The European Commission and International Trade Negotiations: A Principal-Agent Approach. IES WORKING PAPER 2/2011

Starting from the concept of delegation of power in external trade policy, this paper aims to investigate the dynamics surrounding the European Union’s position in international trade negotiations. The analysis centres on the role of the European Commission (the agent), which by means of Treaty-based delegation and as mandated by the Council (the principal) acts as the sole trade negotiator in the international sphere on behalf of the European Union (EU). The broader negotiating process is thus conceptualised as a threelevel game, where the Commission holds an intermediary position between the European and international levels and also interacts with the Member States in the Council. After an insight into the European decision-making process for external trade, the paper further analyses the Commission’s role during the multilateral trade negotiations of the Doha Development Round. By applying the principal-agent theory to international trade negotiations in general, and subsequently to the controversial agricultural negotiations, this paper seeks to investigate some of the potential sources of autonomy that the Commission can draw upon while upholding an EU position at the international level, in addition to the “hardball” job of balancing the interests of the Member States with those of World Trade Organisation (WTO) partners. Along these lines, the paper finally aims to contribute to the literature concerning agency autonomy in EU external trade relations but also to provide a better understanding of inter-institutional relations within the EU as they may unfold in practice.

Memoirs of Vidocq, principal agent of the French police until 1827 [and now proprietor of the paper manufactory at St. Mandé]

Originally published in four volumes.

Memoir of the life and character of the Rev. Samuel Bacon, A.M., late : an officer of marines in the United States' service, afterwards, attorney at law in the state of Pennsylvania, and subsequently, a minister of the Episcopal Church, and principal agent of the American government for persons liberated from slave-ships, on the coast of Africa, where he terminated his life in the month of May, 1820 /

Goldsmiths'-Kress no. 23652.

Memoirs of Vidocq, principal agent of the French police until 1827 /

Tr. of: Les Memoires.

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Vertical relations and local competition : an empirical approach

The analysis of vertical industry relations forms an essential element in the field of industrial organization. This paper tests hypotheses derived from transaction cost theory and the principal-agent problem in Chile’s petrol market. It shows that local competition plays an important role in the choice of a disintegrated vertical structure, and that low levels of service investment have the same effect. Conversely, the number of own-brand outlets and a high level of investment in services reduce the probability of disintegration. The paper demonstrates that vertical disintegration has a null effect on wholesale petrol prices and a positive effect on retail petrol prices of between 1.6 and 7 per cent, depending on fuel type.

Strategische Erfolgsfaktoren für ein kosten-risiko-optimales Public Debt Management - Organisatorische und inhaltliche Parameter im internationalen Vergleich

Aus den im Rahmen dieser Forschungsarbeit empirisch gewonnenen Erkenntnissen werden Gestaltungsempfehlungen für das Public Debt Management abgeleitet. Diese zeigen, dass ein wirtschaftliches Public Debt Management nicht ein ausschließlich kostenminimierendes (sparsames), sondern ein kosten-risiko-optimales Public Debt Management mit effektiven internen und externen Überwachungsinstrumenten und wirksamer externer Finanzkontrolle sein muss.

Conflict, wages, and multiple equilibria

Firms’ compensation practices affect the protection of investors’ interests and the degree of economic inequality by changing the stakes of engaging in appropriation activities versus respecting the status quo. We use a general equilibrium model where workers can either work peacefully or join a guerrilla movement that expropriates entrepreneurs. If workers are peaceful, they receive a competitive wage. If they join a guerrilla movement, they receive a share of the appropriated wealth, which depends positively on the number of guerrilla members. In this framework, we find one low-income, low-wage equilibrium with guerrilla activity and one peaceful, high-income, high-wage equilibrium. The peaceful equilibrium can be reached through redistribution policies, which can be implemented at the firm level. In essence, through their compensation policies entrepreneurs, not the state might be able to protect their assets against expropriation and simultaneously control the internal principal-agent problem.

Essays on incentives, procurement and regulation

Esta tese é composta de três artigos. No primeiro artigo, "Simple Contracts under Simultaneous Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard", é considerado um problema de principal-agente sob a presença simultânea dos problemas de risco moral e seleção adversa, em que a dimensão de seleção adversa se dá sobre as distribuições de probabilidade condicionais as ações do agente. No segundo artigo, "Public-Private Partnerships in the Presence of Adverse Selection" é analisada a otimalidade de parcerias público-privadas sob a presença de seleção adversa. No terceiro artigo, "Regulation Under Stock Market Information Disclosure", por sua vez, é considerado o problema da regulação de firmas de capital aberto, onde as firmas possuem incentivos para mandar sinais opostos para o regulador e o mercado.

