Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the core

[cat] En aquest treball introduïm la classe de "multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games", que generalitza la coneguda classe de jocs d’assignació de Böhm-Bawerk bilaterals a situacions amb un nombre arbitrari de sectors. Trobem els extrems del core de qualsevol multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game a partir d’un joc convex definit en el conjunt de sectors enlloc del conjunt de venedors i compradors. Addicionalment estudiem quan el core d’aquests jocs d’assignació és estable en el sentit de von Neumann-Morgenstern.

Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the core

[cat] En aquest treball introduïm la classe de "multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games", que generalitza la coneguda classe de jocs d’assignació de Böhm-Bawerk bilaterals a situacions amb un nombre arbitrari de sectors. Trobem els extrems del core de qualsevol multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game a partir d’un joc convex definit en el conjunt de sectors enlloc del conjunt de venedors i compradors. Addicionalment estudiem quan el core d’aquests jocs d’assignació és estable en el sentit de von Neumann-Morgenstern.

Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules.

We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. We also show that in this characterization no-envy cannot be replaced by anonymity. When agents are strictly risk averse von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizers, then we reduce the problem of assigning k identical objects to a problem of allocating the amount k of an infinitely divisible commodity.

Relative Egalitarianism and Related Criteria

We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social ordering when alternatives are lotteries and individual preferences are of the von Neumann-Morgenstern type. Relative egalitarianism ranks alternatives by applying the leximin ordering to the distributions of (0-1) normalized utilities they generate. We propose an axiomatic characterization of this aggregation rule and discuss related criteria.

Interpersonal comparison of welfare in Harsanyi’s veil-of-ignorance model

Selon le voile d’ignorance proposé par John Harsanyi (1953, 1955), l’observateur rationnel derrière le voile d’ignorance cherche à maximiser la somme des utilités individuelles. Cependant, le modèle d’Harsanyi est fondé sur une hypothèse erronée que la fonction d’utilité à la von Neumann-Morgenstern de l’observateur permet la comparaison interpersonnelle de bien-être. Ce papier suggère une modification du modèle d’Harsanyi qui permet la comparaison interpersonnelle de bien-être, en utilisant les années de vie en parfaite utilité ou les années de vie heureuse comme mesure du bien-être.

Décisions et perspectives : de la théorie de l'utilité à la philosophie de la volonté.

Les implications philosophiques de la Théorie de la Perspective de 1979, notamment celles qui concernent l’introduction d’une fonction de valeur sur les résultats et d’un coefficient de pondération sur les probabilités, n’ont à ce jour jamais été explorées. Le but de ce travail est de construire une théorie philosophique de la volonté à partir des résultats de la Théorie de la Perspective. Afin de comprendre comment cette théorie a pu être élaborée il faut étudier la Théorie de l’Utilité Attendue dont elle est l’aboutissement critique majeur, c’est-à-dire les axiomatisations de la décision de Ramsey (1926), von Neumann et Morgenstern (1947), et enfin Savage (1954), qui constituent les fondements de la théorie classique de la décision. C’est entre autres la critique – par l’économie et la psychologie cognitive – du principe d’indépendance, des axiomes d’ordonnancement et de transitivité qui a permis de faire émerger les éléments représentationnels subjectifs à partir desquels la Théorie de la Perspective a pu être élaborée. Ces critiques ont été menées par Allais (1953), Edwards (1954), Ellsberg (1961), et enfin Slovic et Lichtenstein (1968), l’étude de ces articles permet de comprendre comment s’est opéré le passage de la Théorie de l’Utilité Attendue, à la Théorie de la Perspective. À l’issue de ces analyses et de celle de la Théorie de la Perspective est introduite la notion de Système de Référence Décisionnel, qui est la généralisation naturelle des concepts de fonction de valeur et de coefficient de pondération issus de la Théorie de la Perspective. Ce système, dont le fonctionnement est parfois heuristique, sert à modéliser la prise de décision dans l’élément de la représentation, il s’articule autour de trois phases : la visée, l’édition et l’évaluation. À partir de cette structure est proposée une nouvelle typologie des décisions et une explication inédite des phénomènes d’akrasie et de procrastination fondée sur les concepts d’aversion au risque et de surévaluation du présent, tous deux issus de la Théorie de la Perspective.

O modelo de avaliação de ativos: (Capital asset pricing model)

Examina o modelo de seleção de portfólios desenvolvido por Markowitz, principalmente no que concerne: as suas relações com a teoria da utilidade de Von Neumann-Morgenstern; aos algo ritmos de solução do problema de Programação Quadrática paramétrica dele decorrente; a simplificação proporcionada pelo Modelo Diagonal de Sharpe. Mostra que a existência de um título sem risco permite a especificação do Teorema da Separação e a simplificação do problema de seleção de portfólios. Analisa o modelo denominado por CAPM, de equilíbrio no Mercado de Capitais sob condições de incerteza, comparando os processos dedutivos empregados por Lintner e Mossin. Examina as implicações decorrentes do relaxamento dos pressupostos subjacentes ã esse modelo de equilíbrio geral, principalmente a teoria do portfólio Zero-Beta desenvolvida por Black.

Asymmetric preferences in investment decisions in the Brazilian financial market

The main objective of this article is to test the hypothesis that utility preferences that incorporate asymmetric reactions between gains and losses generate better results than the classic Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions in the Brazilian market. The asymmetric behavior can be computed through the introduction of a disappointment (or loss) aversion coefficient in the classical expected utility function, which increases the impact of losses against gains. The results generated by both traditional and loss aversion utility functions are compared with real data from the Brazilian market regarding stock market participation in the investment portfolio of pension funds and individual investors.

