952 resultados para transaction costs economics
Resumo:
This paper proposes a simple framework for understanding endogenous transaction costs - their composition, size and implications. In a model of diversification against risk, we distinguish between investments in institutions that facilitate exchange and the costs of conducting exchange itself. Institutional quality and market size are determined by the decisions of risk averse agents and conditions are discussed under which the efficient allocation may be decentralized. We highlight a number of differences with models where transaction costs are exogenous, including the implications for taxation and measurement issues.
Resumo:
This paper proposes a simple model for understanding transaction costs for their composition, size and policy implications. We distinguish between investments in institutions that facilitate exchange and the cost of conducting exchange itself. Institutional quality and market size are determined by the decisions of risk averse agents and conditions are discussed under which the efficient allocation may be decentralized. We highlight a number of differences with models where transaction costs are exogenous, including the implications for taxation and measurement issues.
Resumo:
We characterize the value function of maximizing the total discounted utility of dividend payments for a compound Poisson insurance risk model when strictly positive transaction costs are included, leading to an impulse control problem. We illustrate that well known simple strategies can be optimal in the case of exponential claim amounts. Finally we develop a numerical procedure to deal with general claim amount distributions.
Resumo:
Tämän tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on tutkia sellu- ja paperiteollisuuden toimintojen luonnetta sekä miten yrityksen rajapinnat ovat muodostuneet ko. teollisuudenalalla. Tutkimus on eksploratiivinen ja luonteeltaan kvalitatiivinen. Tutkimuksen aineisto kerättiin yrityksissä tehdyillä teemahaastatteluilla. Sellu- ja paperitehtaan toimintojen analysoinnissa käytetään resurssiperusteista näkemystä ja transaktiokustannusteoriaa. Tutkimuksen yritysten rakennetta voidaan pitää varsin konservatiivisena. Teoreettinen kehys pystyi selittämään varsinaisen tuotannon järjestämistä varsin hyvin. Tukitoiminnoissa löytyi ristiriitoja teorian ja todellisuuden välillä. Tuotantotoiminnot kannattaa pitää yrityksen sisällä, koska ne täyttävät VRIN-attribuutit ja niihin liittyy korkeita transaktiokustannuksia. Suurin osa tukitoiminnoista voidaan luokitella triviaaleiksi. Joitain tukitoimintoja voidaan kuitenkin luokitella strategisesti tärkeiksi, ja voidaan päätellä, että ne pitäisi pitää yrityksen sisällä. Tässä suhteessa tulokset olivat kuitenkin ristiriitaisia, ja lisätutkimuksia tarvittaisiin lopullisten johtopäätösten tekemiseen.
Resumo:
Tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli tutkia yrityksen rajoja laajennetun transaktiokustannusteorian näkökulmasta. Tutkimus oli empiirinen tutkimus, jossa tutkittiin viittä toimialaa. Tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli verrata paperiteollisuutta teräs-, kemian-, ICT- ja energiateollisuuteen. Aineisto empiiriseen osioon kerättiin puolistrukturoiduilla teemahaastatteluilla. Tutkimus osoitti, että laajennettu transaktiokustannusteoria soveltuu hyvinyrityksen rajojen määrittelyyn. Staattinen transaktiokustannusteorian selitysaste ei ole riittävä, joten dynaaminen laajennus on tarpeellinen. Tutkimuksessa ilmeni, että paperiteollisuudella verrattuna muihin toimialoihin on suurimmat haasteet tehokkaiden rajojen määrittämisessä.
Resumo:
Several empirical studies have analyzed the factors that influence local privatization. Variables related to fiscal stress, cost reduction, political processes and ideological attitudes are the most common explanatory variables used in these studies. In this paper, we add to this literature by examining the influence of transaction costs and political factors on local governments’ choices through new variables. In addition to this, we consider the role of additional aspects, such as intermunicipal cooperation as a potential alternative to privatization in order to exploit scale economies or scope economies. We consider two relevant services: solid waste collection and water distribution. Results from our estimates show that privatization (that is, contracting out to a private firm) is less common for water distribution than for solid waste collection. Higher transaction costs in water distribution are consistent with this finding. Furthermore, we find that municipalities with a conservative ruling party privatize more often regardless of the ideological orientation of the constituency. This shows that those political interests able to influence local elections are more important in determining the form of delivery than is the basic ideological stance of the constituency. Finally, we find that intermunicipal cooperation is an alternative to local privatization.
