Corporate opacity and cost of debt for family firms

This paper uses a sample of Chinese firms to examine the impact of corporate opacity on the relationship between family control and firms’ cost of debt. We find that family control is associated with a lower cost of debt on average, and a negative impact exists mainly in firms with relatively low corporate opacity. We further provide evidence that the moderating effect of corporate opacity becomes more pronounced when investors’ perception of controlling families’ moral hazard of expropriation is higher. Our results are robust to alternative opacity proxies and controlling for endogeneity of family control using the instrumental variable method. Our study highlights that controlling families are heterogeneous in their impact on the shareholder–debtholder relationship in family firms, and debtholders view corporate opacity as an important reference in assessing the extent of potential agency conflicts in China.

Evaluation of contagion or interdependence in the financial crises of Asia and Latin America, considering the macroeconomic fundamentals

This article investigates the existence of contagion between countries on the basis of an analysis of returns for stock indices over the period 1994-2003. The economic methodology used is that of multivariate GARCH family volatility models, particularly the DCC models in the form proposed by Engle and Sheppard (2001). The returns were duly corrected for a series of country-specific fundamentals. The relevance of this procedure is highlighted in the literature by the work of Pesaran and Pick (2003). The results obtained in this paper provide evidence favourable to the hypothesis of regional contagion in both Latin America and Asia. As a rule, contagion spread from the Asian crisis to Latin America but not in the opposite direction

Essays on finance and macroeconomy

I study the asset-pricing implications in an cnviromncnt with feedback traders and rational arbitrageurs. Feedback traders are defined as possible naive investors who buy after a raise in prices and sell after a drop in prices. I consider two types of feedback strategies: (1) short-term (SF), motivated by institutional rulcs as top-losscs and margin calls and (2) long-tcrm (LF), motivated by representativeness bias from non-sophisticated investors. Their presence in the market follows a stochastic regime swift process. Short lived assumption for the arbitrageurs prevents the correction of the misspricing generated by feedback strategies. The estimated modcl using US data suggests that the regime switching is able to capture the time varying autocorrclation of returns. The segregation of feedback types helps to identify the long term component that otherwise would not show up due to the large movements implied by the SF typc. The paper also has normativo implications for practioners since it providos a methodology to identify mispricings driven by feedback traders.

Latin America and the new finance and trade flows

Includes bibliography

The international financial crisis: its nature and the economic policy challenges

Includes bibliography

International finance and development: opportunity or threat?

Includes bibliography

Investing better in order to invest more. Finance and management of education in Latin America and the Caribbean

Includes bibliography

Financial liberalisation: its relevance and experiences in the Caribbean

Includes bibliography