Influence of individual ethical orientation on tax compliance: evidence among Ghanaian taxpayers

Even though Africa has constantly emphasized the need to reduce deficit financing through mobilization of more internal revenues, this has not been achieved. Perhaps encouraging voluntary tax compliance can improve internal revenue mobilization. This study explores the relationship between ethical orientation and tax compliance and finds that ethical persons are generally more tax compliant than unethical persons but are more influenced by considerations of tax rate and withholding positions compared to unethical persons. The findings of this study differ from Reckers et al. in a number of ways and contribute to the literature by providing a possible explanation of the cause(s) of tax non- compliance.

Income tax compliance research : supporting appendices to Publication 7285 /

"July 1988."

Compliance operations : tax compliance handbook.

Shipping list no. 86-418-P.

Sales tax enforcement: An empirical analysis of compliance enforcement methodologies and pathologies

Most research on tax evasion has focused on the income tax. Sales tax evasion has been largely ignored and dismissed as immaterial. This paper explored the differences between income tax and sales tax evasion and demonstrated that sales tax enforcement is deserving of and requires the use of different tools to achieve compliance. Specifically, the major enforcement problem with sales tax is not evasion: it is theft perpetrated by companies that act as collection agents for the state. Companies engage in a principal-agent relationship with the state and many retain funds collected as an agent of the state for private use. As such, the act of sales tax theft bears more resemblance to embezzlement than to income tax evasion. It has long been assumed that the sales tax is nearly evasion free, and state revenue departments report voluntary compliance in a manner that perpetuates this myth. Current sales tax compliance enforcement methodologies are similar in form to income tax compliance enforcement methodologies and are based largely on trust. The primary focus is on delinquent filers with a very small percentage of businesses subject to audit. As a result, there is a very large group of noncompliant businesses who file on time and fly below the radar while stealing millions of taxpayer dollars. ^ The author utilized a variety of statistical methods with actual field data derived from operations of the Southern Region Criminal Investigations Unit of the Florida Department of Revenue to evaluate current and proposed sales tax compliance enforcement methodologies in a quasi-experimental, time series research design and to set forth a typology of sales tax evaders. This study showed that current estimates of voluntary compliance in sales tax systems are seriously and significantly overstated and that current enforcement methodologies are inadequate to identify the majority of violators and enforce compliance. Sales tax evasion is modeled using the theory of planned behavior and Cressey’s fraud triangle and it is demonstrated that proactive enforcement activities, characterized by substantial contact with non-delinquent taxpayers, results in superior ability to identify noncompliance and provides a structure through which noncompliant businesses can be rehabilitated.^

The evolution of tax morale in modern Spain

This paper studies the evolution of tax morale in Spain in the post-France era. In contrast to the previous tax compliance literature, the current paper investigates tax morale as the dependent variable and attempts to answer what actually shapes tax morale. Te analysis uses suevey data from two sources; the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey, allowing us to observe tax morale in Spain for the years 1981,1990, 1995 and 1999/2000. The sutudy of evolution of tax morale in Spain over nearly a 20-year span is particularly interesting because the political and fiscal system evolved very rapidly during this period.

Tax morale and conditional cooperation

Why so many people pay their taxes, even though fines and audit probability are low, is a central question in the tax compliance literature. Positing a homo oeconomicus having a refined motivation structure sheds light on this puzzle. This paper provides empirical evidence for the relevance of conditional cooperation, using survey data from 30 West and East European countries. We find a high correlation between perceived tax evasion and tax morale. The results remain robust after exploiting endogeneity and conducting several robustness tests. We also observe a strong positive correlation between institutional quality and tax mmorale. Keywords: Tax morale; Tax compliance; Tax evasion; Pro-social behavior; Institutions

Local autonomy, tax morale, and the shadow economy

Policymakers often propose strict enforcement strategies to fight the shadow economy and to increase tax morale. However, there is an alternative bottom-up approach that decentralises political power to those who are close to the problems. This paper analyses the relationship with local autonomy. We use data on tax morale at the individual level and macro data on the size of the shadow economy to analyse the relevance of local autonomy and compliance in Switzerland. The findings suggest that there is a positive (negative) relationship between local autonomy and tax morale (size of the shadow economy).

