Towards a secure human-and-computer mutual authentication protocol

We blend research from human-computer interface (HCI) design with computational based crypto- graphic provable security. We explore the notion of practice-oriented provable security (POPS), moving the focus to a higher level of abstraction (POPS+) for use in providing provable security for security ceremonies involving humans. In doing so we high- light some challenges and paradigm shifts required to achieve meaningful provable security for a protocol which includes a human. We move the focus of security ceremonies from being protocols in their context of use, to the protocols being cryptographic building blocks in a higher level protocol (the security cere- mony), which POPS can be applied to. In order to illustrate the need for our approach, we analyse both a protocol proven secure in theory, and a similar proto- col implemented by a �nancial institution, from both HCI and cryptographic perspectives.

An hybrid approach for efficient multicast stream authentication over unsecured channels

We study the multicast stream authentication problem when an opponent can drop, reorder and inject data packets into the communication channel. In this context, bandwidth limitation and fast authentication are the core concerns. Therefore any authentication scheme is to reduce as much as possible the packet overhead and the time spent at the receiver to check the authenticity of collected elements. Recently, Tartary and Wang developed a provably secure protocol with small packet overhead and a reduced number of signature verifications to be performed at the receiver. In this paper, we propose an hybrid scheme based on Tartary and Wang’s approach and Merkle hash trees. Our construction will exhibit a smaller overhead and a much faster processing at the receiver making it even more suitable for multicast than the earlier approach. As Tartary and Wang’s protocol, our construction is provably secure and allows the total recovery of the data stream despite erasures and injections occurred during transmission.

Sealing the leak on classical NTRU signatures

Initial attempts to obtain lattice based signatures were closely related to reducing a vector modulo the fundamental parallelepiped of a secret basis (like GGH [9], or NTRUSign [12]). This approach leaked some information on the secret, namely the shape of the parallelepiped, which has been exploited on practical attacks [24]. NTRUSign was an extremely efficient scheme, and thus there has been a noticeable interest on developing countermeasures to the attacks, but with little success [6]. In [8] Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan proposed a randomized version of Babai’s nearest plane algorithm such that the distribution of a reduced vector modulo a secret parallelepiped only depended on the size of the base used. Using this algorithm and generating large, close to uniform, public keys they managed to get provably secure GGH-like lattice-based signatures. Recently, Stehlé and Steinfeld obtained a provably secure scheme very close to NTRUSign [26] (from a theoretical point of view). In this paper we present an alternative approach to seal the leak of NTRUSign. Instead of modifying the lattices and algorithms used, we do a classic leaky NTRUSign signature and hide it with gaussian noise using techniques present in Lyubashevky’s signatures. Our main contributions are thus a set of strong NTRUSign parameters, obtained by taking into account latest known attacks against the scheme, a statistical way to hide the leaky NTRU signature so that this particular instantiation of CVP-based signature scheme becomes zero-knowledge and secure against forgeries, based on the worst-case hardness of the O~(N1.5)-Shortest Independent Vector Problem over NTRU lattices. Finally, we give a set of concrete parameters to gauge the efficiency of the obtained signature scheme.

Modelling ciphersuite and version negotiation in the TLS protocol

Real-world cryptographic protocols such as the widely used Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol support many different combinations of cryptographic algorithms (called ciphersuites) and simultaneously support different versions. Recent advances in provable security have shown that most modern TLS ciphersuites are secure authenticated and confidential channel establishment (ACCE) protocols, but these analyses generally focus on single ciphersuites in isolation. In this paper we extend the ACCE model to cover protocols with many different sub-protocols, capturing both multiple ciphersuites and multiple versions, and define a security notion for secure negotiation of the optimal sub-protocol. We give a generic theorem that shows how secure negotiation follows, with some additional conditions, from the authentication property of secure ACCE protocols. Using this framework, we analyse the security of ciphersuite and three variants of version negotiation in TLS, including a recently proposed mechanism for detecting fallback attacks.

可证明安全性理论与方法研究

论述了可证明安全性理论在安全方案与安全协议的设计与分析中的应用，内容主要包括：什么是可证明安全性，可证明安全性理论涉及到的一些基本概念，RO（randomoracle）模型方法论的基本思想及其在公钥加密和数字签名等方案中的应用研究进展，标准模型下可证明安全性理论在公钥加密和数字签名等方案中的应用研究进展，以及可证明安全性理论在会话密钥分配协议的设计与分析中的应用研究进展．

一种可并行的消息认证码

提出并分析了一种确定的、可并行的消息认证码--DPMAC(deterministic parallelizable message authentication code).它基于分组长度为128-bit的分组密码来构造.使用一个密钥,可以处理任意长度的消息.在底层分组密码是伪随机置换的假设下,使用Game-Playing技术量化了攻击者成功伪造的概率,从而证明了其安全性.

一种可证明安全的消息认证码

消息认证码是保证消息完整性的重要工具,它广泛应用于各种安全系统中.随着可证明安全理论的逐渐成熟,具备可证明安全的消息认证码无疑成为人们的首选.本文基于XOR MAC和PMAC的构造方法,使用分组密码构造了一种确定性、可并行的消息认证码-DXOR MAC(Deterministic XOR MAC).在底层分组密码是伪随机置换的假设下,本文使用Game-Playing技术量化了攻击者成功伪造的概率,从而证明了其安全性.

