Tax evasion, inequality, and progressive taxes : a political economy perspective

The standard approach to tax compliance applies the economics-of-crime methodology pioneered by Becker (1968): in its first application, due to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) it models the behaviour of agents as a decision involving a choice of the extent of their income to report to tax authorities, given a certain institutional environment, represented by parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties in the event the agent is caught. While this basic framework yields important insights on tax compliance behavior, it has some critical limitations. Specifically, it indicates a level of compliance that is significantly below what is observed in the data. This thesis revisits the original framework with a view towards addressing this issue, and examining the political economy implications of tax evasion for progressivity in the tax structure. The approach followed involves building a macroeconomic, dynamic equilibrium model for the purpose of examining these issues, by using a step-wise model building procedure starting with some very simple variations of the basic Allingham and Sandmo construct, which are eventually integrated to a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations framework with heterogeneous agents. One of the variations involves incorporating the Allingham and Sandmo construct into a two-period model of a small open economy of the type originally attributed to Fisher (1930). A further variation of this simple construct involves allowing agents to initially decide whether to evade taxes or not. In the event they decide to evade, the agents then have to decide the extent of income or wealth they wish to under-report. We find that the ‘evade or not’ assumption has strikingly different and more realistic implications for the extent of evasion, and demonstrate that it is a more appropriate modeling strategy in the context of macroeconomic models, which are essentially dynamic in nature, and involve consumption smoothing across time and across various states of nature. Specifically, since deciding to undertake tax evasion impacts on the consumption smoothing ability of the agent by creating two states of nature in which the agent is ‘caught’ or ‘not caught’, there is a possibility that their utility under certainty, when they choose not to evade, is higher than the expected utility obtained when they choose to evade. Furthermore, the simple two-period model incorporating an ‘evade or not’ choice can be used to demonstrate some strikingly different political economy implications relative to its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart. In variations of the two models that allow for voting on the tax parameter, we find that agents typically choose to vote for a high degree of progressivity by choosing the highest available tax rate from the menu of choices available to them. There is, however, a small range of inequality levels for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a relatively low value of the tax rate. The final steps in the model building procedure involve grafting the two-period models with a political economy choice into a dynamic overlapping generations setting with more general, non-linear tax schedules and a ‘cost-of evasion’ function that is increasing in the extent of evasion. Results based on numerical simulations of these models show further improvement in the model’s ability to match empirically plausible levels of tax evasion. In addition, the differences between the political economy implications of the ‘evade or not’ version of the model and its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart are now very striking; there is now a large range of values of the inequality parameter for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a low degree of progressivity. This is because, in the ‘evade or not’ version of the model, low values of the tax rate encourages a large number of agents to choose the ‘not-evade’ option, so that the redistributive mechanism is more ‘efficient’ relative to the situations in which tax rates are high. Some further implications of the models of this thesis relate to whether variations in the level of inequality, and parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties for tax evasion matter for the political economy results. We find that (i) the political economy outcomes for the tax rate are quite insensitive to changes in inequality, and (ii) the voting outcomes change in non-monotonic ways in response to changes in the probability of detection and penalty rates. Specifically, the model suggests that changes in inequality should not matter, although the political outcome for the tax rate for a given level of inequality is conditional on whether there is a large or small or large extent of evasion in the economy. We conclude that further theoretical research into macroeconomic models of tax evasion is required to identify the structural relationships underpinning the link between inequality and redistribution in the presence of tax evasion. The models of this thesis provide a necessary first step in that direction.

Political selection and the relative age effect

In this paper we present substantial evidence for the existence of a bias in the distribution of births of leading US politicians in favor of those that have been the oldest in their cohort at school. This “relative age effect” has been proven to influence performance at school and in sports,but evidence on its impact on people’s vocational success has been rare. We find a marked break in the density of birthdate of politicians using a maximum likelihood test and McCrary’s (2008) nonparametric test. We conjecture that being relatively old in a peer group may create long term advantages which can create a significant role in the ability to succeed in a highly competitive environment like the race for top political offices in the USA. The magnitude of the effect we estimate is larger than what most other studies on the relative age effect for a broader (adult) population find, but is in general in line with studies that look at populations in high-competition environments.

