Essays on Stock Option Compensation and the Role of Incentives and Risk (summary section only)

Managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity has increased rapidly around the world. Early empirical research showed that pay-for-performance sensitivity resulting from stock ownership and stock options appeared to be quite low during the 1970s and early 1980s in the U.S. However, recent empirical research from the U.S. shows an enormous increase in pay-for-performance sensitivity. The global trend has also reached Finland, where stock options have become a major ingredient of executive compensation. The fact that stock options seem to be an appealing form of remuneration from a theoretical point of view combined with the observation that the use of this compensation form has increased significantly during the recent years, implies that research on the dynamics of stock option compensation is highly relevant for the academic community, as well as for practitioners and regulators. The research questions of the thesis are analyzed in four separate essays. The first essay examines whether stock option compensation practices of Finnish firms are consistent with predictions from principal-agent theory. The second essay explores one of the major puzzles in the compensation literature by studying determinants of stock option contract design. In theory, optimal contract design should vary according to firm characteristics. However, in the U.S., variation in contract design seems to be surprisingly low, a phenomenon generally attributed to tax and accounting considerations. In Finland, however, firms are not subject to stringent contracting restrictions, and the variation in contract design tends, in fact, to be quite substantial. The third essay studies the impact of price- and risk incentives arising from stock option compensation on firm investment. In addition, the essay explores one of the most debated questions in the literature, in particular, the relation between incentives and firm performance. Finally, several strands of literature in both economics and corporate finance hypothesize that economic uncertainty is related to corporate decision-making. Previous research has shown that risk tends to slow down firm investment. In the fourth essay, it is hypothesized that firm risk slows down growth from a more universal perspective. Consistent with this view, it is shown that risk not only tends to slow down firm investment, but also employment growth. Moreover, the essay explores whether the nature of firms’ compensation policies, in particular, whether firms make use of stock option compensation, affects the relation between risk and firm growth. In summary, the four essays contribute to the current understanding of stock options as a form of equity incentives, and how incentives and risk affect corporate decision-making. By this, the thesis promotes the knowledge related to the modern theory of the firm.

CEO Compensation, Compensation Risk, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Technology Firms

Literature suggests that CEOs of technology firms earn higher pay than CEOs of non-technology firms. I investigate whether compensation risk explains the difference in compensation between technology firms and non-technology firms. Controlling for firm size and performance, I find that CEOs in technology firms have higher pay, but also have much higher compensation risk compared to non-technology firms. Compensation risk explains the major part of the difference in CEO pay. My study is consistent with the labor market economics view that CEOs earn competitive risk-adjusted total compensation.

Managerial Risk-Taking and CEO Excess Compensation

This paper examines risk taking and CEO excess compensation problems in U.S firms to determine their impact on shareholders wealth. Literature suggests a positive effect of CEO incentive risk and strong corporate governance on CEO risk taking. Furthermore, the strong governance mitigates excess compensation problem. Controlling for governance quality and incentive risk, I provide empirical evidence of a significant association between risk taking and CEO excess compensation. When I also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, I find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, I find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. Finally, I find that CEO risk taking also has structural impacts on CEO compensation

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

RESPIRATORY COMPENSATION MECHANISMS IN THE UPPER AND LOWER RESPIRATORY TRACTS OF AN ANIMAL MODEL AFTER SUBCHRONIC INHALATION EXPOSURE TO FORMALDEHYDE: IMPLICATIONS FOR TOXICOLOGY RISK ASSESSMENT (DEPOSITION, DOSE RECEIVED, RESPONSE)

The potential for significant human populations to experience long-term inhalation of formaldehyde and reports of symptomatology due to this exposure has led to a considerable interest in the toxicologic assessment of risk from subchronic formaldehyde exposures using animal models. Since formaldehyde inhalation depresses certain respiratory parameters in addition to its other forms of toxicity, there is a potential for the alteration of the actual dose received by the exposed individual (and the resulting toxicity) due to this respiratory effect. The respiratory responses to formaldehyde inhalation and the subsequent pattern of deposition were therefore investigated in animals that had received subchronic exposure to the compound, and the potential for changes in the formaldehyde dose received due to long-term inhalation evaluated. Male Sprague-Dawley rats were exposed to either 0, 0.5, 3, or 15 ppm formaldehyde for 6 hours/day, 5 days/week for up to 6 months. The patterns of respiratory response, deposition and the compensation mechanisms involved were then determined in a series of formaldehyde test challenges to both the upper and to the lower respiratory tracts in separate groups of subchronically exposed animals and age-specific controls (four concentration groups, two time points). In both the control and pre-exposed animals, there was a characteristic recovery of respiratory parameters initially depressed by formaldehyde inhalation to at or approaching pre-exposure levels within 10 minutes of the initiation of exposure. Also, formaldehyde deposition was found to remain very high in the upper and lower tracts after long-term exposure. Therefore, there was probably little subsequent effect on the dose received by the exposed individual that was attributable to the repeated exposures. There was a diminished initial minute volume response in test challenges of both the upper and lower tracts of animals that had received at least 16 weeks of exposure to 15 ppm, with compensatory increases in tidal volume in the upper tract and respiratory rate in the lower tract. However, this dose-related effect was probably not relevant to human risk estimation because this formaldehyde dose is in excess of that experienced by human populations. ^

