The evolution of judgement bias in indirect reciprocity.

Indirect reciprocity is a form of reciprocity where help is given to individuals based on their reputation. In indirect reciprocity, bad acts (such as not helping) reduce an individual's reputation while good acts (such as helping) increase an individual's reputation. Studies of indirect reciprocity assume that good acts and bad acts are weighted equally when assessing the reputation of an individual. As different information can be processed in different ways, this is not likely to be the case, and it is possible that an individual could bias an actor's reputation by putting more weight to acts of defection (not helping) than acts of co-operation (helping) or vice versa. We term this difference 'judgement bias', and build an individual-based model of image scoring to investigate the conditions under which it may evolve. We find that, if the benefits of co-operation are small, judgement bias is weighted towards acts perceived to be bad; if the benefits are high, the reverse is true. Our result is consistent under both scoring and standing strategies, and we find that allowing judgement bias to evolve increases the level of co-operation in the population.

Measuring and making decisions for social reciprocity

Social reciprocity may explain certain emerging psychological processes, which are likely to be founded on dyadic relations. Although some indices and statistics have been proposed to measure and make statistical decisions regarding social reciprocity in groups, these were generally developed to identify association patterns rather than to quantify the discrepancies between what each individual addresses to his/her partners and what is received from them in return. Additionally, social researchers are not only interested in measuring groups at the global level, since dyadic and individual measurements are also necessary for a proper description of social interactions. This study is concerned with a new statistic for measuring social reciprocity at the global level and with decomposing it in order to identify those dyads and individuals which account for a significant part of asymmetry in social interactions. In addition to a set of indices some exact analytical results are derived and a way of making statistical decisions is proposed.

Risk Behavior and Reciprocity of Organ Donation Attitudes in Young Men.

BACKGROUND: Lack of donor organs remains a major obstacle in organ transplantation. Our aim was to evaluate (1) the association between engaging in high-risk recreational activities and attitudes toward organ donation and (2) the degree of reciprocity between organ acceptance and donation willingness in young men. METHODS: A 17-item, close-ended survey was offered to male conscripts ages 18 to 26 years in all Swiss military conscription centers. Predictors of organ donation attitudes were assessed in bivariate analyses and multiple logistic regression. Reciprocity of the intentions to accept and to donate organs was assessed by means of donor card status. RESULTS: In 1559 responses analyzed, neither motorcycling nor practicing extreme sports reached significant association with donor card holder status. Family communication about organ donation, student, or academic profession and living in a Latin linguistic region were predictors of positive organ donation attitudes, whereas residence in a German-speaking region and practicing any religion predicted reluctance. Significantly more respondents were willing to accept than to donate organs, especially among those without family communication concerning organ donation. CONCLUSIONS: For the first time, it was shown that high-risk recreational activities do not influence organ donation attitudes. Second, a considerable discrepancy in organ donation reciprocity was identified. We propose that increasing this reciprocity could eventually increase organ donation rates.

Testing reciprocity in social interactions: A comparison between the Directional consistency and Skew symmetry statistics

In the present work we focus on two indices that quantify directionality and skew-symmetrical patterns in social interactions as measures of social reciprocity: the Directional consistency (DC) and Skew symmetry indices. Although both indices enable researchers to describe social groups, most studies require statistical inferential tests. The main aims of the present study are: firstly, to propose an overall statistical technique for testing null hypotheses regarding social reciprocity in behavioral studies, using the DC and Skew symmetry statistics (Φ) at group level; and secondly, to compare both statistics in order to allow researchers to choose the optimal measure depending on the conditions. In order to allow researchers to make statistical decisions, statistical significance for both statistics has been estimated by means of a Monte Carlo simulation. Furthermore, this study will enable researchers to choose the optimal observational conditions for carrying out their research, as the power of the statistical tests has been estimated.

Stochasticity in economic losses increases the value of reputation in indirect reciprocity.