Industry policy, finance and the AIDC : Australia from the 1950s to the 1970s

This thesis, conceived within a Marxist framework, addresses key conceptual issues in the writing and theorising on industry policy in post second world- war Australia. Broadly, the thesis challenges the way that industry policy on the left of politics (reflected in the social democratic and Keynesian positions) has been constructed as a practical, progressive policy agenda. Specifically, the thesis poses a direct challenge to the primacy of the ‘national’ in interpreting the history of industry policy. The challenge is to the proposition that conflicts between national industry and international finance arose only from the mid 1980s. On the contrary, as will be seen, this is a 1960s issue and any interpretation of the debates and the agendas surrounding industry policy in the 1980s must be predicated on an understanding of how the issue was played out two decades earlier. As was the case in the 1960s, industry policy in the 1980s has been isolated from two key areas of interrogation: the role of the nation state in regulating accumulation and the role of finance in industry policy. In the 1950s and more so in the 1960s and early 1970s there was a reconfiguration of financing internationally but it is one that did not enter into industry policy analysis. The central concern therefore is to simultaneously sketch the historical political economy on industry policy from the 1950s through to the early 1970s in Australia and to analytically and empirically insert the role of finance into that history. In so doing the thesis addresses the economic and social factors that shaped the approach to industry finance in Australia during this critical period. The analysis is supported by a detailed examination of political and industry debates surrounding the proposal for, and institution of, a key national intervention in the form of the Australian Industry Development Corporation (AIDC).

Redistribution and technology adoption under uncertainty : a political economy perspective

We examine the role of politico-economic influences on macroeconomic performance within the framework of an endogenous growth model with costly technology adoption and uncertainty. The model is aimed at understanding the diversity in growth and inequality experiences across countries. Agents adopt either of two risky technologies, one of which is only available through financial intermediaries, who are able to alleviate some of this risk. The entry cost of financial intermediation depends on the proportion of government revenue that is allocated towards cost-reducing financial development expenditure, and agents vote on this proportion. The results show that agents at the top and bottom ends of the distribution prefer alternative means of re-distribution, thereby effectively blocking the allocation of resources towards cost-reducing financial development expenditure. Thus political factors have a role in delaying financial and capital deepening and economic development. Furthermore, the model provides a political-economy perspective on the Kuznets curve; uncertainty interacts with the political economy mechanism to produce transitional inequality patterns that, depending on initial conditions, can unearth the Kuznets-curve experience. Finally, the political outcomes are inefficient relative to policies aimed at maximizing the collective welfare of agents in the economy.

The value of political connections : evidence from Korean chaebols

This thesis examines the value of political connections for business groups by constructing a unique dataset that allows us to identify the form and extent of the connections. Results show firms' membership to family-controlled business groups (South Korean chaebol) play a key role in determining the value of political connections. Politically connected chaebol firms experience substantial price increases following the establishment of the connection than other firms, but the reverse is found for other (non-family-controlled) connected business groups.

Essays in the political economy of voting and reforms

This thesis presents four essays in the political economy of elections and reforms. The first study exploits discontinuities around school entry cut-off dates to show that early childhood conditions can impact the probability to become a top-flight politician. The second study provides empirical estimates of the effect of sequential voting on turnout and bandwagon voting outside the laboratory. The third work describes a novel nonparametric strategy to identify tactical voting patterns directly from balloting results using British election data. Finally, a study is put forward that examines the political feasibility of reforms.

Institutional investors, political connections and analyst following in Malaysia

We examine the association between institutional ownership, political connections, and analyst following in Malaysia from 1999 to 2009. Based on 940 firm-year observations, we document a positive relation between institutional ownership, particularly by Employees Provident Fund (EPF), and analyst following, thus supporting the governance role that institutional investors play in promoting corporate transparency. However, there is no evidence that political connections matter to analyst following. The monitoring role of institutional investors, including EPF, does not appear to be any different between politically connected and non-connected firms.

Born leaders: Political selection and the relative age effect in the US Congress

We present substantial evidence for the existence of a bias in the distribution of births of leading US politicians in favour of those who were the eldest in their cohort at school. This result adds to the research on the long-term effects of relative age among peers at school. We discuss parametric and non-parametric tests to identify this effect, and we show that it is not driven by measurement error, redshirting or a sorting effect of highly educated parents. The magnitude of the effect that we estimate is larger than what other studies on ‘relative age effects’ have found for broader populations but is in general consistent with research that looks at professional sportsmen. We also find that relative age does not seem to correlate with the quality of elected politicians.