Stable sets in one-seller assignment games

We consider von Neumann -- Morgenstern stable sets in assignment games with one seller and many buyers. We prove that a set of imputations is a stable set if and only if it is the graph of a certain type of continuous and monotone function. This characterization enables us to interpret the standards of behavior encompassed by the various stable sets as possible outcomes of well-known auction procedures when groups of buyers may form bidder rings. We also show that the union of all stable sets can be described as the union of convex polytopes all of whose vertices are marginal contribution payoff vectors. Consequently, each stable set is contained in the Weber set. The Shapley value, however, typically falls outside the union of all stable sets.

Caso Fondo Nacional del Ahorro: recomendaciones para la optimización del Programa de Promoción de Vivienda

El presente documento constituye un estudio de caso que se desarrolló de acuerdo a los lineamientos planteados en el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2010 – 2014 “Prosperidad para todos”, en la que el Gobierno define que se deben otorgar 1.000.000 de soluciones de vivienda a nivel nacional en este periodo presidencial, de las cuales 254.920 soluciones son responsabilidad del Fondo Nacional del Ahorro. Por lo tanto, se analizan las estrategias que ha venido desarrollando el FNA con el propósito de proponer alternativas que permitan a la alta dirección de la entidad tomar decisiones coherentes con los modelos de promoción de vivienda, los cuales han estado alineados con el cumplimiento de los objetivos definidos por el Gobierno Nacional en el eje central de vivienda.

A Strategic-Equilibrium Based

The strategic equilibrium of an N-person cooperative game with transferable utility is a system composed of a cover collection of subsets of N and a set of extended imputations attainable through such equilibrium cover. The system describes a state of coalitional bargaining stability where every player has a bargaining alternative against any other player to support his corresponding equilibrium claim. Any coalition in the sable system may form and divide the characteristic value function of the coalition as prescribed by the equilibrium payoffs. If syndicates are allowed to form, a formed coalition may become a syndicate using the equilibrium payoffs as disagreement values in bargaining for a part of the complementary coalition incremental value to the grand coalition when formed. The emergent well known-constant sum derived game in partition function is described in terms of parameters that result from incumbent binding agreements. The strategic-equilibrium corresponding to the derived game gives an equal value claim to all players.  This surprising result is alternatively explained in terms of strategic-equilibrium based possible outcomes by a sequence of bargaining stages that when the binding agreements are in the right sequential order, von Neumann and Morgenstern (vN-M) non-discriminatory solutions emerge. In these solutions a preferred branch by a sufficient number of players is identified: the weaker players syndicate against the stronger player. This condition is referred to as the stronger player paradox.  A strategic alternative available to the stronger players to overcome the anticipated not desirable results is to voluntarily lower his bargaining equilibrium claim. In doing the original strategic equilibrium is modified and vN-M discriminatory solutions may occur, but also a different stronger player may emerge that has eventually will have to lower his equilibrium claim. A sequence of such measures converges to the equal opportunity for all vN-M solution anticipated by the strategic equilibrium of partition function derived game.    [298-words]

Prospect theory, diversificação ingênua e propensão a risco de especialistas em mercado: evidência empírica no Brasil

The Prospect Theory is one of the basis of Behavioral Finance and models the investor behavior in a different way than von Neumann and Morgenstern Utility Theory. Behavioral characteristics are evaluated for different control groups, validating the violation of Utility Theory Axioms. Naïve Diversification is also verified, utilizing the 1/n heuristic strategy for investment funds allocations. This strategy causes different fixed and equity allocations, compared to the desirable exposure, given the exposure of the subsample that answered a non constrained allocation question. When compared to non specialists, specialists in finance are less risk averse and allocate more of their wealth on equity.

Perspectivas históricas da pesquisa operacional

Pós-graduação em Educação Matemática - IGCE

An efficient simulation algorithm for the generalized von Mises distribution of order two

In this article we propose an exact efficient simulation algorithm for the generalized von Mises circular distribution of order two. It is an acceptance-rejection algorithm with a piecewise linear envelope based on the local extrema and the inflexion points of the generalized von Mises density of order two. We show that these points can be obtained from the roots of polynomials and degrees four and eight, which can be easily obtained by the methods of Ferrari and Weierstrass. A comparative study with the von Neumann acceptance-rejection, with the ratio-of-uniforms and with a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithms shows that this new method is generally the most efficient.

Critical behavior of su(1|1) supersymmetric spin chains with long-range interactions

We introduce a general class of su(1|1) supersymmetric spin chains with long-range interactions which includes as particular cases the su(1|1) Inozemtsev (elliptic) and Haldane-Shastry chains, as well as the XX model. We show that this class of models can be fermionized with the help of the algebraic properties of the su(1|1) permutation operator and take advantage of this fact to analyze their quantum criticality when a chemical potential term is present in the Hamiltonian. We first study the low-energy excitations and the low-temperature behavior of the free energy, which coincides with that of a (1+1)-dimensional conformal field theory (CFT) with central charge c=1 when the chemical potential lies in the critical interval (0,E(π)), E(p) being the dispersion relation. We also analyze the von Neumann and Rényi ground state entanglement entropies, showing that they exhibit the logarithmic scaling with the size of the block of spins characteristic of a one-boson (1+1)-dimensional CFT. Our results thus show that the models under study are quantum critical when the chemical potential belongs to the critical interval, with central charge c=1. From the analysis of the fermion density at zero temperature, we also conclude that there is a quantum phase transition at both ends of the critical interval. This is further confirmed by the behavior of the fermion density at finite temperature, which is studied analytically (at low temperature), as well as numerically for the su(1|1) elliptic chain.