Anglican Church knew clergyman Robert Waddington was a risk

AUSTRALIAN church officials knew of child-sex allegations in Britain against a senior clergymen when they pushed a victim into accepting a compensation payout on the basis that there was no evidence to back up his claims of abuse. Former Church of England investigator Ray Morris says he prepared a 2004 report about allegations in Britain and Australia - from the 1960s and 80s - against Robert Waddington. He sent it to north Queensland diocese officials, who were at the time involved in mediation with the Australian victim over his claims that he was abused weekly by Waddington between 1964 and 1968, who was headmaster of St Barnabas boarding school in Ravenshoe, southwest of Cairns.

Occupational injury risk among Australian paramedics: An analysis of national data

Objective To identify the occupational risks for Australian paramedics, by describing the rate of injuries and fatalities and comparing those rates with other reports. Design and participants Retrospective descriptive study using data provided by Safe Work Australia for the period 2000–2010. The subjects were paramedics who had been injured in the course of their duties and for whom a claim had been made for workers compensation payments. Main outcome measures Rates of injury calculated from the data provided. Results The risk of serious injury among Australian paramedics was found to be more than seven times higher than the Australian national average. The fatality rate for paramedics was about six times higher than the national average. On average, every 2 years during the study period, one paramedic died and 30 were seriously injured in vehicle crashes. Ten Australian paramedics were seriously injured each year as a result of an assault. The injury rate for paramedics was more than two times higher than the rate for police officers. Conclusions The high rate of occupational injuries and fatalities among paramedics is a serious public health issue. The risk of injury in Australia is similar to that in the United States. While it may be anticipated that injury rates would be higher as a result of the nature of the work and environment of paramedics, further research is necessary to identify and validate the strategies required to minimise the rates of occupational injury for paramedics.

Accounting for risk: The advent of capped conveyancing title insurance

Title insurance companies originating from America, have, in the past 15 years become part of the Australian conveyancing landscape. However for most residential freehold owners, their activities would be a mystery. A purchaser does not routinely obtain title insurance, with the companies presently focussing on servicing the mortgagee sector. While the lack of penetration in the residential purchaser market may be attributed to the consumer’s lack of knowledge, evidence from Ontario and New Zealand illustrates that title insurance is likely to become an additional cost in the conveyancing process in Australia. In this article we highlight the reasons why, and demonstrate how title insurers have, by working with the legal profession been able to subtly move the risk of responsibility for compensation for loss, (at least in the first instance) from the state to the insurer, but with the added benefit for the state and the conveyancing agents that the cost of the insurance is ultimately borne by the consumer. In New Zealand this development is being accelerated by the introduction of capped conveyancing title insurance. Whether title insurance will become part of the conveyancing process is no longer the relevant question for Australia, (it undoubtedly will), but the unknown issue is just how title insurance companies will work with conveyancing agents to infiltrate the market, and what response this infiltration will have in terms of the state’s view as to their continued role in the provision of assurance. We suggest that developments from New Zealand in relation to capped conveyancing insurance are likely to be replicated in Australia in the near future, and that the state’s role in providing an assurance fund will continue, though the state may seek to expand the areas in which the right to compensation is restricted.

Predictive technology and natural hazards: Risk for Australian planning authorities?

