to assess the efficiency of the alerting, orienting and executive control networks. We compared the performance of 25 preterm children (gestational age < or = 32 weeks) to 25 full-term children, all between 5(1/2) and 6(1/2) years of age. Results showed that, as compared to full-term children, preterm children were slower on all conditions of the Child ANT and had a specific deficit in executive control abilities. We also observed a significantly higher correlation between the orienting and executive control networks in the preterm group, suggesting less differentiation of these two networks in this population.

Understanding portfolio efficiency with conditioning information

We show that unconditionally efficient returns do not achieve the maximum unconditionalSharpe ratio, neither display zero unconditional Jensen s alphas, when returns arepredictable. Next, we define a new type of efficient returns that is characterized by thoseunconditional properties. We also study a different type of efficient returns that is rationalizedby standard mean-variance preferences and motivates new Sharpe ratios and Jensen salphas. We revisit the testable implications of asset pricing models from the perspective ofthe three sets of efficient returns. We also revisit the empirical evidence on the conditionalvariants of the CAPM and the Fama-French model from a portfolio perspective.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects needto borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, thecompetitive equilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurswith additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic ofthese additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it doesnot condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attainefficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the marketsfor monitored loans.

Communication, coordination and efficiency in evolutionary one-population models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuringefficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

The efficiency of a carbamazepine-mianserin combination scheme in opiate detoxification.

A recent comparative randomized double-blind study has suggested the utility of a carbamazepine/mianserin combination as a treatment for opiate withdrawal. The aim of the present study was to explore the feasibility and efficiency of this combination under naturalistic conditions. Five hundred and fifty mostly polysubstance abusing patients treated with a standardized scheme combining carbamazepine and mianserin were assessed with regard to deviations to the protocol, used co-medications and retention in treatment.Three hundred and sixty three patients (66.0%) received the carbamazepine/mianserin combination as specified by the standardized protocol. In 350 patients (63.7%) the whole 10 days was completed. The most frequently used p.r.n. medications were for anxiety (47.5%) and insomnia (54.5%).The treatment of opiate withdrawal with a carbamazepine/mianserin combination scheme in an inpatient setting seems to be feasible and applicable with few adaptations to most patients, and may represent an interesting treatment option for multidrug users.

Effects of fructose-containing caloric sweeteners on resting energy expenditure and energy efficiency: a review of human trials.

Epidemiological studies indicate that the consumption of fructose-containing caloric sweeteners (FCCS: mainly sucrose and high-fructose corn syrup) is associated with obesity. The hypothesis that FCCS plays a causal role in the development of obesity however implies that they would impair energy balance to a larger extent than other nutrients, either by increasing food intake, or by decreasing energy expenditure. We therefore reviewed the literature comparing a) diet-induced thermogenesis (DIT) after ingestion of isocaloric FCCS vs glucose meals, and b) basal metabolic rate (BMR) or c) post-prandial energy expenditure after consuming a high FCCS diet for > 3 days vs basal,weight-maintenance low FCCS diet. Nine studies compared the effects of single isocaloric FCCS and glucose meals on DIT; of them, six studies reported that DIT was significantly higher with FCCS than with glucose, 2 reported a non-significant increase with FCCS, and one reported no difference. The higher DIT with fructose than glucose can be explained by the low energy efficiency associated with fructose metabolism. Five studies compared BMR after consumption of a high FCCS vs a low FCCS diet for > 3 days. Four studies reported no change after 4-7 day on a high FCCS diet, and only one study reported a 7% decrease after 12 week on a high FCCS diet. Three studies compared post-prandial EE after consumption of a high FCCS vs a low FCCS diet for > 3 days, and did not report any significant difference. One study compared 24-EE in subjects fed a weight-maintenance diet and hypercaloric diets with 50% excess energy as fructose, sucrose and glucose during 4 days: 24-EE was increased with all 3 hypercaloric diets, but there was no difference between fructose, sucrose and glucose. We conclude that fructose has lower energy efficiency than glucose. Based on available studies, there is presently no hint that dietary FCCS may decrease EE. Larger, well controlled studies are however needed to assess the longer term effects of FCCS on EE.

On the efficiency and sensitivity of a pyramidal classification algorithm

In this paper we propose a Pyramidal Classification Algorithm,which together with an appropriate aggregation index producesan indexed pseudo-hierarchy (in the strict sense) withoutinversions nor crossings. The computer implementation of thealgorithm makes it possible to carry out some simulation testsby Monte Carlo methods in order to study the efficiency andsensitivity of the pyramidal methods of the Maximum, Minimumand UPGMA. The results shown in this paper may help to choosebetween the three classification methods proposed, in order toobtain the classification that best fits the original structureof the population, provided we have an a priori informationconcerning this structure.

The credit ratings game

The collapse of so many AAA-rated structured finance products in 2007-2008has brought renewed attention to the causes of ratings failures and the conflicts of interestin the Credit Ratings Industry. We provide a model of competition among Credit RatingsAgencies (CRAs) in which there are three possible sources of conflicts: 1) the CRA conflictof interest of understating credit risk to attract more business; 2) the ability of issuersto purchase only the most favorable ratings; and 3) the trusting nature of some investorclienteles who may take ratings at face value. We show that when combined, these give riseto three fundamental equilibrium distortions. First, competition among CRAs can reducemarket efficiency, as competition facilitates ratings shopping by issuers. Second, CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings in boom times, when there are more trusting investors, andwhen the risks of failure which could damage CRA reputation are lower. Third, the industrypractice of tranching of structured products distorts market efficiency as its role is to deceivetrusting investors. We argue that regulatory intervention requiring: i) upfront paymentsfor rating services (before CRAs propose a rating to the issuer), ii) mandatory disclosure ofany rating produced by CRAs, and iii) oversight of ratings methodology can substantiallymitigate ratings inflation and promote efficiency.

