303 resultados para voters


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"Published in compliance with Statute by Charles F. Carpentier, Secretary of State."

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verso: This is a picture of the "First Voters' Republican Club" of Leslie, taken in the fall of 1896, during the gold and silver campaign. Arthur J. Tuttle, captain of the outfit, is shown at the right, in front, wearing his father's silk wedding hat, gilded for the occasion. The horsemen are facing the Michigan Central Railroad traks [sic] and this picture was taken while they were waiting for the train which was to bring Civil War veterans, including General Alger Captain Tanner and several others. The building shown in the background is the old Allen House, which was an aristocratic country hotel at that time. This picture is greatly valued by Judge Tuttle and the only one he has.

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Limited, with minor exceptions, to continental United States.

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General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.

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General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.

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Osborne shows that for almost all distributions of voters' preferences, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist in the classical Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with free entry. We show that equilibrium is generically possible if in addition one allows voters an option to announce their candidacy to compete side-by-side with office-seeking players. The model studied in this paper renders Osborne and the celebrated citizen-candidate model à la Osborne and Slivinski as two extreme cases. We characterize the equilibrium set with two central questions: (i) can there be equilibria where only voters contest? and (ii) are equilibria with contesting office-seeking players possible? We also show that in our general setting, extremists are typically voter-candidates so that in every two-party contest, office-seeking politicians stay out of competition.