Designing persuasive third party applications for social networking services based on the 3D-RAB model

The use of social networks services for promoting business, teaching, learning, persuasion and spread of information continues to attract attention as most social networking services (SNSs) now allow third party applications to operate on their sites. In the field of persuasive technology, the ability of SNSs to build relationships among their users and create momentum and enthusiasm through rapid cycles also give it a greater advantage over other persuasive technology approaches. In this paper we discuss the 3-dimensional relationship between attitude and behavior (3D-RAB) model, and demonstrate how it can be used in designing third-party persuasive applications in SNSs by considering external factors which affects persuasive strategies.

RP93-395 Liability Insurance and the Family Child Care Provider

Life other small business owners, family child care providers need adequate life, health, and disability insurance to protect their families from the loss of their income. However, child care providers also face unique risks. Perhaps the most important of these risks is the financial loss that would result if the provider were found liable or responsible for the injury or death of a child or a child's parent. If a claim were filed against you as a provider, three different types of financial losses are possible: medical expenses, damages awarded to the victim or his/her family after a lawsuit, and court costs related to your defense. This booklet will help you to: (1) evaluate options for insuring a family child care operation, and (2) evaluate available liability insurance policies.

Third party assessments in trust problems with conflict of interest: An experiment on the effects of promisesm

Is it possible to elicit reliable assessment from an assessor having a conflict of interest (e.g. a professor that writes a recommendation letter for a formal PhD student)? We propose an experimental test and show that compared to a not-incentivized assessment, a promise to give a truthful assessment reduces misreporting to the same extent as an incentivized assessment (i.e. when the assessor gains higher payoff if the assessment is correct).

Intergroup bias in third-party punishment stems from both ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination

Social norms pervade almost every aspect of social interaction. If they are violated, not only legal institutions, but other members of society as well, punish, i.e., inflict costs on the wrongdoer. Sanctioning occurs even when the punishers themselves were not harmed directly and even when it is costly for them. There is evidence for intergroup bias in this third-party punishment: third-parties, who share group membership with victims, punish outgroup perpetrators more harshly than ingroup perpetrators. However, it is unknown whether a discriminatory treatment of outgroup perpetrators (outgroup discrimination) or a preferential treatment of ingroup perpetrators (ingroup favoritism) drives this bias. To answer this question, the punishment of outgroup and ingroup perpetrators must be compared to a baseline, i.e., unaffiliated perpetrators. By applying a costly punishment game, we found stronger punishment of outgroup versus unaffiliated perpetrators and weaker punishment of ingroup versus unaffiliated perpetrators. This demonstrates that both ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination drive intergroup bias in third-party punishment of perpetrators that belong to distinct social groups.

Third-party complaints and firm performance: an application in Spanish banking

This article focuses on the impact of third-party complaints on firm performance. We propose two research hypotheses, which are developed from the literature of dissatisfaction, emotions, and economics. The methodology is based on an event study to estimate variation in firm share returns in the stock market due to the publication of the Annual Complaints Service Report by the Bank of Spain; as well as a regression analysis to examine the impact of the number of complaints per branch on the variation obtained. The empirical focus is on a sample of eleven banks to which complaints were made and which were quoted on the Spanish Stock Exchange between 1992 and 2001. The results show a negative impact of the publication of these annual complaint reports on the share returns of the banks concerned. Additionally, these returns have a negative relationship with the number of complaints per branch.

Review of the Government's rights and practices concerning recovery of the cost of hospital and medical services in negligent third-party cases /

"May 1960."

Third-party movements in the United States.

Includes bibliography.

Tentative drafts of Workmen's Compensation Act. Act creating bureau to enforce workmen's compensation act. Act creating state insurance fund. Act regulating policies of insurance against liability arising under article III of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Act authorizing the creation of mutual liability insurance associations. Act exempting farm and domestic employees from Workmen's Compensation Act. Joint resolution amending the constitution of Pennsylvania.

Mode of access: Internet.