Cost efficiency in primary care contracting: A stochastic frontier cost function approach

The principal aim of this paper is to estimate a stochastic frontier costfunction and an inefficiency effects model in the analysis of the primaryhealth care services purchased by the public authority and supplied by 180providers in 1996 in Catalonia. The evidence from our sample does not supportthe premise that contracting out has helped improve purchasing costefficiency in primary care. Inefficient purchasing cost was observed in thecomponent of this purchasing cost explicitly included in the contract betweenpurchaser and provider. There are no observable incentives for thecontracted-out primary health care teams to minimise prescription costs, whichare not explicitly included in the present contracting system.

Overconfidence and market efficiency with heterogeneous agents

We study financial markets in which both rational and overconfident agents coexist and make endogenous information acquisition decisions. We demonstrate the following irrelevance result: when a positive fraction of rational agents (endogeneously) decides to become informed in equilibrium, prices are set as if all investors were rational, and as a consequence the overconfidence bias does not aect informational efficiency, price volatility, rational traders expected profits or their welfare. Intuitively, as overconfidence goes up, so does price infornativeness, which makes rational agents cut their information acquisition activities, effectively undoing the standard effect of more aggressive trading by the overconfident.

French version validation of the psychotic symptom rating scales (PSYRATS) for outpatients with persistent psychotic symptoms.

ABSTRACT: BACKGROUND: Most scales that assess the presence and severity of psychotic symptoms often measure a broad range of experiences and behaviours, something that restricts the detailed measurement of specific symptoms such as delusions or hallucinations. The Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales (PSYRATS) is a clinical assessment tool that focuses on the detailed measurement of these core symptoms. The goal of this study was to examine the psychometric properties of the French version of the PSYRATS. METHODS: A sample of 103 outpatients suffering from schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorders and presenting persistent psychotic symptoms over the previous three months was assessed using the PSYRATS. Seventy-five sample participants were also assessed with the Positive And Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS). RESULTS: ICCs were superior to .90 for all items of the PSYRATS. Factor analysis replicated the factorial structure of the original version of the delusions scale. Similar to previous replications, the factor structure of the hallucinations scale was partially replicated. Convergent validity indicated that some specific PSYRATS items do not correlate with the PANSS delusions or hallucinations. The distress items of the PSYRATS are negatively correlated with the grandiosity scale of the PANSS. CONCLUSIONS: The results of this study are limited by the relatively small sample size as well as the selection of participants with persistent symptoms. The French version of the PSYRATS partially replicates previously published results. Differences in factor structure of the hallucinations scale might be explained by greater variability of its elements. The future development of the scale should take into account the presence of grandiosity in order to better capture details of the psychotic experience.

Growth accounting in items of turbulence and death: efficiency, technology, capital accumulation and human capital 1929-1950

We employ a non-parametrical approach to growth accounting (Data Envelopment Analysis,DEA) to disentangle the proximate sources of labour productivity growth in 41 nationsbetween 1929 and 1950 by decomposing productivity growth into four components:technological change; efficiency catch-up (movements towards the production frontier),capital accumulation and human capital accumulation. We show that efficiency catch-upgenerally explains productivity growth, whereas technological change and factoraccumulation were limited and distorted by the effects of war. War clearly hamperedefficiency. Moreover, an unbalanced ratio of human capital to physical capital (a gap to thetechnological leader) was crucial for efficiency catching-up.

Market structure and hospital efficiency: Evaluating potential effects of deregulation in a national health service

In this article we examine the potential effect of market structureon hospital technical efficiency as a measure of performance controlled byownership and regulation. This study is relevant to provide an evaluationof the potential effects of recommended and initiated deregulation policiesin order to promote market reforms in the context of a European NationalHealth Service. Our goal was reached through three main empirical stages.Firstly, using patient origin data from hospitals in the region of Cataloniain 1990, we estimated geographic hospital markets through the Elzinga--Hogartyapproach, based on patient flows. Then we measured the market level ofconcentration using the Herfindahl--Hirschman index. Secondly, technicaland scale efficiency scores for each hospital was obtained specifying aData Envelopment Analysis. According to the data nearly two--thirds of thehospitals operate under the production frontier with an average efficiencyscore of 0.841. Finally, the determinants of the efficiency scores wereinvestigated using a censored regression model. Special attention waspaid to test the hypothesis that there is an efficiency improvement in morecompetitive markets. The results suggest that the number of competitors inthe market contributes positively to technical efficiency and there is someevidence that the differences in efficiency scores are attributed toseveral environmental factors such as ownership, market structure andregulation effects.

Bargaining efficiency and screening: An experimental investigation

This paper investigates whether information about fairness types canbe useful in lowering dispute costs and enhancing bargaining efficiency.An experiment was conducted in which subjects were first screened usinga dictator game, with the allocations chosen used to separate participantsinto two types. Mutually anonymous pairs of subjects then bargained, witha dispute cost structure imposed. Sorting with identification reducesdispute costs; there are also significant differences in bargainingefficiency across pairing types. Information about types is crucial forthese differences and also strongly affects the relative bargainingsuccess of the two types and the hypothetical optimal bargaining strategy.