A compilation of the messages and papers of the Presidents, 1789-1902,

UANL

Graduate School and University Center Archives Finding Aid - Record Group V-D: Presidents' Files: Kelly

This is part of the finding aid to the Graduate School and University Center (GSUC) Archives. Record Group V-D is the papers of William P. Kelly from when he was president of the GSUC (2005-2013).

Graduate School and University Center Archives Finding Aid - Record Group V-C: Presidents' Files: Horowitz

This is part of the finding aid to the Graduate School and University Center (GSUC) Archives. Record Group V-C is the papers of Frances Degen Horowitz from when she was president of the GSUC (1991-2005).

Graduate School and University Center Archives Finding Aid - Record Group V-B: Presidents' Files: Proshansky

This is part of the finding aid to the Graduate School and University Center (GSUC) Archives. Record Group V-B is the papers of Harold M. Proshansky from when he was president of the GSUC (1972-1990).

Graduate School and University Center Archives Finding Aid - Record Group V-A: Presidents' Files: Rees

This is part of the finding aid to the Graduate School and University Center (GSUC) Archives. Record Group V-A is the papers of Mina S. Rees from when she was president of the GSUC (1969-1972).

Graduate School and University Center Archives Finding Aid - Record Group V: Presidents' Files

This is part of the finding aid to the Graduate School and University Center (GSUC) Archives. Record Group V explains the record groups in the "Presidents' Files" series.

Presidents, assemblies, and accountability

Much research has explored the relationship between economics and elections, and scholars have begun to explore how institutions mediate that link. However, the relationship between presidential institutions and electoral accountability remains largely unexplored in comparative politics. Because voters in presidential systems can cast votes for executive and legislative elections separately, we have good reasons to suspect that the institutions of presidentialism might generate different forms or degrees of accountability than parliamentarism. Powell and Whitten (1993) suggest that the partisan or institutional “clarity of responsibility” might mediate the relationship between economics and elections: when responsibility for outcomes is clear, the relationship should be strong, and vice-versa. I develop this notion for use in presidential systems, and explore executive and legislative elections in 24 countries. The results indicate that economics always influences the incumbent vote in executive elections, regardless of the partisan or institutional clarity of responsibility. Economics also affects vote swings in legislative elections, but the institutional clarity of responsibility does mediate this relationship: legislative accountability for national economic outcomes is lowest when clarity of responsibility is highest, a situation that arises when the president is relatively more powerful and the bases for electing legislators and the president differ. By providing an empirical basis for a discussion of accountability under presidentialism, these findings contribute to important debates in comparative politics.

Changing local elite selection in Thailand : emergence of new local government presidents after direct elections and their capabilities

Before rural local government units were established in Thailand, reform debates within the country faced a crucial issue: Candidates at the rural sub-district levels might adopt electioneering methods such as vote buying and the patronage system of the local political and economic elite, the methods that had been used in the national elections. In fact, the results of the 2006 survey in this paper, which followed the introduction of direct elections in rural local government units in 2003, contrast with the result anticipated during the debates on political reform. The preliminary data of the survey shows that the decentralization process and the introduction of the direct election system in the rural areas had some effect in changing the selection process of the local elite in Thailand.

De part dels molt Illustres senyors Presidents y Concell del Batallò se notifica y fa a saber ab las presents als Iurats y Vniuersitats de Cover [i. e. Covet] que ... toca a pagar ... en la taula de Cervera ... en compte del Batallò

Notificación a los jurados y universidad de Covet de las 4 libras y 1 hombre en el repartimiento que les ha correspondido del Consell del Batalló

[Yearly salaries for 1737 to 1795 of the Presidents, 1796]

One leaf containing a handwritten list of the salaries of Harvard presidents for the years 1737 to 1795.

[Average salaries of the presidents and professors, 1803]

One leaf containing a handwritten list of figures comparing the salaries and grants received by Harvard Presidents and Professors for various time ranges from 1775 to 1803. The paper includes the inscription "Merrill 1st."