1000 resultados para Economia monetária
Resumo:
Cada cop més, els editors d'avui dia actuen a nivell global per proveïr informació electrònica, i és responsabilitat de les biblioteques actuar a nivell global per expressar les seves posicions al mercat pel que fa a les polítiques de preus i altres requisits i condicions relatius a l'adquisició d'informació publicada. Aquest document actualitza les declaracions anteriors de l'ICOLC sobre el context actual de la informació electrònica, el context que desitjem per al futur, i els usos preferits per tal que els consorcis de biblioteques i les seves biblioteques membre puguin assolir els resultats desitjats. En aquesta actualització general, emfatitzem els aspectes referents a l'economia i les polítiques de preus, que han estat una preocupació destacada des de les primeres trobades de l'ICOLC el 1996 i al llarg de les Declaracions que hem fet fins ara.
Resumo:
The objective of this paper is to identify empirically the logic behind short-term interest rates setting
Resumo:
The objective of this study is the empirical identification of the monetary policy rules pursued in individual countries of EU before and after the launch of European Monetary Union. In particular, we have employed an estimation of the augmented version of the Taylor rule (TR) for 25 countries of the EU in two periods (1992-1998, 1999-2006). While uniequational estimation methods have been used to identify the policy rules of individual central banks, for the rule of the European Central Bank has been employed a dynamic panel setting. We have found that most central banks really followed some interest rate rule but its form was usually different from the original TR (proposing that domestic interest rate responds only to domestic inflation rate and output gap). Crucial features of policy rules in many countries have been the presence of interest rate smoothing as well as response to foreign interest rate. Any response to domestic macroeconomic variables have been missing in the rules of countries with inflexible exchange rate regimes and the rules consisted in mimicking of the foreign interest rates. While we have found response to long-term interest rates and exchange rate in rules of some countries, the importance of monetary growth and asset prices has been generally negligible. The Taylor principle (the response of interest rates to domestic inflation rate must be more than unity as a necessary condition for achieving the price stability) has been confirmed only in large economies and economies troubled with unsustainable inflation rates. Finally, the deviation of the actual interest rate from the rule-implied target rate can be interpreted as policy shocks (these deviation often coincided with actual turbulent periods).
Resumo:
This paper has three objectives. First, it aims at revealing the logic of interest rate setting pursued by monetary authorities of 12 new EU members. Using estimation of an augmented Taylor rule, we find that this setting was not always consistent with the official monetary policy. Second, we seek to shed light on the inflation process of these countries. To this end, we carry out an estimation of an open economy Philips curve (PC). Our main finding is that inflation rates were not only driven by backward persistency but also held a forward-looking component. Finally, we assess the viability of existing monetary arrangements for price stability. The analysis of the conditional inflation variance obtained from GARCH estimation of PC is used for this purpose. We conclude that inflation targeting is preferable to an exchange rate peg because it allowed decreasing the inflation rate and anchored its volatility.
Resumo:
We examine the evolution of monetary policy rules in a group of inflation targeting countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom) applying moment- based estimator at time-varying parameter model with endogenous regressors. Using this novel flexible framework, our main findings are threefold. First, monetary policy rules change gradually pointing to the importance of applying time-varying estimation framework. Second, the interest rate smoothing parameter is much lower that what previous time-invariant estimates of policy rules typically report. External factors matter for all countries, albeit the importance of exchange rate diminishes after the adoption of inflation targeting. Third, the response of interest rates on inflation is particularly strong during the periods, when central bankers want to break the record of high inflation such as in the U.K. or in Australia at the beginning of 1980s. Contrary to common wisdom, the response becomes less aggressive after the adoption of inflation targeting suggesting the positive effect of this regime on anchoring inflation expectations. This result is supported by our finding that inflation persistence as well as policy neutral rate typically decreased after the adoption of inflation targeting.