改进的CBC模式及其安全性分析

针对CBC模式在分块适应性攻击模型下不安全这一问题，提出了一个新的分组密码工作模式。新方案引进了Gray码，改变了原有模式的输入方式，打乱了前后输出输入的内在联系。同时，利用规约的思想对其安全性进行了分析。结果表明，在所用分组密码是伪随机置换的条件下，方案在分块适应性攻击模型下是可证明安全的。

一个优化的分组密码的工作模式

作为基本工作模式OFB具有流密码的特点，它允许明文的分组单位长度小于分组密码的长度，从而可适应用户数据格式的需要。但当分组单位长度远远小于分组密码的长度时，此模式使用分组密码的效率不高。因为不管加密多短的明文块，每加密一块都要使用一次分组密码。为了提高其效率，引进了计数嚣和缓冲嚣，使分组密码的输出得到全部使用。同时为了增强安全性，改进了OFB模式的反馈输入方式，使得在P．Rogaway等人给出的强安全性定义（priv）下是可证明安全的，并用M．Bellare和V．Shoup的玩游戏的方法给出了一个自然、通俗易懂的证明。

WHIRLBOB, the Whirlpool Based Variant of STRIBOB: Lighter, Faster, and Constant Time

WHIRLBOB, also known as STRIBOBr2, is an AEAD (Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data) algorithm derived from STRIBOBr1 and the Whirlpool hash algorithm. WHIRLBOB/STRIBOBr2 is a second round candidate in the CAESAR competition. As with STRIBOBr1, the reduced-size Sponge design has a strong provable security link with a standardized hash algorithm. The new design utilizes only the LPS or ρ component of Whirlpool in flexibly domain-separated BLNK Sponge mode. The number of rounds is increased from 10 to 12 as a countermeasure against Rebound Distinguishing attacks. The 8 ×8 - bit S-Box used by Whirlpool and WHIRLBOB is constructed from 4 ×4 - bit “MiniBoxes”. We report on fast constant-time Intel SSSE3 and ARM NEON SIMD WHIRLBOB implementations that keep full miniboxes in registers and access them via SIMD shuffles. This is an efficient countermeasure against AES-style cache timing side-channel attacks. Another main advantage of WHIRLBOB over STRIBOBr1 (and most other AEADs) is its greatly reduced implementation footprint on lightweight platforms. On many lower-end microcontrollers the total software footprint of π+BLNK = WHIRLBOB AEAD is less than half a kilobyte. We also report an FPGA implementation that requires 4,946 logic units for a single round of WHIRLBOB, which compares favorably to 7,972 required for Keccak / Keyak on the same target platform. The relatively small S-Box gate count also enables efficient 64-bit bitsliced straight-line implementations. We finally present some discussion and analysis on the relationships between WHIRLBOB, Whirlpool, the Russian GOST Streebog hash, and the recent draft Russian Encryption Standard Kuznyechik.

Cryptanalysis of an efficient three-party password-based key exchange scheme

Three-party password-authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) protocols allow entities to negotiate a secret session key with the aid of a trusted server with whom they share a human-memorable password. Recently, Lou and Huang proposed a simple 3PAKE protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography, which is claimed to be secure and to provide superior efficiency when compared with similar-purpose solutions. In this paper, however, we show that the solution is vulnerable to key-compromise impersonation and offline password guessing attacks from system insiders or outsiders, which indicates that the empirical approach used to evaluate the scheme's security is flawed. These results highlight the need of employing provable security approaches when designing and analyzing PAKE schemes. Copyright (c) 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

PEPSI: Privacy-Enhanced Participatory Sensing Infrastructure.

Participatory Sensing combines the ubiquity of mobile phones with sensing capabilities of Wireless Sensor Networks. It targets pervasive collection of information, e.g., temperature, traffic conditions, or health-related data. As users produce measurements from their mobile devices, voluntary participation becomes essential. However, a number of privacy concerns -- due to the personal information conveyed by data reports -- hinder large-scale deployment of participatory sensing applications. Prior work on privacy protection, for participatory sensing, has often relayed on unrealistic assumptions and with no provably-secure guarantees. The goal of this project is to introduce PEPSI: a Privacy-Enhanced Participatory Sensing Infrastructure. We explore realistic architectural assumptions and a minimal set of (formal) privacy requirements, aiming at protecting privacy of both data producers and consumers. We design a solution that attains privacy guarantees with provable security at very low additional computational cost and almost no extra communication overhead.

Key reconciliation for high performance Quantum Key Distribution

Quantum Key Distribution is carving its place among the tools used to secure communications. While a difficult technology, it enjoys benefits that set it apart from the rest, the most prominent is its provable security based on the laws of physics. QKD requires not only the mastering of signals at the quantum level, but also a classical processing to extract a secret-key from them. This postprocessing has been customarily studied in terms of the efficiency, a figure of merit that offers a biased view of the performance of real devices. Here we argue that it is the throughput the significant magnitude in practical QKD, specially in the case of high speed devices, where the differences are more marked, and give some examples contrasting the usual postprocessing schemes with new ones from modern coding theory. A good understanding of its implications is very important for the design of modern QKD devices.