Secure communication protocol for preserving E-tendering integrity.

This paper presents a secure communication protocol which can be used as the framework for an e-tendering scheme. This protocol is focused on securing the integrity of tendering documents and ensuring that a secure record of document generation is kept. Our protocol provides a mechanism to manage e-tendering contract evidence as a legal record in a unique and effective manner. It is the starting point of reliable record keeping. To a certain extent, it also addresses existing security problems in the traditional tendering processes.

Strongly Secure Certificateless Key Agreement

We introduce a formal model for certificateless authenticated key exchange (CL-AKE) protocols. Contrary to what might be expected, we show that the natural combination of an ID-based AKE protocol with a public key based AKE protocol cannot provide strong security. We provide the first one-round CL-AKE scheme proven secure in the random oracle model. We introduce two variants of the Diffie-Hellman trapdoor the introduced by \cite{DBLP:conf/eurocrypt/CashKS08}. The proposed key agreement scheme is secure as long as each party has at least one uncompromised secret. Thus, our scheme is secure even if the key generation centre learns the ephemeral secrets of both parties.

A forward and backward secure key management in wireless sensor networks for PCS/SCADA

Process Control Systems (PCSs) or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems have recently been added to the already wide collection of wireless sensor networks applications. The PCS/SCADA environment is somewhat more amenable to the use of heavy cryptographic mechanisms such as public key cryptography than other sensor application environments. The sensor nodes in the environment, however, are still open to devastating attacks such as node capture, which makes designing a secure key management challenging. In this paper, a key management scheme is proposed to defeat node capture attack by offering both forward and backward secrecies. Our scheme overcomes the pitfalls which Nilsson et al.'s scheme suffers from, and is not more expensive than their scheme.

Elliptic curve algorithm integration in the secure shell transport layer

This document describes algorithms based on Elliptic Cryptography (ECC) for use within the Secure Shell (SSH) transport protocol. In particular, it specifies Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement, Elliptic Curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone (ECMQV) key agreement, and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) for use in the SSH Transport Layer protocol.

Towards authorisation models for secure information sharing : a survey and research agenda

This article presents a survey of authorisation models and considers their ‘fitness-for-purpose’ in facilitating information sharing. Network-supported information sharing is an important technical capability that underpins collaboration in support of dynamic and unpredictable activities such as emergency response, national security, infrastructure protection, supply chain integration and emerging business models based on the concept of a ‘virtual organisation’. The article argues that present authorisation models are inflexible and poorly scalable in such dynamic environments due to their assumption that the future needs of the system can be predicted, which in turn justifies the use of persistent authorisation policies. The article outlines the motivation and requirement for a new flexible authorisation model that addresses the needs of information sharing. It proposes that a flexible and scalable authorisation model must allow an explicit specification of the objectives of the system and access decisions must be made based on a late trade-off analysis between these explicit objectives. A research agenda for the proposed Objective-based Access Control concept is presented.

Mitigating sandwich attacks against a secure key management scheme in wireless sensor networks for PCS/SCADA

Alzaid et al. proposed a forward & backward secure key management scheme in wireless sensor networks for Process Control Systems (PCSs) or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. The scheme, however, is still vulnerable to an attack called the sandwich attack that can be launched when the adversary captures two sensor nodes at times t1 and t2, and then reveals all the group keys used between times t1 and t2. In this paper, a fix to the scheme is proposed in order to limit the vulnerable time duration to an arbitrarily chosen time span while keeping the forward and backward secrecy of the scheme untouched. Then, the performance analysis for our proposal, Alzaid et al.’s scheme, and Nilsson et al.’s scheme is given.