Resumo:
Estimated Taylor rules became popular as a description of monetary policy conduct. There are numerous reasons why real monetary policy can be asymmetric and estimated Taylor rule nonlinear. This paper tests whether monetary policy can be described as asymmetric in three new European Union (EU) members (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), which apply an inflation targeting regime. Two different empirical frameworks are
Resumo:
We examine whether and how main central banks responded to episodes of financial stress over the last three decades. We employ a new methodology for monetary policy rules estimation, which allows for time-varying response coefficients as well as corrects for endogeneity. This flexible framework applied to the U.S., U.K., Australia, Canada and Sweden together with a new financial stress dataset developed by the International Monetary Fund allows not only testing whether the central banks responded to financial stress but also detects the periods and type of stress that were the most worrying for monetary authorities and to quantify the intensity of policy response. Our findings suggest that central banks often change policy
Resumo:
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was established to govern discretionary fiscal policy in the European Monetary Union. This article studies the effects created when there is uncertainty about the members’ commitment to respecting the established deficit limits in the SGP. We will show that, even if countries respect the SGP deficit ceiling, the presence of uncertainty about their compliance will bring about higher volatility in key economic variables, which could, in turn, affect unemployment and growth negatively. This finding shows that it is important to reduce uncertainty about the members’ commitment towards the SGP. Keywords: fiscal policy rules, monetary union, Stability and Growth Pact, uncertainty, commitment. JEL No.: E63, F55, H62, H87
Resumo:
Treball final de carrera. Consisteix en la creació d'un portal web que permet als usuaris que s'hi registrin gestionar la seva economia domèstica a base de registrar i classificar les seves despeses i ingressos
Resumo:
Disseny d'un model informàtic i de comunicacions basat en programari lliure que permeti l'estandardització de la instal·lació i posterior manteniment de les TIC aplicables a les delegacions territorials d'una entitat bancària.
Resumo:
Estudi que analitza la incidència que la Universitat de Girona ha tingut, durant els quinze anys que han transcorregut des de la seva creació, a la ciutat de Girona i les comarques gironines des d’un punt de vista urbanístic, cultural, social i econòmic
Resumo:
Aquest treball de recerca pretén analitzar les conseqüències de tenir el poder de decisió separat entre la política fiscal i la política monetària en la UEM. Alguns autors han anomenat aquest fet com el pecat original de l’eurozona, considerant que aquesta àrea monetària ha patit un error de disseny des d’un bon principi1. El creixement econòmic d’alguns EM, ha amagat aquesta dialèctica constant, retardant la decisió entre les Institucions Europees i els EM eternament, fins a tal punt que la recessió econòmica actual ha evidenciat la necessitat de coordinació entre aquestes dues polítiques econòmiques i s’ha començat a instrumentalitzar nous mecanismes per millorar l’estructura actual
Resumo:
En l'àmbit de la política econòmica en la Constitució es produeixen canvis que poden ser importants en el futur, referits al reforçament de la capacitat de gestió de l'eurozona, a més de convertir el BCE com una institució sense disminuir la seva independència. Essencialment els camgios en el mecanisme de govern pivoten al voltant de la governança de la política monetària i l'euro, i s'estenen als aspectes de les decisions sobre el procediment de dèficit públic excessiu. És a dir, s'avança en els mecanismes de presa de decisions que pertanyen ja al camp competencial de les polítiques de la Unió. Per contra, s'avança poc en la coordinació de les polítiques econòmiques, les competències pertanyen als estats membres.
Resumo:
This paper investigates the role of learning by private agents and the central bank (two-sided learning) in a New Keynesian framework in which both sides of the economy have asymmetric and imperfect knowledge about the true data generating process. We assume that all agents employ the data that they observe (which may be distinct for different sets of agents) to form beliefs about unknown aspects of the true model of the economy, use their beliefs to decide on actions, and revise these beliefs through a statistical learning algorithm as new information becomes available. We study the short-run dynamics of our model and derive its policy recommendations, particularly with respect to central bank communications. We demonstrate that two-sided learning can generate substantial increases in volatility and persistence, and alter the behavior of the variables in the model in a signifficant way. Our simulations do not converge to a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium and we highlight one source that invalidates the convergence results of Marcet and Sargent (1989). Finally, we identify a novel aspect of central bank communication in models of learning: communication can be harmful if the central bank's model is substantially mis-specified