Small business entity tax concessions : through the eyes of the practitioner

The often competing imperatives of equity, simplicity and efficiency in the income tax regime, particularly the notion of simplicity, has been most evident within Australia’s small business sector over the last decade. In an attempt to provide tax simplification and reduce the tax compliance burden faced by Australian small businesses, provisions collectively referred to as the ‘simplified tax system’ or STS were introduced. The STS was designed to provide eligible small businesses with the option of adopting a range of ‘simplified’ tax measures designed to simplify their tax affairs whilst at the same time, reducing their tax compliance costs. Ultimately, a low take-up rate and accompanying criticisms led to a remodelled and rebadged concessionary regime known as the ‘Small Business Entity’ (SBE) regime which came into effect from 1 July 2007. This paper, through a pilot study, investigates the SBE regime though the eyes of the practitioner. In line the Australian Federal Government’s objective of simplification and reduced compliance costs, the purpose of the study was to (1) determine the extent to which the SBE concessions are being adopted by tax practitioners on behalf of their clients, (2) gain an understanding as to which individual SBE tax concessions are most favoured by practitioners, (3) determine the primary motivation as to why tax practitioners recommend particular SBE concessions to their clients, and (4) canvass the opinions of practitioners as to whether they believed that the introduction of the SBE concessions had met their stated objective of reducing tax compliance costs for small businesses. The findings of this research indicate that, while there is a perception that the SBE concessions are worth embracing, contrary to the policy intent, the reasons behind adopting the concessions was the opportunity to minimise a clients’ tax liability. It was revealed that adopting particular concessions had nothing to do with compliance costs savings and, in fact, the SBE concessions merely added another layer of complexity to an already cumbersome and complex tax code, which resulted in increased compliance costs for their small businesses clients. Further, the SBE concessions allowed tax practitioners the opportunity to engage in effective tax minimisation, thereby fulfilling the client advocacy role of the tax practitioner in maximising their clients’ tax preferences.

Tax morale, Eastern Europe and European enlargement

This study tries to remedy the current lack of tax compliance research analyzing tax morale in 10 Eastern European countries that joined the European Union in 2004 or 2007. By exploring tax morale differences between 1999 and 2008 we show that tax morale has decreased in 7 out of 10 Eastern European countries. This lack of sustainability may support the incentive based conditionality hypothesis that European Union has only a limited ability to influence tax morale over time. We observe that events and processes at the country level are crucial to understanding tax morale. Factors such as perceived government quality, trust in the justice system and the government are positively correlated with tax morale in 2008.

Tax evasion, inequality, and progressive taxes : a political economy perspective

The standard approach to tax compliance applies the economics-of-crime methodology pioneered by Becker (1968): in its first application, due to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) it models the behaviour of agents as a decision involving a choice of the extent of their income to report to tax authorities, given a certain institutional environment, represented by parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties in the event the agent is caught. While this basic framework yields important insights on tax compliance behavior, it has some critical limitations. Specifically, it indicates a level of compliance that is significantly below what is observed in the data. This thesis revisits the original framework with a view towards addressing this issue, and examining the political economy implications of tax evasion for progressivity in the tax structure. The approach followed involves building a macroeconomic, dynamic equilibrium model for the purpose of examining these issues, by using a step-wise model building procedure starting with some very simple variations of the basic Allingham and Sandmo construct, which are eventually integrated to a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations framework with heterogeneous agents. One of the variations involves incorporating the Allingham and Sandmo construct into a two-period model of a small open economy of the type originally attributed to Fisher (1930). A further variation of this simple construct involves allowing agents to initially decide whether to evade taxes or not. In the event they decide to evade, the agents then have to decide the extent of income or wealth they wish to under-report. We find that the ‘evade or not’ assumption has strikingly different and more realistic implications for the extent of evasion, and demonstrate that it is a more appropriate modeling strategy in the context of macroeconomic models, which are essentially dynamic in nature, and involve consumption smoothing across time and across various states of nature. Specifically, since deciding to undertake tax evasion impacts on the consumption smoothing ability of the agent by creating two states of nature in which the agent is ‘caught’ or ‘not caught’, there is a possibility that their utility under certainty, when they choose not to evade, is higher than the expected utility obtained when they choose to evade. Furthermore, the simple two-period model incorporating an ‘evade or not’ choice can be used to demonstrate some strikingly different political economy implications relative to its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart. In variations of the two models that allow for voting on the tax parameter, we find that agents typically choose to vote for a high degree of progressivity by choosing the highest available tax rate from the menu of choices available to them. There is, however, a small range of inequality levels for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a relatively low value of the tax rate. The final steps in the model building procedure involve grafting the two-period models with a political economy choice into a dynamic overlapping generations setting with more general, non-linear tax schedules and a ‘cost-of evasion’ function that is increasing in the extent of evasion. Results based on numerical simulations of these models show further improvement in the model’s ability to match empirically plausible levels of tax evasion. In addition, the differences between the political economy implications of the ‘evade or not’ version of the model and its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart are now very striking; there is now a large range of values of the inequality parameter for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a low degree of progressivity. This is because, in the ‘evade or not’ version of the model, low values of the tax rate encourages a large number of agents to choose the ‘not-evade’ option, so that the redistributive mechanism is more ‘efficient’ relative to the situations in which tax rates are high. Some further implications of the models of this thesis relate to whether variations in the level of inequality, and parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties for tax evasion matter for the political economy results. We find that (i) the political economy outcomes for the tax rate are quite insensitive to changes in inequality, and (ii) the voting outcomes change in non-monotonic ways in response to changes in the probability of detection and penalty rates. Specifically, the model suggests that changes in inequality should not matter, although the political outcome for the tax rate for a given level of inequality is conditional on whether there is a large or small or large extent of evasion in the economy. We conclude that further theoretical research into macroeconomic models of tax evasion is required to identify the structural relationships underpinning the link between inequality and redistribution in the presence of tax evasion. The models of this thesis provide a necessary first step in that direction.