Studies on Binary Time Series Models with Applications to Empirical Macroeconomics and Finance

This thesis studies binary time series models and their applications in empirical macroeconomics and finance. In addition to previously suggested models, new dynamic extensions are proposed to the static probit model commonly used in the previous literature. In particular, we are interested in probit models with an autoregressive model structure. In Chapter 2, the main objective is to compare the predictive performance of the static and dynamic probit models in forecasting the U.S. and German business cycle recession periods. Financial variables, such as interest rates and stock market returns, are used as predictive variables. The empirical results suggest that the recession periods are predictable and dynamic probit models, especially models with the autoregressive structure, outperform the static model. Chapter 3 proposes a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for the usefulness of the autoregressive structure of the probit model. The finite sample properties of the LM test are considered with simulation experiments. Results indicate that the two alternative LM test statistics have reasonable size and power in large samples. In small samples, a parametric bootstrap method is suggested to obtain approximately correct size. In Chapter 4, the predictive power of dynamic probit models in predicting the direction of stock market returns are examined. The novel idea is to use recession forecast (see Chapter 2) as a predictor of the stock return sign. The evidence suggests that the signs of the U.S. excess stock returns over the risk-free return are predictable both in and out of sample. The new "error correction" probit model yields the best forecasts and it also outperforms other predictive models, such as ARMAX models, in terms of statistical and economic goodness-of-fit measures. Chapter 5 generalizes the analysis of univariate models considered in Chapters 2 4 to the case of a bivariate model. A new bivariate autoregressive probit model is applied to predict the current state of the U.S. business cycle and growth rate cycle periods. Evidence of predictability of both cycle indicators is obtained and the bivariate model is found to outperform the univariate models in terms of predictive power.

Oligarchs, political regime changes, and firm valuation

This paper examines the impact of a regime shift on the valuation of politically powerful oligarch firms. Focusing on the Yeltsin-Putin regime shift in Russia, we find that the valuations of outside shareholders claims are significantly higher under the Putin regime than under the Yeltsin regime after controlling for industry and time effects. The findings suggest that the increasing cost of extracting private benefits outweigh the reduction in the value of political connections following the political regime change. The results are also consistent with changes in the risk of state expropriation. Our results show that effects driven by the political regime change complement the traditional view stating that increased ownership concentration improved the performance of Russian oligarch firms.

Political Risk in Credit Evaluation: Empirical Studies and Survey Results

Financing trade between economic agents located in different countries is affected by many types of risks, resulting from incomplete information about the debtor, the problems of enforcing international contracts, or the prevalence of political and financial crises. Trade is important for economic development and the availability of trade finance is essential, especially for developing countries. Relatively few studies treat the topic of political risk, particularly in the context of international lending. This thesis explores new ground to identify links between political risk and international debt defaults. The core hypothesis of the study is that the default probability of debt increases with increasing political risk in the country of the borrower. The thesis consists of three essays that support the hypothesis from different angles of the credit evaluation process. The first essay takes the point of view of an international lender assessing the credit risk of a public borrower. The second investigates creditworthiness assessment of companies. The obtained results are substantiated in the third essay that deals with an extensive political risk survey among finance professionals in developing countries. The financial instruments of core interest are export credit guaranteed debt initiated between the Export Credit Agency of Finland and buyers in 145 countries between 1975 and 2006. Default events of the foreign credit counterparts are conditioned on country-specific macroeconomic variables, corporate-specific accounting information as well as political risk indicators from various international sources. Essay 1 examines debt issued to government controlled institutions and conditions public default events on traditional macroeconomic fundamentals, in addition to selected political and institutional risk factors. Confirming previous research, the study finds country indebtedness and the GDP growth rate to be significant indicators of public default. Further, it is shown that public defaults respond to various political risk factors. However, the impact of the risk varies between countries at different stages of economic development. Essay 2 proceeds by investigating political risk factors as conveivable drivers of corporate default and uses traditional accounting variables together with new political risk indicators in the credit evaluation of private debtors. The study finds links between corporate default and leverage, as well as between corporate default and the general investment climate and measeures of conflict in the debtor country. Essay 3 concludes the thesis by offering survey evidence on the impact of political risk on debt default, as perceived and experienced by 103 finance professionals in 38 developing countries. Taken together, the results of the thesis suggest that various forms of political risk are associated with international debt defaults and continue to pose great concerns for both international creditors and borrowers in developing countries. The study provides new insights on the importance of variable selection in country risk analysis, and shows how political risk is actually perceived and experienced in the riskier, often lower income countries of the global economy.