Recent theory predicts harsh and stochastic conditions to generally promote the evolution of cooperation. Here, we test experimentally whether stochasticity in economic losses also affects the value of reputation in indirect reciprocity, a type of cooperation that is very typical for humans. We used a repeated helping game with observers. One subject (the "Unlucky") lost some money, another one (the "Passer-by") could reduce this loss by accepting a cost to herself, thereby building up a reputation that could be used by others in later interactions. The losses were either stable or stochastic, but the average loss over time and the average efficiency gains of helping were kept constant in both treatments. We found that players with a reputation of being generous were generally more likely to receive help by others, such that investing into a good reputation generated long-term benefits that compensated for the immediate costs of helping. Helping frequencies were similar in both treatments, but players with a reputation to be selfish lost more resources under stochastic conditions. Hence, returns on investment were steeper when losses varied than when they did not. We conclude that this type of stochasticity increases the value of reputation in indirect reciprocity.

Tacit Collusion under Fairness and Reciprocity

This paper departs from the standard profit-maximizing model of firm behavior by assuming that firms are motivated in part by personal animosity-or respect-towards their competitors. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (negative reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (positive reciprocity). We find that collusion is easier to sustain when firms have a concern for reciprocity towards competing firms provided that they consider collusive prices to be kind and punishment prices to be unkind. Thus, reciprocity concerns among firms can have adverse welfare consequences for consumers.

Bias and standard error for social reciprocity measurements

The directional consistency and skew-symmetry statistics have been proposed as global measurements of social reciprocity. Although both measures can be useful for quantifying social reciprocity, researchers need to know whether these estimators are biased in order to assess descriptive results properly. That is, if estimators are biased, researchers should compare actual values with expected values under the specified null hypothesis. Furthermore, standard errors are needed to enable suitable assessment of discrepancies between actual and expected values. This paper aims to derive some exact and approximate expressions in order to obtain bias and standard error values for both estimators for round-robin designs, although the results can also be extended to other reciprocal designs.

Exploring Reciprocity in International Service Learning Programs

Using aspects of grounded theory methodology, this study explored the perceptions and practical implementation of reciprocity in International Service Learning (ISL) Programs. Data were collected through interviews with nine ISL practitioners representing a variety of organizations offering international service learning programs. Findings suggest that multiple conceptualizations of ISL programs exist. ISL programs are interdisciplinary in nature and that using reciprocity as a guiding framework is problematic. Further attention is needed in relation to shifting the guiding framework of ISL programs from reciprocity to interdependence.

On blame-freeness and reciprocity: an experimental study

The theory of reciprocity is predicated on the assumption that people are willing to reward nice or kind acts and to punish unkind ones. This assumption raises the question as to how to define kindness. In this paper we offer a new definition of kindness that we call “blame-freeness.” Put most simply, blame-freeness states that in judging whether player i has been kind or unkind to player j in a social situation, player j would have to put himself in the strategic position of player i, while retaining his preferences, and ask if he would have acted in a manner that was worse than i did under identical circumstances. If j would have acted in a more unkind manner than i acted, then we say that j does not blame i for his behavior. If, however, j would have been nicer than i was, then we say that “j blames i” for his actions (i’s actions were blameworthy). We consider this notion a natural, intuitive and empirically relevant way to explain the motives of people engaged in reciprocal behavior. After developing the conceptual framework, we then test this concept in a laboratory experiment involving tournaments and find significant support for the theory.

Intention-based economic theories of reciprocity

In recent years, several experiments have shown individuals exhibit authentic reciprocal behaviour in anonymous one-shot interactions. As reciprocity has been shown to be relevant in several economic fields, there have also been several attempts to model reciprocal bahaviour. I review the intention-based models of reciprocity and present an example of teacher management in the public sector in which the government offers an incentive scheme to implement a program. The incentive scheme has a prisoner´s dilemma structure. In both simultaneous and sequential games, equilibrium results may differ from those predicted by standard theory.

Conformism and reciprocity in public good provision

People contribute more to experimental public goods the more others contribute, a tendency called “crowding-in.” We propose a novel experimental design to distinguish two possible causes of crowding-in: reciprocity, the usual explanation, and conformity, a neglected alternative. Subjects are given the opportunity to react to contributions of a payoff-irrelevant group, in addition to their own group. We find evidence of conformity, accounting for roughly 1/3 of crowding-in.