Towards a U.S. Army officer corps strategy for success : employing talent /

Efficient talent employment is at the core of the Army Officer Human Capital Model. However, the Army's current employment paradigm is unequal to the needs of a professional, volunteer Army facing the twin challenges of a competitive labor market and an increasingly complex global operating environment. It unduly prioritizes "fairness" when making assignments, has a narrowly defined pathway to senior leadership ranks, cannot see the talent it possesses, and suffers from severe principal-agent problems. Optimal employment theories, information age tools, and well-regulated market mechanisms can help the Army match individual officer talents against specific work requirements, reducing risk and achieving the depth and breadth of talent it needs, both now and in the future.

Petroleum taxation contingent on counter-factual investment behaviour

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We thank the referees for constructive suggestions. Thanks are due to Norwegian Research Council (Petrosam 2) for financial support.

Petroleum taxation contingent on counter-factual investment behaviour

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We thank the referees for constructive suggestions. Thanks are due to Norwegian Research Council (Petrosam 2) for financial support.

Hierarchical Forest Management Planning: A Bilevel Wood Supply Modelling Approach

Le processus de planification forestière hiérarchique présentement en place sur les terres publiques risque d’échouer à deux niveaux. Au niveau supérieur, le processus en place ne fournit pas une preuve suffisante de la durabilité du niveau de récolte actuel. À un niveau inférieur, le processus en place n’appuie pas la réalisation du plein potentiel de création de valeur de la ressource forestière, contraignant parfois inutilement la planification à court terme de la récolte. Ces échecs sont attribuables à certaines hypothèses implicites au modèle d’optimisation de la possibilité forestière, ce qui pourrait expliquer pourquoi ce problème n’est pas bien documenté dans la littérature. Nous utilisons la théorie de l’agence pour modéliser le processus de planification forestière hiérarchique sur les terres publiques. Nous développons un cadre de simulation itératif en deux étapes pour estimer l’effet à long terme de l’interaction entre l’État et le consommateur de fibre, nous permettant ainsi d’établir certaines conditions pouvant mener à des ruptures de stock. Nous proposons ensuite une formulation améliorée du modèle d’optimisation de la possibilité forestière. La formulation classique du modèle d’optimisation de la possibilité forestière (c.-à-d., maximisation du rendement soutenu en fibre) ne considère pas que le consommateur de fibre industriel souhaite maximiser son profit, mais suppose plutôt la consommation totale de l’offre de fibre à chaque période, peu importe le potentiel de création de valeur de celle-ci. Nous étendons la formulation classique du modèle d’optimisation de la possibilité forestière afin de permettre l’anticipation du comportement du consommateur de fibre, augmentant ainsi la probabilité que l’offre de fibre soit entièrement consommée, rétablissant ainsi la validité de l’hypothèse de consommation totale de l’offre de fibre implicite au modèle d’optimisation. Nous modélisons la relation principal-agent entre le gouvernement et l’industrie à l’aide d’une formulation biniveau du modèle optimisation, où le niveau supérieur représente le processus de détermination de la possibilité forestière (responsabilité du gouvernement), et le niveau inférieur représente le processus de consommation de la fibre (responsabilité de l’industrie). Nous montrons que la formulation biniveau peux atténuer le risque de ruptures de stock, améliorant ainsi la crédibilité du processus de planification forestière hiérarchique. Ensemble, le modèle biniveau d’optimisation de la possibilité forestière et la méthodologie que nous avons développée pour résoudre celui-ci à l’optimalité, représentent une alternative aux méthodes actuellement utilisées. Notre modèle biniveau et le cadre de simulation itérative représentent un pas vers l’avant en matière de technologie de planification forestière axée sur la création de valeur. L’intégration explicite d’objectifs et de contraintes industrielles au processus de planification forestière, dès la détermination de la possibilité forestière, devrait favoriser une collaboration accrue entre les instances gouvernementales et industrielles, permettant ainsi d’exploiter le plein potentiel de création de valeur de la ressource forestière.