Purpose The object of this paper is to examine whether the improvements in technology that enhance community understanding of the frequency and severity of natural hazards also increased the risk of potential liability of planning authorities in negligence. In Australia, the National Strategy imposes a resilience based approach to disaster management and stresses that responsible land use planning can reduce or prevent the impact of natural hazards upon communities. Design/methodology/approach This paper analyses how the principles of negligence allocate responsibility for loss suffered by a landowner in a hazard prone area between the landowner and local government. Findings The analysis in this paper concludes that despite being able to establish a causal link between the loss suffered by a landowner and the approval of a local authority to build in a hazard prone area, it would be in the rarest of circumstances a negligence action may be proven. Research limitations/implications The focus of this paper is on planning policies and land development, not on the negligent provision of advice or information by the local authority. Practical implications This paper identifies the issues a landowner may face when seeking compensation from a local authority for loss suffered due to the occurrence of a natural hazard known or predicted to be possible in the area. Originality/value The paper establishes that as risk managers, local authorities must place reliance upon scientific modelling and predictive technology when determining planning processes in order to fulfil their responsibilities under the National Strategy and to limit any possible liability in negligence.

Stock Option Compensation in Finland: An Analysis of Economic Determinants, Contracting Frequency, and Design

This paper addresses several questions in the compensation literature by examining stock option compensation practices of Finnish firms. First, the results indicate that principal-agent theory succeeds quite well in predicting the use of stock options. Proxies for monitoring costs, growth opportunities, ownership structure, and risk are found to determine the use of incentives consistent with theory. Furthermore, the paper examines whether determinants of stock options targeted to top management differ from determinants of broad-based stock option plans. Some evidence is found that factors driving these two types of incentives differ. Second, the results reveal that systematic risk significantly increases the likelihood that firms adopt stock option plans, whereas total firm risk and unsystematic risk do not seem to affect this decision. Third, the results show that growth opportunities are related to time-dimensional contracting frequency, consistent with the argument that incentive levels deviate more rapidly from optimum in firms with high growth opportunities. Finally, the results suggest that vesting schedules are decreasing in financial leverage, and that contract maturity is decreasing in firm focus. In addition, both vesting schedules and contract maturity tend to be longer in firms involving state ownership.

Stress, social support, and health risk behaviours as mediators of the forgiveness-health relation /

The mediating roles of stress, social support, and health risk behaviours in the relationships between dispositional forgiveness and mental and physical health were examined. Participants were 748 undergraduate students (554 women, 194 men) entering their first year of studies at Brock University. Participants, ranging in age from 17 to 25 years, completed the Brock University First Year Health Study and were provided monetary compensation. Dispositional forgiveness, stress, social support, health risk behaviours, mental health, and physical health were measured using self-report methods. The data were analyzed separately for women and men because there were significant mean differences on many of the study'S variables. Analyses revealed that the mediated relationships between dispositional forgiveness and health were generally stronger for women than men. Stress was the most robust mediator of the forgiveness-health relation for both women and men. The only health risk behaviour that mediated the forgivenesshealth relation was physical fitness and this result was found for women only. Social support mediated several of the relationships between forgiveness and health but not others. Results were discussed with reference to the literature on forgiveness and health. Several directions for future research were offered, such as conducting longitudinal research designs to assess the direction of causality better, investigating moderator variables of the forgiveness-health relation, and building models, which incorporate multiple mediators using structural equation modelling techniques.

Effect of executive compensation on firm performance

The paper finds evidence that the equity-based CEO pay is positively related to firm performance and risk-taking. Both stock price and operating performance as well as firm's riskiness increase in the pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) provided by CEO stock options and stock holdings. PPS can explain stock returns better as an additional factor to the Fama-French 3-factor model. When CEOs are compensated with higher PPS, firms experience higher return on asset (ROA). The higher PPS also leads to the higher risk-taking. While CEO incentive compensation has been perceived mixed on its effectiveness, this study provides support to the equity-based CEO compensation in reducing agency conflicts between CEOs and shareholders.

Paying for long-term performance: restructuring bankers’ pay for risk regulation

The purpose of this paper is to propose hybrid capital securities as a new approach to compensation for senior bank executives and risk-takers instead of cash or equity-based compensation currently adopted by the industry. The global financial turmoil indicated that misaligned pay-for-performance compensation arrangements encouraged management short-termism and rewarded excessive risk-taking behaviour in Anglo-Saxon system. Rather than regulating specific instruments and processes, we believe that it is much more efficient to overhaul the compensation scheme to align it with risk management and governance. This empirical paper investigates the European hybrid market by employing data from the Merrill Lynch Global Index System from 2000 to 2010. Our paper contributes to both literature and practices by designing a structured scheme to tie the executive’s interests to long-term performance of the bank, the goal of regulators and the economy at large which consequently reduce the probability of future bank failures.