Effects of a Financial Transaction Tax - Do Transaction Costs Lower Volatility?: A Literature Review
Resumo:
In this literature review the theorethical framework of Financial transaction taxes and their assumed effect on market volatility is assessed. The empirical evidence from various studies is compared against the theory and a simple empirical review of the Finnish stock market is conducted. The findings implicate that financial transaction taxes can not reduce volatility and their actual effect on markets is dependend by many other factors as well. Some evidence even suggests that transactions taxes may actually raise volatility.
Resumo:
Recent research on payments for environmental services (PES) has observed that high transaction costs (TCs) are incurred through the implementation of PES schemes and farmer participation. TCs incurred by households are considered to be an obstacle to the participation in and efficiency of PES policies. This study aims to understand transactions related to previous forest plantation programmes and to estimate the actual TCs incurred by farmers who participated in these programmes in a mountainous area of northwestern Vietnam. In addition, this study examines determinants of households’ TCs to test the hypothesis of whether the amount of TCs varies according to household characteristics. Results show that average TCs are not likely to be a constraint for participation since they are about 200,000 VND (USD 10) per household per contract, which is equivalent to one person’s average earnings for about two days of labour. However, TCs amount to more than one-third of the programmes’ benefits, which is relatively high compared to PES programmes in developed countries. This implies that rather than aiming to reduce TCs, an appropriate agenda for policy improvement is to balance the level of TCs with PES programme benefits to enhance the overall attractiveness of afforestation programmes for smallholder farmers. Regression analysis reveals that education, gender and perception towards PES programmes have significant effects on the magnitude of TCs. The analyses also points out the importance of local conditions on the level of TCs, with some unexpected results.
Resumo:
The basic premise of transaction-cost theory is that the decision to outsource, rather than to undertake work in-house, is determined by the relative costs incurred in each of these forms of economic organization. In construction the "make or buy" decision invariably leads to a contract. Reducing the costs of entering into a contractual relationship (transaction costs) raises the value of production and is therefore desirable. Commonly applied methods of contractor selection may not minimise the costs of contracting. Research evidence suggests that although competitive tendering typically results in the lowest bidder winning the contract this may not represent the lowest project cost after completion. Multi-parameter and quantitative models for contractor selection have been developed to identify the best (or least risky) among bidders. A major area in which research is still needed is in investigating the impact of different methods of contractor selection on the costs of entering into a contract and the decision to outsource.
Resumo:
Using a transactions costs framework, we examine the impact of information and communication technologies (mobile phones and radios) use on market participation in developing country agricultural markets using a novel transaction-level data set of Ghanaian farmers. Our analysis of the choice of markets by farmers suggests that market information from a broader range of markets may not always induce farmers to sell in more distant markets; instead farmers may use broader market information to enhance their bargaining power in closer markets. Finally, we find weak evidence on the impact of using mobile phones in attracting farm gate buyers.
Resumo:
We develop a transaction cost economics theory of the family firm, building upon the concepts of family-based asset specificity, bounded rationality, and bounded reliability. We argue that the prosperity and survival of family firms depend on the absence of a dysfunctional bifurcation bias. The bifurcation bias is an expression of bounded reliability, reflected in the de facto asymmetric treatment of family vs. nonfamily assets (especially human assets). We propose that absence of bifurcation bias is critical to fostering reliability in family business functioning. Our study ends the unproductive divide between the agency and stewardship perspectives of the family firm, which offer conflicting accounts of this firm type's functioning. We show that the predictions of the agency and stewardship perspectives can be usefully reconciled when focusing on how family firms address the bifurcation bias or fail to do so.
Resumo:
The paper proposes an alternative general equilibrium formulation of financial asset economies with transactions costs. Transaction costs emerge endogenously at equilibrium and reflect agents decisions of intermediating financial activities at the expense of providing labor services. An equilibrium is shown to exist in the case of real asset structures.
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Transaction costs have a random component in the bid-ask spread. Facing a high bid-ask spread, the consumer has the option to wait for better terms oI' trade, but only by carrying an undesirable portfolio balance. We present the best policy in this case. We pose the control problem and show that the value function is the uni que viscosity solution of the relevant variational inequality. Next, a numerical procedure for the problem is presented.
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Includes bibliography